Judge: Kristin S. Escalante , Case: 22STCV11512, Date: 2023-05-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV11512 Hearing Date: May 18, 2023 Dept: 24
The Motion for
Leave to file First Amended Complaint; reservation no.: 760064454963 filed by
Plaintiffs Beatriz Ramos and Melissa Macias on 01/23/2023 is DENIED without prejudice on
procedural grounds.
Should Plaintiffs decide to
refile the motion they are advised to follow California Rule of Court Rule
3.1324. (see also Citizens Com. for Pensions v. Bd. of Sup’rs of L.A. Cty.
(1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 658, 661.)
Plaintiffs Beatriz
Ramos (“Beatriz”), Melissa Macias (“Melissa”), and Armelio Macias (“Armelio”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) move for an order granting leave to file a first amended
complaint (“FAC”). (Notice of Mtn. at p. 1.) Based on the court’s review of the
proposed FAC, Plaintiffs seek to add additional elements of damages and an
additional claim for Medical Negligence by Melissa.
By way of
background, on April 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed suit for medical malpractice in
connection with the birth of their daughter, Melissa. Specifically, Beatriz and
Armelio (collectively “Parents”) allege Defendants Katheryn Shaw (“Shaw”); Kathryn
Shaw MD, Inc (“Shaw Inc.”); White Memorial OB/GYN Medical Group (“WM Medical
Group”); Taska Moore; and White Memorial Community Health Center Inc (“White
Memorial”) (collectively “Defendants”) committed medical malpractice when they
failed to adequately diagnosis and advise Beatriz regarding the health
conditions of their fetus in utero. As such, Beatriz was denied the opportunity
to make an intelligent and informed decision about whether to carry her fetus
to term. As a result, Beatriz gave birth to Melissa and Parents then learned Melissa
had Spina Bifida.
White
Memorial’s 03/01/2023 objections to the declaration of Samuel Winokur are
sustained. The court does not consider the parties emails attached to Winokur’s
declaration as Exhibits 6 and 7.
Plaintiffs
request leave to amend because the original complaint did not specify
particular damages and now, they seek to include emotional distress, general
damages, and medical expenses. The proposed damages amendments affect Parents
claims for wrongful birth, but not Melissa’s claim for wrongful life. Plaintiff
argues there is no prejudice to Defendants because they have responded to
discovery regarding their emotional distress prior to any depositions being
taken. Plaintiffs also seek to add a third claim of medical negligence on
Melissa’s behalf which they argue are premised on the same underlying facts—the
failure to diagnosis Spina Bifida and the resultant injury. Plaintiff’s counsel
further provides that “had the spinal [sic] bifida been properly diagnosed,
plaintiff Betriz Ramos could have had an in-utero surgery to lessen the damage
of the spinal [sic] bifida. This would have led to a better life for Melissa
Macias.” (Winokur Decl., ¶3.)
The
Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper,
allow a party to amend any pleading.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, 576.) California courts liberally exercise
discretion to permit amendment of pleadings due to a strong policy favoring
resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action. (Nestle
v. Santa Monica
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939
(Nestle).) There is “a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of
amendments.” (Mesler
v. Bragg Management Co. (1985)
39 Cal.3d 290, 296.)
Thus, the court generally grants requests for leave to amend unless the party
seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before
the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the
opposing party. (Hirsa
v. Superior Court (1981)
118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490;
Higgins
v. Del Faro
(1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.) The trial court
has the discretion to determine whether to grant leave to amend and “it is a
rare case in which a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend
[their] pleadings. . .” (Morgan v. Superior Court of
Cal., In and For Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)
The court may deny a
motion for leave to amend where there is “inexcusable delay and probable
prejudice to the opposing party.” (Magpali
v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487 (Magpali) [permitting
denial where plaintiff sought to add a new claim on the eve of trial which
would subject defendant to prejudice in trial preparation].) “Prejudice can
include the time and expense associated with opposing a legal theory that a
plaintiff belatedly seeks to change.” (Payton
v. CSI Elec. Contractors, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 832, 849; see also P&D
Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345
[amendment would require “additional discovery and perhaps result in a demurrer
or other pretrial motion”].)
Defendants, in
turn, file three separate oppositions: (1) on behalf of White Memorial’s behalf
(“WM Opp.”), (2) on behalf of Shaw, Shaw Inc., WM Medical Group (collectively
“Shaw Defendants”) (“Shaw Opp.”), and (3) on behalf of Taska Moore (“Moore
Opp.”). The court takes each argument raised in turn and, where the oppositions
overlap, address them once.
Shaw Defendants
argue the motion should be denied on procedural grounds as Plaintiffs failed to
concurrently submit a code compliant declaration with the motion. (See Rules of
Ct., Rule, 3.1324.) Shaw Defendant are correct. Counsel’s declaration does
comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1324. It lacks information
regarding why the amendment is necessary and proper, when the facts giving rise
to the amended allegations were discovered, and the reasons why the request for
amendment were not made earlier. (See Rules of Ct., Rule, 3.1324, subd. (b).)
The court notes that the amended pleading also does not state what allegations are
proposed to be added by page, paragraph, and line number. (See Rules of Ct.,
Rule, 3.1324, subd. (a).)
Plaintiff’s Counsel’s
additional declaration submitted in reply to the Defendants’ oppositions is
insufficient as Defendants do not have the opportunity to respond to the information
contained within declaration.
Accordingly, the motion is
denied on this ground. Assuming arguendo, the motion was properly brought the
court addresses the substantive arguments made briefly.
First, White
Memorial argues the new damages allegations are unfairly prejudicial because
Defendants have already conducted extensive discovery including taking
depositions and speaking with experts. (WM Opp., at p. 2:14-19.) White Memorial
argues it will have to conduct a second set of deposition of Parents. Here,
though there is prejudice, it is minimal. The court agrees with White Memorial
that Plaintiffs’ responses to discovery which include a discussion of emotional
distress damages does not amount to a meaningful opportunity to address these
new damages claims. However, with the trial set for October 2023, there is
ample time to conduct further written and oral discovery. Further, it appears
based on the moving papers that expert discovery has not occurred yet. Thus,
the prejudice to White Memorial does not outweigh granting leave to amend
considering the liberal allowances in leave.
Next, White Memorial, and Shaw Defendants
argues the new amendments for damages do not relate back to the alleged injury and
thus are barred by the statute of limitations. (WM Opp. at pp. 6:16-7:23;
Shaw Opp., at pp. 3:20-5:11.) Specifically,
Parents do not allege any personal injury in the original complaint which would
give rise to the damages sought. Since the claims do not relate back, the new
damages claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The court disagrees that
the new damages allegations do not relate back.
In the original complaint, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants improperly diagnosed Beatriz and her fetus, failed to perform proper
prenatal health care, failed to warn Beatriz her fetus had Spina Bifida, failed
to provide Beatriz with the information necessary to decide whether she would
carry the fetus to term, and as a result Beatriz gave birth to Melissa—who had
Spina Bifida. (Compl., ¶ 14.) “[A]n amended complaint relates back to the date
of the filing of the original complaint and thus avoids the bar of the statute
of limitations so long as recovery sought in both pleadings is based upon the
same general set of facts.” (Hirsa v. Superior Ct. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486,
489 [referencing Austin v. Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co. (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 596].)
Here, the court disagrees that the sought after damages—including, but not
limited to allegations of “shock, and severe emotional distress,” and “medical,
psychological and related expenses”—do not relate back to the original
allegations. (FAC., ¶¶17, 18.) Rather, the appears directly tied to the
allegations of medical malpractice and wrongful birth. Thus, the statute of
limitations is not a bar to the new damages claims.
White Memorial,
Shaw Defendants, and Moore argue, third, that emotional distress and general
damages are not recoverable in either wrongful life or a wrongful birth cause
of action. (WM Opp., at pp. 3:09-5:13; Shaw Opp., at pp. 5:11-6:06; Moore Opp.,
at pp. 7:01-10:11.) The parties appear to be disputing whether Turpin v.
Sortini (1982) 31 Cal.3d 220, 238 or Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162
Cal.App.3d 600 applies to the current case and governs whether Parents—as
opposed to a child in a wrongful birth case—may recover emotional distress or
general damages. The court’s review of the cases reveals this issue is
debatable and, thus, not appropriate grounds to deny leave to amend. This
argument is more properly brought on a demurrer where the parties can supply
ample briefing on the underlying case law as to this issue.
Finally, it is
unclear, but Moore also appears to argue that Melissa’s added claim for medical
negligence does not relate back to the original complaint and is barred by the
statute of limitations. The court disagrees. First, Melissa is not a new
plaintiff. In the original complaint, she brings a wrongful life through her Guardian
ad litem. Second, Melissa’s negligence claim appears to be premised on the
allegations previously set forth including Defendants’ improper diagnoses
of Beatriz and her fetus, failure to perform proper prenatal health care, and
Melissa’s resultant birth with Spina Bifida. (FAC., ¶¶ 14, 18.) The FAC does
add one new allegation, specifically, Defendants failure to provide Beatriz
with the facts and information necessary to “form an intelligent free, real and
informed decision on whether to have in-utero surgery to lessen the dame caused
by the spinal [sic] bifida.” (FAC, ¶24.) However, this allegation expands upon
the prior allegations regarding failure to provide proper prenatal health care.
Again, the allegations tie back to the original complaint and turn on the same general
facts. Thus, the amendment relates back and is not barred by the statute of
limitations.
Accordingly,
the motion is denied
without prejudice on procedural grounds.
Moving party is directed to give notice.