Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: 24STCV06139, Date: 2024-07-30 Tentative Ruling

Hearing Date: July 30, 2024

Case Name: Jamgotchian, et al. v. DONE! Ventures, LLC, et al.

Case No.: 24STCV05004

Matter: Anti-SLAPP Motion 

Moving Party: Plaintiffs Jerry Jamgotchian, El Segundo Plaza Associates L.P., and Theta 

Holding IV, Inc.

Responding Party: Defendant DONE! Ventures, LLC

Notice: OK

Ruling: The Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted.

Done! to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly 

encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In case no. BC674357, on February 7, 2023, a jury entered verdicts in favor of Plaintiffs DONE! Ventures, LLC (“Done!”) and Coastal Laundromat, Inc. (“Coastal”), and against Defendants Jerry Jamgotchian, El Segundo Plaza Associates L.P. (“ESPA”), and Theta Holding IV, Inc. (“Theta”) for Plaintiffs’ claims for interference with contract, negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of contract.

On May 8, 2023, the Court entered a “judgment” on the verdict.  

On July 12, 2023, the Court ruled on a motion for new trial/JNOV, stating that the amount of punitive damages awarded by the jury was improper and that Coastal was either to stipulate to $525,000 or else the Court would grant a new trial only as to the amount of punitive damages.  Coastal stipulated to taking less punitive damages.

On September 5, 2023, the Court ruled on Coastal’s motion for attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest.  Prejudgment interest was rejected, but the Court awarded $357,673 in fees.

On February 6, 2024, the Court entered a final ruling denying Defendants’ motion to tax costs with respect to Done!.  That ruling also rejected prejudgment interest for Done!.  

On February 27, 2024, the Court entered an “amended judgment”, which reduced the amount of punitive damages to be obtained by Done! and indicated the amount of fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to be awarded as discussed above.  

On March 27, 2024, the Court denied Defendants’ request to amend the February 27, 2024, judgment as follows: “(1) amend title of the Court’s February 27, 2024, judgment to read ‘Final Judgment’ and not its current incorrect and misleading title, ‘Amended Judgment,’ (2) Amend the date of the Court’s award of post-judgment interest from May 8, 2023 (date of the Court’s interim, non-final jury verdict judgment) to the date of final judgment, or February 27, 2024 (the date the Court signed final judgment in this case, erroneously entitled ‘Amended Judgment,’ as above), as the May 8, 2023 interim judgment is void and no longer has any force and effect by operation of law.”  The Court also denied Defendants’ request to quash  “all outstanding levies issued under the Court’s interim - and now void and unenforceable - May 8, 2023 jury verdict judgment.”  

On December 12, 2023, Jamgotchian, ESPA, and Theta filed case no. 23STCV31285 against Coastal, Bruce Nye, and Sonja Nye for (1) slander of title, (2) quiet title, (3) defamation, (4) libel per se, (5) intentional interference with contractual relations, and (6) negligent interference with contractual relations. 

On February 27, 2024, Jamgotchian, ESPA, and Theta filed the instant action—case no. 24STCV05004—against Done! for (1) slander of title, (2) quiet title, (3) defamation, (4) libel per se, (5) intentional interference with contractual relations, and (6) negligent interference with contractual relations.  Essentially, Jamgotchian and his entities have now elevated their contentions about a premature judgment to separate lawsuits.  The basis for all of their claims is that the entire enforcement proceedings in BC674357 were invalid and premature, which has been rejected by the Court multiple times. 

On June 14, 2024, the Court related case nos. BC674357, 23STCV31285, and 24STCV05004. 

Done! now asserts an Anti-SLAPP Motion or Special Motion to Strike the entirety of the Complaint pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16.

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets forth the procedure governing anti-SLAPP motions.  In pertinent part, the statute states, “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1).)  The purpose of the statute is to identify and dispose of lawsuits brought to chill the valid exercise of a litigant’s constitutional right of petition or free speech.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a); Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055-1056.)

Courts employ a two-step process to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions.  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.)  To invoke the protections of the statute, the defendant must first show that the challenged lawsuit arises from protected activity, such as an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.  (Ibid.)  From this fact, courts “ ‘presume the purpose of the action was to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.  It is then up to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption by showing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In determining whether the plaintiff has carried this burden, the trial court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(2); see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (“Soukup”).)

1. Protected Activity 

To meet its burden for the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Done! must demonstrate that the Complaint’s causes of action arise from protected activity.  That is, it must be that “defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) . . . ‘the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause’ or ‘the at which forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action’ must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ ”  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 (internal citations omitted).)  

An “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e).)

Here, all causes of action are premised on the enforcement proceedings in BC674357.  Indeed, the Complaint states: “At the time of the filing and issuance of each of the Abstract of Judgment, ORAPs, Writ of Execution and Notices of Levy, there was no final enforceable judgment in the Underlying Action which is a legal requirement before any Abstract of Judgment, ORAP, Writ of Execution and/or Notice of Levy can be filed, recorded and maintained. The ‘judgment’ to which the Abstract of Judgment, ORAPs, Writ of Execution and Notices of Levy relate was not a final enforceable judgment by legal definition . . .”  (Compl. ¶ 15.)  Plaintiffs allege that, because of these supposed premature filings, they “suffer and continue to suffer financial damage in the form of, among other things, loss of property marketability, loss of market value, loss of business, loss of current and prospective economic relationships, damage to credit rating, inability to borrow money, inability to secure an appellate bond, the costs and legal fees in bringing the instant action to quiet title, and failed attempts at refinancing certain of Plaintiffs’ real properties . . . .”  (Compl. ¶  21.)

The actions taken to enforce the judgment in BC674357, including the filing of abstracts of judgment, ORAPS, and writs of execution, are protected activity within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(1)-(2). (See, e.g., O'Neil-Rosales v. Citibank (S. Dakota) N.A. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 6. [“privileged or not, defendants’ acts of obtaining an abstract of judgment and recording it as a real property lien fell within the categories of section 425.16, subdivision (e).  Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713 [‘ “Any act” includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action’].)”].)  Indeed, “claims for . . . a wrongful levy of execution on plaintiff's property [ ] are subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.”  (Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Guide 2024) Ch. 7(II)-B.)

Jamgotchian and his entities argue that their claims for quiet title and other equitable relief would not be subject to the anti-SLAPP Motion because the litigation privilege only targets tort damages.

This lacks merit.  The equitable claims at issue essentially challenge the force and effect of the judgment in BC674357, and this undoubtedly relates to protected petitioning activity.  (See, e.g., Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 286–87 [“paragraphs 33, 38, and 45 set forth what Hoffman is alleged to have done that gives rise to the quiet title, cancellation of instrument, and slander of title causes of action; each of those paragraphs complains about Hoffman's recording of the 2018 Abstract of Judgment . .  . .  Hoffman has demonstrated that the conduct about which the Weedens complain . . . is Hoffman's conduct in obtaining and recording the 2018 Abstract of Judgment, which the Weedens concede is protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).”].)  Jamgotchian also fails to recognize that the scopes of CCP § 425.16(e) and the litigation privilege are not identical.   (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323.)

The Court concludes that Done! has carried its burden to show that the Complaint arises from protected activity under CCP § 425.16(e)(1)-(2).    

2. Minimal Merit

On the second component of the analysis, courts employ a “summary-judgment-like” procedure, “accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the defendant’s evidence only to determine whether the defendant has defeated the plaintiff’s evidence as a matter of law.”  (Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 444.)  In other words, the Court does not assess credibility, and the plaintiff is not required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.  The Court accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, who need only establish that his or her claim has “minimal merit” to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.  (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.)

Here, the subject causes of action are premised on the assertion that the enforcement proceedings/actions in BC674357 were wrongful because they were based on a premature judgment.  This has been rejected at least a half-dozen times in BC674357.  Jamgotchian and his entities are well aware of this Court’s reasoning and can refer to the rulings in BC674357, all of which are incorporated herein by reference.  Based on these rulings, the Court concludes that there is no possibility of Jamgotchian and his entities prevailing herein and that there are no triable issues of fact.

Thus, the Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted.  The entirety of the Complaint is stricken.  

Done! to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic.