Judge: Kevin C. Brazile, Case: BC715031, Date: 2022-10-04 Tentative Ruling

Hearing Date: October 4, 2022

Case Name: Navarro, et al. v. Sensenstein, et al.

Case No.: 22STCV18830 

Matter: Anti-SLAPP Motion 

Moving Party: Defendants Angelica Sensenstein and Ana Sensenstein, individually and

as trustee of the Ana Sensenstein Family Trust

Responding Party: Unopposed

Notice: OK


Ruling: The Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted.


Moving parties to give notice.


If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly 

encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 



This is a landlord-tenant dispute.  On June 29, 2022, Plaintiffs Marbela Navarro, by and through her guardian ad litem Eduardo Navarro, and Gabriel Navarro, by and through his guardian ad litem Eduardo Navarro filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging twenty-three causes of action against Defendants Angelica Sensenstein and Ana Sensenstein, individually and as trustee of the Ana Sensenstein Family Trust.

Defendants now bring an Anti-SLAPP Motion as to the FAC’s twenty-first cause of action for violation of retaliatory eviction and anti-harassment ordinance.  Alternatively, Defendants seek to strike “Paragraph 402, subpart a, on unnumbered page, lines 11-12[ ] and [ ] Paragraph 402, subpart b, on unnumbered page, line [1]3”, which relate to retaliatory eviction.



Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets forth the procedure governing anti-SLAPP motions.  In pertinent part, the statute states, “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1).)  The purpose of the statute is to identify and dispose of lawsuits brought to chill the valid exercise of a litigant’s constitutional right of petition or free speech.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a); Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055-1056.)

Courts employ a two-step process to evaluate anti-SLAPP motions.  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61.)  To invoke the protections of the statute, the defendant must first show that the challenged lawsuit arises from protected activity, such as an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.  (Ibid.)  From this fact, courts “ ‘presume the purpose of the action was to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.  It is then up to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption by showing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.’ ”  (Ibid.)  In determining whether the plaintiff has carried this burden, the trial court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(2); see Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (“Soukup”).)


To meet their burden for the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Defendants must demonstrate that the twenty-first cause of action arises from protected activity.  That is, it must be that “defendant’s conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) . . . ‘the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause’ or ‘the at which forms the basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action’ must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ ”  (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 63 (internal citations omitted).)  

An “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e).)

The twenty-first cause of action relates to a number of wrongs, including retaliatory eviction, which arises from protected activity, and other misconduct, for example, failing to do repairs in bad faith, which is unprotected.  The only protected activity relates to the allegations of retaliatory eviction, which pertain to the filing of an unlawful detainer action.  (Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Assocs. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1479-80.)  As no opposition was filed, this argument is conceded.  (See DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566.)  Defendants have partially carried their burden on the first prong of the anti-SLAPP framework—specifically, with respect to the allegations of retaliatory eviction only.


On the second component of the analysis, courts employ a “summary-judgment-like” procedure, “accepting as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff and evaluating the defendant’s evidence only to determine whether the defendant has defeated the plaintiff’s evidence as a matter of law.”  (Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 435, 444.)  In other words, the Court does not assess credibility, and the plaintiff is not required to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.  The Court accepts as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, who need only establish that his or her claim has “minimal merit” to avoid being stricken as a SLAPP.  (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 291.)

Because no opposition was filed, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden.  Therefore, the Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted.  Specifically, all allegations of retaliatory eviction are stricken from the twenty-first cause of action.  The Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

As prevailing parties, Defendants request $3,660 in fees and costs, but the Court awards $2,760.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1).)  

Moving parties to give notice.

If counsel do not submit on the tentative, they are strongly encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect rather than in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 




Case Number: BC715031    Hearing Date: October 4, 2022    Dept: 20

Tentative Ruling

Judge Kevin C. Brazile

Department 20