Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 20STLC09487, Date: 2024-01-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STLC09487 Hearing Date: January 23, 2024 Dept: 25
Hearing Date: Wednesday, January 23, 2024
Case Name: STATE
FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. GRACE VILLEGAS, et al.
Case No.: 20STLC09487
Motion: Motion to Set Aside Dismissal; and Enter Judgment (CCP 664.6)
Moving Party: Plaintiff
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Responding Party: None
Notice: OK
Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.’s Motion to Set Aside Dismissal and Enter Judgment is
GRANTED, and judgment is entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant Villegas
in the amount of $5,321.74.
Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to electronically submit a
proposed form of Judgment for the Court’s approval, within 10-days.
SERVICE:
[X]
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK
[X]
Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[X]
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: None filed as of January 09, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None
REPLY: None filed as of January 16, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None
BACKGROUND
On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) filed an action against Defendants Grace
Villegas (“Villegas”) and Christofe Arnaud dba Blue La Car Sharing (“Arnaud”)
(collectively “Defendants”) for subrogation, stemming from an automobile
collision between Defendants and Plaintiff’s insured. Plaintiff sought damages
in the amount of $6,168.92.
On June 23, 2021, Plaintiff amended its complaint to
substitute Bluela Carsharing LLC for Doe 2 as a defendant to the subrogation
action.
On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff requested dismissal of Defendant
Arnaud from the case.
On August 10, 2021, Plaintiff moved for default to be
entered against Defendant Bluela Carsharing LLC. The Clerk entered default
against Defendant Bluela Carsharing LLC the same day.
On October 19, 2021, Plaintiff requested dismissal of Defendant
Bluela Carsharing LLC from the case.
On December 23, 2021, Defendant Villegas filed her Answer.
On November 03, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant Villegas filed
a joint stipulation and order to continue trial on account that the parties
were in settlement talks and close to resolving the case. The Court finding
good cause ordered the trial be continued to December 13, 2022.
On December 13, 2022, the trial was placed off calendar as
counsel for Plaintiff represented to the Court that the matter has settled.
On January 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Stipulation for
Dismissal with Reservation to Vacate and Enter Judgment upon Breach
(“Stipulation”), signed by both parties, to dismiss the action on the premise
that Defendant Villegas would compensate Plaintiff for the settlement amount of
$4,935.14. On January 24, 2023, the Court dismissed the entire case without
prejudice pursuant to the Stipulation.
On November 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to
Set Aside Dismissal and Enter Judgment (“Motion”).
No opposition has been filed.
MOVING PARTY
POSITION
Plaintiff prays for the Court to set aside its dismissal and
enter judgment against Defendant Villegas in the sum of $5,321.74
for the following: principal amount of $4,935.14, less $0.00 in payments
made by Defendant, plus court cost in totaling $386.60 consisting of:
$246.60 Complaint filing fee, $80.00 service of process fee, and $60.00 motion
fee.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Villegas’ default in payments constituted a
breach of the parties’ Stipulation, thus making Plaintiff entitled to an entry
of judgment by the Court.
OPPOSITION
No
opposition has been filed.
REPLY
No reply
has been filed.
ANALYSIS
I. Legal
Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6
(“CCP § 664.6”) states: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a
writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally
before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon
motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If
requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to
enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the
settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a) [emphasis added].) For
purposes of the statute, “a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by any
of the following [among other individuals]: (1) ¶ The party. (2) ¶ An attorney
who represents the party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (b) [emphasis
added].)
“On a motion to enforce, the court
must determine whether the settlement agreement is valid and binding.
[Citation.] The court assesses whether the material terms of the settlement
were reasonably well-defined and certain, and whether the parties expressly
acknowledged that they understood and agreed to be bound by those terms. [In
re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 Cal.4th 896, 911.]” (Estate of
Jones (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 948, 952.)
The court may
interpret the terms and conditions of a settlement (Fiore v. Alvord
(1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566), but the court may not create material terms of
a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have
previously agreed upon (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 793, 810).
II. Discussion
A.
Retention of Jurisdiction
“‘[V]oluntary dismissal of an action or special
proceeding terminates the court’s jurisdiction over the matter.’ (Conservatorship
of Martha P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 857, 867.) ‘If requested by the
parties,’ however, ‘the [trial] court may retain jurisdiction over the parties
to enforce [a] settlement until performance in full of the terms of the
settlement.’ (§ 664.6, italics added.)” (Mesa RHF Partners, L.P. v. City of
Los Angeles (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 913, 917.) “‘Because of its summary
nature, strict compliance with the requirements of section 664.6 is
prerequisite to invoking the power of the court to impose a settlement
agreement.’” (Id. (quoting Sully-Miller Contracting Co. v.
Gledson/Cashman Construction, Inc. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 30, 37).)
“A request for the trial court to retain jurisdiction
under section 664.6 ‘must conform to the same three requirements which the
Legislature and the courts have deemed necessary for section 664.6 enforcement
of the settlement itself: the request must be made (1) during the pendency of
the case, not after the case has been dismissed in its entirety, (2) by the
parties themselves, and (3) either in a writing signed by the parties or orally
before the court.’” (Id. (quoting Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
429, 440).) “The ‘request must be express, not implied from other language, and
it must be clear and unambiguous.’” (Id. (quoting Wackeen, supra,
97 Cal.App.4th at 440).)
Here, the parties signed a stipulation containing the
parties’ agreement for the Court to retain jurisdiction pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure §664.6 to enforce the terms of the stipulation and enter
judgment in the event of default. (01-13-23 Stipulation.) Prior to the
dismissal of this action, the Stipulation was signed by the parties and
submitted to the Court. (Id. at p. 3.) On January 24, 2023, the Court
dismissed the entire case without prejudice pursuant to the Stipulation and
expressly stated that it “shall retain jurisdiction pursuant to CCP § 664.6.”
(01-24-23 Order.) Therefore, the Court finds that the Stipulation complies with
the requirements under CCP § 664.6 and it has retained jurisdiction to enter
judgment pursuant to the parties’ Stipulation in this action.
B.
Entry of Judgment
The Settlement
Agreement filed on January 13, 2023, provides that the parties agreed to settle
the matter for a principal sum of $4,935.14, with Defendant Villegas
paying an initial payment of $500.00 on March 06, 2023, and then making
subsequent monthly payments of $100.00 beginning on April 06, 2023. (Harlan
Reese Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiff’s Counsel avers that “Defendant made monthly
payments pursuant to the stipulation totaling $0.00, however, Defendant has
since defaulted on payments.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Counsel further states that
around October 30, 2023, Plaintiff mailed Defendant a default letter regarding
the missed payments notifying Defendant that failure to cure the default within
fourteen (14) days would entitle Plaintiff to seek a set aside of the dismissal
and request for entry of judgment. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6; Exh. C – a copy of the
default letter.) Accordingly, due to Defendant’s failure to comply with the
Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff requested that a judgment of $5,321.64 be
entered against Defendant.
The Court
finds the Settlement Agreement to be valid and enforceable under CCP § 664.6. Here,
Plaintiff provides evidence that Defendant has not made any payments and has
not cured the default after Plaintiff sent notice. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.)
Therefore, since a valid and signed settlement agreement between the parties
has been breached, and the Court retains jurisdiction to enter judgment, the
motion satisfies the requirements under CCP § 664.6.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment is GRANTED. Dismissal entered on January 24,
2023, is vacated, and judgment is entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant Villegas in the amount
of $5,321.74 for the following: principal amount of $4,935.14, plus
court cost totaling $386.60. The Court notes
that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s declaration and proposed order references $5,321.64
as the judgment amount, but the Court enters judgment for $5,321.74 based on
the amounts noted in Plaintiff’s motion.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal and Enter Judgment
is GRANTED, and judgment is entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant Villegas
in the amount of $5,321.74.
Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to electronically submit a
proposed form of Judgment for the Court’s approval, within 10-days.
Moving party is ordered to give
notice.