Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 22STLC01784, Date: 2024-01-24 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STLC01784 Hearing Date: January 24, 2024 Dept: 25
Hearing Date: Wednesday, January 24, 2024
Case Name: STATEFARM
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MANUEL BARRA AKA MANUEL BARRA JR, and
DOES 1 to 10
Case No.: 22STLC01784
Motion: Motion to Vacate Judgment and For
Leave to Defend; Motion for Relief from Deemed Admissions.
Moving Party: Defendant
Manuel Barra
Responding Party: Plaintiff
Notice: OK
Tentative Ruling: Defendant Manuel Barra’s
Motion to Vacate Judgment for Leave to Defend is GRANTED.
Defendant’s
Motion for Relief from the Deemed Admissions is GRANTED.
JURY TRIAL is reset
for 10/29/2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 25 of the Spring Street Courthouse.
Discovery and all other trial-related deadlines
shall be based on the new trial date.
SERVICE:
[ ] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC,
rule 3.1300) OK
[ ] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[ ] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c,
1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: Filed as of January 10, 2024 [ ] Late [ ] None
REPLY: Filed as of January 12, 2024 [ ] Late [ ] None
BACKGROUND
On March 18, 2022, Plaintiff State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint
against Defendant Manuel Barra aka Manuel Barra Jr. (“Defendant” or “Barra”)
for subrogation, stemming from an automobile accident between Defendant Barra
and an individual insured by Plaintiff’s automobile insurance policy. (Compl. ¶
6.) Plaintiff compensated Insured for claimed damages in the amount of
$20,912.23 and filed the instant claim against Defendant for allegedly causing
the damages.
November 22, 2022, Defendant filed
an Answer to the Complaint.
On March 29, 2023, the Court
granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted against
Defendant, filed on February 2, 2023. On May 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings. On August 07, 2023, the Court granted the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings without leave to amend and ordered Plaintiff to file
a proposed judgment along with memorandum of cost.
On August 21, 2023, the Court entered
judgment in the amount of $23, 455.30 for Plaintiff and against Defendant.
On December 15, 2023, Defendant
filed the instant Motions to Vacate Judgment and for Leave to Defend and Relief
from Deemed Admissions.
MOVING PARTY
POSITION
Defendant prays for the Court to vacate the judgment
entered on August 21, 2023, on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, and
excusable neglect under CCP §§ 128(a)(8) and 473(b). Defendant argues for
relief under CCP § 473(b) as Defendant timely filed the motion within six (6)
months of the Court’s judgment. Defendant argues that his inability to provide
verified responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions and defend against the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is attributable to mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect because of more than half of the attorneys leaving Defendant’s
counsel’s firm, including Defendant’s former attorney of record, which led to
the Court granting judgment on the pleadings. Thus, because of this mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect, Defendant should be entitled to relief from
the deemed admissions and an order vacating judgment.
OPPOSITION
In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not entitled to equitable relief
from judgment based on extrinsic fraud and or mistake because Defendant does
not set forth the three essential requirements for obtaining relief based on
extrinsic mistake. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not
diligently sought relief from the judgment entered on August 21, 2023. Further,
Plaintiff argues it would be prejudiced if the judgment is vacated as it would
penalize Plaintiff for obtaining a proper judgment in this case.
In
opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Deemed Admissions, Plaintiff
argues that Defendant is not entitled to relief under CCP § 473(b) as the
motion is not timely filed. Moreover, the Court’s order to deem admissions as
admitted did not result from Defendant’s mistake as Defendant could have
appeared at the hearing and communicated the miscommunication, which Defendant
did not do. Finally, Plaintiff argues that relief would result in substantial prejudice
to Plaintiff as it is entitled to finality.
REPLY
In reply,
Defendant reasserts that he is entitled to relief under 473(b), as Plaintiff’s
Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted was granted because of mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect by Defendant’s former counsel. That neglect
extended to Defendant’s failure to appear at the hearing on the motion.
Further, Defendant points out that Plaintiff misconstrues the standard under
473(b) as it does not require a determination as to whether the mistake was
reasonable but simply requires Defendant to prove that the instance was due to
mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Finally, Defendant reasserts that
he is entitled to equitable relief as evidence points to extrinsic mistake as
argued in his moving papers.
ANALYSIS
I. Legal
Standard and Discussion
A. Motion for Relief from Deemed
Admissions
Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.300
provides that a party must respond to requests for admissions within 30 days
after service of such requests. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.250, subd. (a).)
“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely
response…(a) [that party] waives any objection to the requests, including one
based on privilege or on the protection for work product…” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2033.280, subd. (a).) “The requesting party may move for an order that the
genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the
requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter
7.” (Id. at subd. (b).) A motion dealing with the failure to
respond, rather than with inadequate responses, does not require the requesting
party to meet and confer with the responding party. (Deymer v. Costa Mesa
Mobile Home Estates (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 393, 395, fn. 4 [disapproved on
other grounds in Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973]). There is
no time limit within which a motion to have matters deemed admitted must be
made. (Brigante v. Huang (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1585.)
“A party seeking discretionary relief [under
CCP § 473(b)] on the ground[s] of attorney error must demonstrate that the
error was excusable, since the attorney’s negligence is imputed to the client.
[Citation.]” (Huh v. Wang (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419.) “Excusable
neglect is that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent
person under the same circumstances.
[Citation.]” (Id.)
Defendant moves to be relieved
from the Court order deeming Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions (Set One)
admitted on March 29, 2023, on the ground of attorney’s “inadvertence, mistake
or reasonable neglect.” (Mot. p. 5.)
Here, the Court notes that the motion is
not timely filed for the purposes of seeking mandatory relief. The Court notes
that the order deeming the RFA’s as admitted was issued on March 29, 2023. The
instant motion was filed on December 15, 2023, beyond the six-month deadline to
seek mandatory relief. Moreover, Defendant does not attach an attorney
affidavit of fault from its former counsel. Thus, Defendant is not entitled to
mandatory relief under CCP 473(b).
Here, Defendant provides the Court with the declaration of
Counsel Jon E. Hellesen’s in support of the motion. Hellesen explains that the
former attorney representing Defendant has left the firm, along with several
other attorneys. (Hellesen Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)
Hellesen joined the firm approximately two months prior and was recently
assigned to handle Defendant’s case. (Id.) After Hellesen was assigned
to the case he, “discovered that the prior handling attorney and
prior support staff, inadvertently forgot to serve the Plaintiff with the Defendant’s
signed verification response…” which he found in an incorrect file. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Counsel
asserts that the failure to obtain and provide signed verifications was due to
excusable neglect because the former attorney left the firm abruptly, and
verifications could not be obtained until Hellesen was assigned to the case, which
led to the failure to provide signed verifications to Defendant’s discovery
responses which resulted in the Court’s order deeming the admissions admitted. (Id.
at ¶ 5.) Hellesen attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s attorney and
immediately sent the responses with verifications on May 17, 2023. (Id.
at ¶ 4.) Counsel further states that,
the failure of Defendant to timely
submit oppositions to both Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions
Admitted and to Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings were due to
the severe shortage of attorneys as a result of the resignation of half of the
firm's attorneys which then resulted in a large amount of cases being
reassigned in a short period of time. This mass reassignment made it difficult
for all reassigned attorneys to manage each and every file in a timely manner.
(Id. at ¶ 6.)
Counsel has submitted a copy of Defendant’s unverified responses, the executed
verification, and proof of service of the verification. (Exh. A.)
In opposition to Defendant’s Motion
for Relief from Deemed Admissions, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not
entitled to relief under CCP § 473(b) as the motion is not timely filed.
Moreover, the Court’s order to deem admissions as admitted did not result from
Defendant’s mistake as Defendant had the opportunity to appear at the hearing
and communicate the miscommunication, which Defendant did not do. Finally,
Plaintiff argues that relief would result in substantial prejudice to Plaintiff
as it is entitled to finality.
The Court finds that Defendant
has presented sufficient evidence that his failure to respond to the Requests
for Admission was the result of his attorney’s excusable neglect. Here, based
on Defendant’s counsel’s declaration, Defendant did have verified responses to Plaintiff’s
RFAs. However, due to the abrupt
departure of Defendant’s prior counsel from the firm, the responses were not
provided to Plaintiff. The Court also
finds that Plaintiff will not be substantially prejudiced if Defendant is
relieved from the deemed admissions and permitted to respond to the discovery
request because Plaintiff has an opportunity to prove its case in court on the
merits.
Accordingly, the Court grants
Defendant’s Motion to Be Relieved from Deemed Admissions.
B. Motion to Vacate Judgment and for Leave
to Defend
Defendant moves
to vacate the Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (“MJOP”) and entering judgment for Plaintiff and against
Defendant. (Mot. p. 2.) The Motion is brought under Code of Civil
Procedure §§ 128(a)(8) and 473(b) on the basis of “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect.” (Mot. p. 2.) Defendant also seeks
relief pursuant to the Court’s authority to vacate judgment on equitable
grounds, based on “extrinsic fraud and/or mistake.” (Id.) The
Court notes that based on Defendant’s reply brief that the ground for equitable
relief is based on extrinsic mistake rather than both extrinsic mistake and
extrinsic fraud.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b), both
discretionary and mandatory relief is available to parties from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding. Discretionary relief is available
under the statute as “the court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code of Civ. Proc.
§¿473(b).) Alternatively, mandatory relief is available when “accompanied
by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect.” (Ibid.) Under this statute, an
application for discretionary or mandatory relief must be made no more than six
months after entry of the judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding from
which relief is sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b); English v. IKON
Business Solutions (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 143.)
“‘[W]hen relief under section 473¿is¿available, there is a
strong¿public¿policy¿in¿favor¿of granting relief and allowing the requesting
party his or her day in court…[Citation.]” (Rappleyea v. Campbell¿(1994)
8 Cal. 4th 975, 981-82.)
“Even where
relief is no longer available under statutory provisions, a trial court
generally retains the inherent power to vacate a default judgment or order on
equitable grounds where a party establishes that the judgment or order was void
for lack of due process or resulted from extrinsic fraud or mistake.” (County
of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228; Bacon v. Bacon
(1907) 150 Cal. 477, 491-92; Olivera v. Grace, 122 P.2d 564, 567-68; Stiles
v. Wallis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147 (“There are four grounds which a
court, utilizing its equity capacity may rely upon to provide relief from
default.¿ Those areas are (1) void judgment, (2) extrinsic fraud,
(3)¿constructive service, and (4)¿extrinsic mistake.”)¿ In limited civil
cases, grounds for equitable relief also include “inadvertence or excusable
neglect.”¿ (Code of Civ. Proc. § 86(b)(3).)
“‘To set aside a judgment based upon extrinsic mistake one
must satisfy three elements. First, the defaulted party must demonstrate that
it has a meritorious case. Second, the party seeking to set aside the default
must articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the
original action. Last, the moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking
to set aside the default once … discovered.’ [Citation.]” (Rappleyea v.
Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 982.)
i.
Extrinsic Mistake
First, the Court examines if Defendant has a meritorious case.
Here, the Court finds that Defendant arguably has a meritorious case because
Defendant provides the Court with a copy of its verified responses to Plaintiff’s
RFA. (Exh. A.) Within the responses, Defendant both admits to specific requests
while noting its objections to others. This sufficiently demonstrates that
Defendant has a meritorious case because Defendant provides that it does have responses
to Plaintiff’s RFAs. Thus, Defendant satisfies the first element.
For
the second element, Defendant provides the Court with a satisfactory excuse for
failing to timely respond to Plaintiff’s motions. As noted before, Defendant’s
counsel states that the former attorney representing
Defendant has left the firm, along with several other attorneys.
(Hellesen Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) After Hellesen
was assigned to the case he “discovered that the prior handling
attorney and prior support staff, inadvertently forgot to serve the Plaintiff
with the Defendants
signed verification response…” which he found in an incorrect file. (Id. at ¶
4.) Further, Counsel states that the mass departure of attorneys “made
it difficult for all reassigned attorneys to manage each and every file in a
timely manner” thereby causing Defendant’s failure to timely submit oppositions
to both Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted and to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Id. ¶ 6.) Thus,
Defendant satisfies the second element.
Finally,
the Court examines whether Defendant demonstrated diligence in seeking to vacate
the judgment once it was discovered. Here, Defendant has demonstrated diligence
in seeking to vacate the judgment and seek relief from the deemed admittances. First,
Defendant’s counsel states that after discovering that the verified responses were
not sent, counsel attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel in
order to stipulate setting aside the judgment. (Id. ¶ 7.) This effort
was unsuccessful thus necessitating the motion. (Id.) Secondly,
Defendant demonstrates diligence in seeking relief by filing the instant motion
less than four months after judgment was entered.
As discussed previously, Plaintiff argues in opposition
that relief in this case would result in prejudice to Plaintiff for properly
seeking judgment in this case and deny Plaintiff finality in resolving the
matter. However, the Court disagrees with this in that Plaintiff will have an
opportunity to argue its case on the merits.
The Court notes that case law supports “a
strong¿public¿policy¿in¿favor¿of granting relief and allowing the requesting
party his or her day in court” when relief can be granted under CCP 473. (Rappleyea
v. Campbell¿(1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 981-82.) As such, the Court is inclined to grant
relief in this case.
Therefore,
because the Defendant satisfies the three elements to set aside default
judgment based on equitable grounds of extrinsic mistake, the Court grants
equitable relief in this case.
II. Conclusion
Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Judgment is GRANTED. THE
JUDGMENT ENTERED ON AUGUST 21, 2023, IS VACATED.
Defendant’s Motion for Relief from the Deemed Admittances
is GRANTED.
JURY TRIAL is reset for 10/29/2024 at
8:30 a.m. in Department 25 of the Spring Street Courthouse.
Discovery and all other trial related deadlines
shall be based on the new trial date.
Parties
must comply with the trial requirements as set forth in the court's Third
Amended Standing Order for Limited Civil Cases (effective February 24, 2020).
All
trial documents are to be electronically filed at least ten (10) days prior to
the trial date.
Parties
should be prepared to submit a JOINT Trial Readiness Binder / Exhibit Binder,
and to personally appear on the date of trial.
Moving party is ordered to give
notice.