Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 23STCV27879, Date: 2024-08-28 Tentative Ruling

Hearing Date: August 28, 2024

Case Name: Ornelas v. Lopez, et al.

Case No.: 23STCV11755

Matter: Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendant Christen Lopez

Responding Party: Plaintiff Carlos Ornelas

Notice: OK

Ruling: The Motion to Strike is denied.

Moving party to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly 

encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

On May 24, 2023, Plaintiff Carlos Ornelas filed the operative Complaint against Defendants American Honda Motor Co. and Christen Lopez for (1) negligence, (2) strict products liability, (3) breach of implied warranty, and (4) negligence—products liability.  

Lopez now seeks to strike the Complaint’s references to punitive damages.  Lopez contends that “Plaintiff has only alleged that Defendant was under the influence when the subject accident occurred. It is well established that merely alleging a defendant was under the influence while driving, without more, does not support a request for punitive damages.”

Motions to strike are used to challenge defects in the pleadings not subject to demurrer.  Any party may move to strike the whole or any part of a pleading within the time allotted to respond to the pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435(b)(1).)  The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the Court is required to take judicial notice.  (Id. § 437(a).)  The Court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.  (Id. § 436.)  An “irrelevant” matter includes any “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.”  (Id. § 431.10(b)(3), (c); see also Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1036-1042.)

Punitive damages are available when the plaintiff establishes oppression, fraud, or malice by clear and convincing evidence.  (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)  

Malice means “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).)  In this context, despicable conduct is conduct considered “so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Oppression means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”  (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).)  Fraud means “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”  (Id. § 3294(c)(3).)

“As nonintentional torts support punitive damages when the defendant's conduct ‘involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others,’ our focus is on malice and oppression.”  (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.)

“[M]alice does not require actual intent to harm. (Id. at p. 895, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854.) Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences. (Id. at pp. 895–896, 157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854.) Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication through indirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.”  (Angie M. v. Superior Ct. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228.)

Lopez is a Defendant only for the first cause of action for negligence.  Plaintiff alleges that Lopez struck the rear of his vehicle and “[t]he violence of the collision caused Plaintiff to suffer, among other injuries, burst fractures of his T11 and T12 vertebrae with severe spinal cord compression, spinal cord edema, rib fractures, and rendered him a paraplegic. Plaintiff suffered severe life-altering injuries.”  Plaintiff further alleges that Lopez was inattentively driving under the influence and at excessive speeds. 

“There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [ ] One who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.”  (Taylor v. Superior Ct. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896–97.)

A plaintiff must “plead[ ] specific facts from which the conscious disregard of probable injury to others may reasonably be inferred. Justice Franson aptly noted the distinction in his article on punitive damages in vehicle accident cases: ‘(A)llegations of intoxication, excessive speed, driving with defective equipment or the running of a stop signal, without more, do not state a cause of action for punitive damages. (Par.) On the other hand, if the facts show that the defendant intentionally drove his vehicle at a high speed into an intersection crowded with pedestrians, or if he drove at a high speed through a crowded residential area where children were playing in the street, a legitimate inference of actual malice perhaps could arise. This would be particularly true if the defendant had not been drinking, or, if drinking, he was not under the influence to the point where he was incapable of being aware of the situation confronting him. Under these circumstances, it reasonably might be said that the defendant acted in such an outrageous and reprehensible manner that the jury could infer that he knowingly disregarded the substantial certainty of injury to others.”  (Dawes v. Superior Ct. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 90.)

Here, it is alleged that “witness accounts saw Defendant LOPEZ exit his/her vehicle with a blue nitrous tank in hand, leave the nitrous tank on the sidewalk, run away, but then later return to the vehicle.”  (Compl. ¶ 30.)  The allegations are sufficient to the extent Plaintiff pleads that Lopez (1) was intoxicated; (2) was driving at excessive speeds; (3) was driving in an inattentive fashion; and (4) attempted to flee from the scene.  (Cf. Pelletti v. Membrila (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 606, 611–12 [“[I]n the case at bench the evidence was sufficient to support the charge of wilful misconduct on both grounds. Defendant's conduct contained the following elements: (1) intoxication; (2) speed excessive for the time and place and condition of the driver, as indicated by the testimony on swerving and by 116 feet of skid marks; (3) gross inattentiveness or gross incapacity in not seeing a pedestrian directly under a street light until 35 feet away; (4) flight from the scene, as direct evidence of defendant's indifference to the point of recklessness to the welfare of others. The concatenation of these factors provided sufficient basis to submit the issue of wilful misconduct to the jury.”].)

Therefore, the Motion to Strike is denied. 

Moving party to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.