Judge Kristin S. Escalante , Case 20STCV20159 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Kristin S. Escalante , Case: 20STCV20159, Date: 2022-09-09 Tentative Ruling

DEPARTMENT 24 - LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Submission Instructions.

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Demurrer of Defendants Redondo Pier Inn and Rina Mehta to the first, third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED.

However, on the court’s own motion, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subd. (a)(b)(2), the court sets an order to show cause for why the court should not grant judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend as to the sixth cause of action for public nuisance. For the reasons stated below, the complaint does not plead a public nuisance. The hearing on the OSC is set for November 2, 2022 at 8:30 a.m. The Case Management Conference is also set for that date and time.

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she checked into the Redondo Beach Inn on July 1, 2018. Soon after, she discovered her room was infested with cockroaches. She complained to management but was not offered a new room. She nonetheless stayed overnight, checking out the next morning. A few days later, Plaintiff was diagnosed with bed bug bites. A health inspector later informed her that bed bugs had been found in the building.

Plaintiff alleges that the hotel had had a longstanding history with bed bugs. Defendants deliberately and recklessly chose not to inspect or otherwise ensure that Plaintiff’s room was free of bed bugs, and willfully disregarded knowledge of the prior bed bug infestation. Defendants had failed to eradicate a prior bed bug infestation, and did not ensure that Plaintiff’s room was free of bed bugs despite knowledge of a prior infestation.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants deliberately chose not to notify Plaintiff of the presence of bed bugs in her room. Instead, despite knowledge of an earlier bed bug infestation, Defendants deliberately and recklessly chose to turn a blind eye to the infestation and its impact on guests. Management did not place adequate safeguards to protect clients from ongoing bed bug exposure.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants rented the room to Plaintiff despite having knowledge that there was a bed bug infestation present in the hotel and specifically in Plaintiff’s room. Defendants concealed this bed bug infestation and deliberately chose not to notify Plaintiff of it upon her arrival.

Defendants’ actions demonstrated an extreme indifference and reckless disregard for the health and safety of its guests.

Plaintiff alleges claims for battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent concealment, private nuisance, and public nuisance. She seeks general and specific damages, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest.

Defendants Redondo Pier Inn and Rina Mehta demurrer to each of the causes of action.

“The elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) the defendant touched the plaintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) the plaintiff was harmed or offended by the defendant's conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have been offended by the touching.” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 879, 890.)

Defendants demur to this claim on the ground that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Redondo Pier Inn intended to harm or offend Plaintiff. A plaintiff can prove intent to harm by proving that the defendant acted with willful disregard for the harm that a plaintiff was likely to suffer because of the defendant’s actions. (Ashcraft v. King (1991) 288 Cal.App.3d 604, 613). Further, “every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of [the person’s] acts. Thus, a person who acts willfully may be said to intend those consequences which . . . are known to be substantially certain to result” from the person’s actions. (Gomez v. Acquistapace (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 740, 746).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Redondo Pier Inn knew that the room assigned to Plaintiff had a bed bug infestation yet rented it to her anyway, in willful and reckless disregard for her rights. For purposes of this demurrer, the court can infer that a natural and probable consequence of knowingly renting a room infested with bed bugs to an overnight guest is that the bed bugs will have contact with the overnight guest’s body, and that the overnight guest would find that touching offensive. Accordingly, the court concludes that the allegations are sufficient to plead intent.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress.” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc., (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 994, 1007).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged outrageous behavior because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that Defendants behaved with reckless disregard of the substantial certainty of a severe emotional injury. Again, Plaintiff alleges that Redondo Pier Inn rented her a room that it knew was infested with bed bugs. The court concludes that this behavior is sufficiently outrageous to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Further, the allegations in the complaint are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to support an inference that Redondo Pier Inn acted with reckless disregard of the fact that an overnight guest who encounters a bed bug infestation in the room would be substantially certain to suffer a sufficiently severe emotional injury.

To state a claim for fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: (1) the “concealment of a material fact by defendant;” (2) the defendant’s “duty to disclose that fact to the plaintiff;” (3) the defendant “concealed the fact with an intent to induce reliance by the plaintiff;” (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did with knowledge of the concealed fact;” and (5) plaintiff suffered injury as a result. (Doe v. Superior Ct.(2015) 237 Cal. App. 4th 239, 244.)

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not alleged the elements with sufficient particularity. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew the room that they were renting her was infested with bedbugs, that Defendants concealed this fact from Plaintiff in order to induce her to rent the room, that Plaintiff would not have rented the room had she known of the infestation and therefore relied on the concealment, and that Plaintiff was injured as a result. The facts are alleged with a sufficient degree of particularity to state a claim.

To state a claim for private nuisance, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the defendant interfered with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property; (2) that “the invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the use and enjoyment of the land was substantial, i.e., that it cause[d] the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage”; (3) “the interference was unreasonable, i.e., it must be ‘of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Chase v. Wizman (2021) 71 Cal. App. 5th 244.)

First, Defendants argue that the nuisance claim is duplicative of the negligence claim. But a plaintiff may plead multiple legal theories for injuries arising out an invasion of a single primary right. The cases cited by Defendants support this conclusion. For example, in Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water District (1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d 92, 101 the court observed: “In California, it is settled that where negligent conduct, i.e., conduct that violates a duty of care toward another, also interferes with another's free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” The fact that the claims may be duplicative does not mean that the nuisance claim should be dismissed.

Second, Defendants argue that Defendant’s alleged interference with Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the hotel room was not unreasonable. Defendants specifically argue: “When a reasonable person generally looks at the whole situation impartially and objectively, a bed bug infestation in a room allegedly caused by negligently maintaining and operating a hotel is not an unreasonable interference.” This is a factual argument that cannot be resolved on a demurrer.

Defendants challenge the public nuisance claim on the same grounds as the private nuisance claim. For the reasons stated above, the arguments fail.

However, on the court’s own motion, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subd. (a)(b)(2), the court sets an order to show cause for why the court should not grant judgment on the pleadings as to this cause of action. The complaint plainly does not state a claim for a public nuisance. “A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civil Code section 3480.) Plaintiff has not alleged such a nuisance, and it does not appear that the Plaintiff could do so.

Given that this issue was not raised in the demurrer, Plaintiff will be permitted to respond. The hearing on the OSC is set as indicated above.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege malice, fraud or oppression under Civil Code section 3294. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for fraudulent concealment, a species of fraud. Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges oppression. Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew that the room assigned to Plaintiff was infested with bed bugs but rented to her anyway. A reasonable juror could conclude that the conduct meets the definition of oppression.