Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 22STLC05841, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling

*** Please Note that the Judicial Officer Presiding in Department 25 is Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong ***
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Case Number: 22STLC05841    Hearing Date: January 25, 2024    Dept: 25

Hearing Date:                         Thursday, January 25, 2024

Case Name:                             TABATHA RENE FISH, an individual v. SUNSET MOTORS LLC; WESTERN SURETY CO.; and DOES 1-40, inclusive

Case No.:                                22STLC05841

Motion:                                   Motion for Attorney’s Fees in the Amount of $11,216.50

Moving Party:                         Plaintiff Tabatha Rene Fish

Responding Party:                   None

Notice:                                    OK

Tentative Ruling:                    Plaintiff Tabatha Rene Fish’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part for $9,783.00.

SERVICE: 

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                      OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                      OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                       OK 

OPPOSITION:          None filed as of December 01, 2023              [   ] Late          [X] None 

REPLY:                     None filed as of December 07, 2023              [   ] Late          [X] None 

BACKGROUND

On September 07, 2022, Plaintiff Tabatha Rene Fish (“Plaintiff” or “Fish”) filed this action against Defendants Sunset Motors LLC (“Sunset Motors”) and Western Surety Co. (“Western Surety”) (collectively “Defendants”) for (1) violation of Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code § 1750 et seq.; (2) violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., Unlawful Acts or Practices; and (3) Claim Against Surety.

Defendant Western Surety filed an Answer on November 16, 2022.

On November 16, 2022, Plaintiff moved for default to be entered against Defendant Sunset Motors. The Clerk entered default on the same day.

On June 14, 2023, Defendant Western Surety was dismissed from the case with prejudice.

On September 13, 2023, default judgment was entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant Sunset Motors in the amount of $14,181.10.

On October 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney’s Fees in the amount of $11,216.50.

MOVING PARTY POSITION

            Plaintiff prays for the Court to issue an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $11,216.50 against Defendant Sunset Motors pursuant to Civil Code Section 1780(e). Plaintiff makes this motion arguing that since she is the prevailing party in the litigation under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, she is entitled to reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees under said Act.

OPPOSITION

            No opposition has been filed.  

REPLY

            No reply has been filed.

ANALYSIS

I.          Legal Standard

 Pursuant to the Civil Code § 1780, “[t]he court shall award court costs and attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to this section.”

A prevailing party in a lawsuit includes “the party with a net monetary recovery…If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.”  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1032(a)(4).)

“A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under . . . rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).)  In a limited civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of 30 days after service of a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or 90 days after the entry of judgment.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.822(a)(1).)

The calculation of attorney’s fees in California begins with the “lodestar” method – multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Ibid. at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.:

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]  The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

((2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623624.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets.  (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.  (Ibid.; Serrano, 20 Cal.3d 25 at 49.)

II.        Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Defendant Western Surety was dismissed from the case on June 14, 2023, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request. (06-14-23 Request for Dismissal.) On November 16, 2022, default was entered against Defendant Sunset Motors. (11-16-22 Request for Entry of Default.) On September 13, 2023, default judgment was entered against Defendant Sunset Motors. (9-13-23 Judgment.) Thus, the Court does not have jurisdiction over Defendant Western Surety and, as no judgment was entered against Defendant Western Surety, Plaintiff may not obtain attorney’s fees as to Western Surety.

With respect to Sunset Motors, however, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees as it is the prevailing party given judgment was entered for the Plaintiff and against Defendant Sunset Motors. (Id.)

            Plaintiff requests $11,216.50 in attorney’s fees.  (Mot. p. 7.)  Plaintiff submits the declaration of Kasra Sadr who provides a copy of his fee bill for this matter and states that the billing is “accurate and reasonable, and without duplicative or unnecessary legal work having been performed.”  (Sadr Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.)  He also provides a copy of the Laffey Matrix.  (Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 2.)  Sadr declares that he has been practicing law for 25 years and specializes in consumer protection litigation, exclusively consumer related cases like this one.  (Id. at ¶ 5.)  His hourly rate is $650 per hour.  (Id. at ¶ 6.) Sadr’s associate Nima Heydari (NH) is a ninth-year attorney who bills $375 per hour.  (Id. at ¶ 10.)  Paralegal Liz Peralta (LP) has 20 years of experience and bills at $135 per hour.  (Id. at ¶9, 11.)  Sadr adds that the retainers signed by his clients on automobile matters are on a contingency fee basis.  (Id. at ¶¶ 12.)

            Plaintiff argues that the attorney’s fees requested are “fair and reasonable” because (1) they represent the attorneys’ ordinary rates and are thus, presumptively correct, (2) Plaintiff’s attorneys represent clients on a contingency basis, (3) the hourly rate of other Los Angeles plaintiff’s attorneys practicing in a similar area of law is generally higher, and (4) according to the Laffey Matrix, the average attorney’s fees are greater than those requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys. (Mot. p. 6.)

            The Court notes discrepancies with the fee bill. For example, on August 30, 2022, LP’s work was billed at a rate of $350/hr. to scan and upload a client affidavit rather than her stated rate of $135/hr. Based on the Court’s calculation, there was a total of $857.50 billed for LP at a higher rate than what is purported in Counsel’s declaration. (Sadr Decl., Ex. 1) Moreover, as the Court previously indicated, Plaintiff cannot obtain attorney’s fees as to Western Surety since they were dismissed from the action. In total, the Court calculates $576.00 in charges which referenced Western Surety. Therefore, the Court is inclined to award Plaintiff attorney’s fees incurred as to Sunset Motors minus $1,433.50 in fees associated with the higher entry rates from LP and entries relating to Western Surety and finds attorney’s fees in the amount of $9,783.00 to be reasonable.

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, in part, in the amount of $9,783.00

III.       Conclusion

            Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part in the amount of $9,783.00.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.