Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 21STLC07663, Date: 2024-01-04 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 21STLC07663 Hearing Date: January 4, 2024 Dept: 25
Hearing Date: Thursday, January 04, 2024
Case Name: INTERINSURANCE
EXCHANGE OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB, an interinsurance exchange v. ERIC HEREDIA, an
individual; JOSE LUIS MOLINA, an individual; DOES 1 through 10 inclusive
Case No.: 21STLC07663
Motion: Motion
to Set Aside/ Vacate Default Judgment
Moving Party: Defendant Eric
Heredia
Responding Party: None
Notice: OK
Tentative Ruling: Defendant Eric Heredia’s
Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default /Default Judgment is GRANTED.
DEFENDANT ERIC
HEREDIA IS ORDERED TO FILE HIS ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF
NOTICE OF THIS COURT’S RULING.
TRIAL IN THIS ACTION
IS RESET FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 2024 AT 8:30 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 25 OF THE SPRING
STREET COURTHOUSE.
MOTION AND DISCOVERY
CUT-OFF DATES ARE TO FOLLOW THE NEW TRIAL DATE.
Moving party is
ordered to give notice.
SERVICE:
[X] Proof of
Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK
[X] Correct
Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[X] 16/21 Court
Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: None filed as
of December 20, 2023 [
] Late [X]
None
REPLY: None filed
as of December 27, 2023 [
] Late [X]
None
BACKGROUND
On October 25, 2021,
Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (“Plaintiff”) filed an
Automobile Subrogation claim against Defendants Eric Heredia (“Defendant” “Heredia”),
and Jose Luis Molina (“Molina”) seeking damages in the sum of $15,000.00.
On February 25,
2022, the Clerk entered default against Defendant.
On February 01,
2023, Plaintiff requested dismissal Defendant Molina from the action without
prejudice.
On February 28,
2023, the Court entered default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant in the amount of $15,729.52.
On October 26, 2023,
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Set Aside/ Vacate Default Judgment. No
opposition was filed.
MOVING PARTY POSITION
Defendant prays for the Court to set aside the default and
default judgment entered against Defendant. Defendant argues that he should be
entitled to relief under 473(b) due to his own mistake, inadvertence surprise
or excusable neglect due to him not being aware of the action against him. In
the alternative, Defendant requests relief on the equitable ground of extrinsic
mistake or fraud.
OPPOSITION
No opposition has been filed.
REPLY
No reply has been filed.
ANALYSIS
I. Legal
Standard
Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 473, subdivision
(b), “the court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or
her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding
taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., §473(b)). Relief under this section is
mandatory when based on an attorney affidavit of fault; otherwise, it is
discretionary. (Id.) An application for relief must be made no more than
six months after entry of the order from which relief is sought and must be
accompanied by an affidavit of fault attesting to the moving party’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); English
v. IKON Business Solutions (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 143.) When relief
from default and a default judgment is based on an attorney affidavit of fault,
the six-month period starts to run from the date of the entry of the default
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, sub. (b); Sugasawara v. Newland
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 294, 295.)
“‘[W]hen relief under section 473¿is¿available, there is a
strong¿public¿policy¿in¿favor¿of granting relief and allowing the requesting
party his or her day in court…[Citation.]” (Rappleyea v. Campbell¿(1994)
8 Cal. 4th 975, 981-82.)
II. Discussion
Defendant moves to set aside default and default judgment
under Section 473(b) or in the alternative under equitable grounds of either
extrinsic fraud or mistake.
A. Motion to Set Aside under CCP § 473(b)
As a general matter, the Court notes that the motion is not
timely as it pertains to setting aside the default and default judgment under
CCP § 473(b). First, more than six months have lapsed since both default and
default judgment was entered against Defendant. Second, Courts have continually
held that setting aside default judgment without setting aside the default
would be an “idle act” and thus not permitted even though technically timely. (Pulte
Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc. (2016) 2 CA5th 267, 273.)
Here since both default and default judgment has been entered, setting aside
default judgment in this case would still not allow Defendant to file an answer
without first setting aside the default. Thus, for Defendant to be able to
properly file his answer, Defendant must seek to set aside the default.
Here, default was entered against Defendant on February 25,
2022. (02/25/22 Request for Entry of Default.) Default Judgment was entered on
February 28, 2023. (02/28/23 Default Judgment.) Defendant filed his motion to
set aside default judgment on October 26, 2023, well over the six-month
deadline prescribed under CCP § 473(b) to seek relief from both the default and
default judgment. Thus, Defendant would be time barred from setting aside both
the default and default judgment because the motion was filed more than six
months after the issuance of default and default judgment.
Here, Defendant is
additionally not entitled to mandatory relief as he does not provide an
attorney affidavit of fault.
Therefore, the Court cannot grant statutory relief under
473(b).
B. Equitable Grounds
Defendant alternatively argues that he is
entitled to equitable relief based on either extrinsic fraud or mistake.
Equitable relief from judgments or dismissals is available only upon a
showing of extrinsic factors like extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Advanced
Bldg. Maint. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1996) 49 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1395.)
i. Extrinsic Fraud
“Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to
present his claim or defense to the court; where he was kept ignorant or, other
than from his own negligence, fraudulently prevented from fully participating
in the proceeding. [Citation.] Examples of extrinsic fraud are: ... failure to
give notice of the action to the other party, and convincing the other party
not to obtain counsel because the matter will not proceed (and then it does
proceed). [Citation.] The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party's preventing
the other from having his day in court.” (Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc.
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300.) To warrant relief from a judgment based
upon fraud, "the fraud must have brought about the entry of the judgment,
e.g., by lulling the movant into sacrificing his opportunity to present a
defense." (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th
1401, 1416.)
Here, Defendant fails to establish grounds for equitable relief based on
extrinsic fraud. Nothing in Defendant’s moving papers supports the contention
that he was kept ignorant or fraudulently prevented from fully participating in
the proceeding. Defendant argues that extrinsic fraud or mistake exists because
he was not actually served with process of the complaint and was only made
aware of the default/default judgment entered against him once his license was
suspended via the Court’s Order of Suspension. (Motion p. 2:22-28, 3:1-3.)
However, this is not sufficient to show extrinsic fraud because Defendant has
not shown that it was Plaintiff’s actions that led to Defendant being deprived
of the opportunity to present his claim or defense in court. Thus, because
Defendant does not supply evidence to establish sufficient grounds, the Court
cannot grant equitable relief based on extrinsic fraud.
ii. Extrinsic
Mistake
“To set aside a
judgment based upon extrinsic mistake one must satisfy three elements. First,
the defaulted party must demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. Second,
the party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory
excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action. Last[ly], the
moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default
once ... discovered.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982.)
First, we examine if Defendant had a meritorious case. Here Defendant
arguably has a meritorious case as he provides the court with his proposed
answer in which he generally and specifically denies the allegations made in
Plaintiffs complaint. (Motion, Ex. 1.) This is sufficient to demonstrate
Defendant has a meritorious case because Defendant challenges the allegations
made by the Plaintiff. Thus, Defendant satisfies the first element.
As for the second element, Defendant provides the Court with a
satisfactory excuse for failing to timely answer the original complaint. Here,
Defendant states under penalty of perjury that he did not live at the property
where service was rendered. (Eric Heredia Decl. ¶ 3.) At the time service was
rendered, Defendant resided at 3129 Syracuse Ave., Baldwin Park, CA, 91706 and
not 1118 W. Grove, Center Street, Covina, CA, 91722. Defendant further avers
that he never received any notice of the instant suit until he received a
Notice of License Suspension from the Department of Motor Vehicles around
September 2023. (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 1.) Upon discovering the default and
default judgment Defendant sought to meet and confer with Plaintiff. (Id.
¶ 14.) When communications fell through Defendant filed the motion to set
aside. (Id.) Thus, Defendant satisfies the second element.
Finally, we examine
whether Defendant demonstrated diligence in seeking to set aside the default
once it was discovered. Here, Defendant has demonstrated diligence in seeking
to set aside the default judgment. First, Defendant states that he discovered the
default and default judgment entered against him on September 01, 2023. (Id.
¶ 13.) Subsequently, Defendant states
that he “diligently sought to meet and confer with Plaintiff regarding [a
stipulation] to set aside/vacate judgment prior to filing this Motion.” (Id.
¶14.) However, the parties were not able to reach an agreement. (Id.)
Additionally, Defendant demonstrates his diligence by subsequently filing this
motion to set aside a month after his discovery. Thus, Defendant satisfies the
third element.
Thus, because the Defendant satisfies the three elements to set aside
default judgment based on equitable grounds of extrinsic mistake, the Court
grants equitable relief in this case.
Accordingly, the Court orders the Defendant to file a properly noticed
answer within 10 days of the Court’s ruling.
III. Conclusion
Defendant Eric
Heredia’s Motion to Set aside/Vacate Default / Default Judgment is GRANTED.
THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT ERIC HEREDIA
ON FEBRUARY 25, 2022, AND FEBRUARY 28, 2023, ARE SET ASIDE AND VACATED.
THE COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT ERIC HEREDIA TO FILE A PROPERLY NOTICED ANSWER
TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 10 DAYS OF THIS COURT’S RULING.
TRIAL IN THIS ACTION IS RESET FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 2024 AT 8:30
A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 25 OF THE SPRING STREET COURTHOUSE.
MOTION AND DISCOVERY
CUT-OFF DATES ARE TO FOLLOW THE NEW TRIAL
DATE.
Moving party to give
notice.