Judge Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case Number: 22STLC08124, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 22STLC08124, Date: 2024-04-10 Tentative Ruling

*** Please Note that the Judicial Officer Presiding in Department 25 is Commissioner Latrice A. G. Byrdsong ***
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Case Number: 22STLC08124 Hearing Date: April 10, 2024 Dept: 25

Hearing Date: Wednesday, April 10, 2024

Case Name: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. TYRONE MAYFIELD

Case No.: 22STLC08124

Motion: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Moving Party: Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Responding Party: None

Notice: OK

Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Auto’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

SERVICE:

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK

OPPOSITION: None filed as of March 27, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None

REPLY: None filed as of April 03, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None

BACKGROUND

On December 07, 2022, Plaintiff State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”), filed a subrogation action against Defendant Tyrone Mayfield (“Defendant”). The case arises from alleged injuries sustained by Plaintiff’s insured during an automobile accident allegedly involving the Defendant.

Defendant, in propria persona, filed an Answer to the Complaint on April 21, 2023.

On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions as to Defendant as Admitted. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion on October 16, 2023, and ordered Defendant and his counsel, jointly and severally, to pay sanctions in the amount of $460.00.

On February 01, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

No opposition has been filed.

MOVING PARTY POSITION

Plaintiff prays for an order from the Court granting its motion for judgment on the pleadings against the Defendant pursuant to CCP § 438(b)(1). Plaintiff asserts that upon the Court taking judicial notice of the order granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions admitted, the deemed admissions remove any issue raised by the Defendant under a general denial or any affirmative defense raised in his Answer.

OPPOSITION

No opposition has been filed.

REPLY

No reply has been filed.

ANALYSIS

I. Evidentiary Motions

1. Plaintiff’s request for the Court to take judicial notice of Defendant’s Answer to the Complaint, marked as Exhibit 1, is GRANTED under Evidence Code 452(d) because it is a record of LA County Superior Court.

2. Plaintiff’s request for the Court to take judicial notice of a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s accompanying Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions admitted is GRANTED under Evidence Code 452(d) because it is a record of LA County Superior Court.

3. Plaintiff’s request for the Court to take judicial notice of Court’s October 16, 2023, Minute Order deeming Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions Admitted as to Defendant is GRANTED under Evidence Code 452(d) because it is a record of LA County Superior Court.

II. Legal Standard

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322, citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points, and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits. (Id.) The motion may not be supported by extrinsic evidence. (Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 221, 236.)

When the moving party is a plaintiff, he or she must demonstrate that the complaint states sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against the defendant and that the answer does not state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).)

Additionally, a motion for judgment on the pleadings must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to meet and confer in person or by telephone, at least five days before the date a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439.)

III. Discussion

A. Meet and Confer Requirement

Before addressing the merits, the Court notes that the Motion is accompanied by a “meet and confer” declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 439(a). Here, Plaintiff provides the declaration of its counsel who states that on January 03, 2024, her office served on Defendant a meet and confer letter in compliance with CCP § 439 to the address listed on Defendant’s Answer. (Janelle McCammack Esq. Decl. ¶ 1; Exh. 1.) To date, counsel swears that she has received no contact from the Defendant. (Id. ¶ 2.) Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s declaration satisfies the meet and confer requirement under 439(a).

B. Causes of Action – Subrogation

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that to the extent Plaintiff relies on admissions that were deemed admitted, Plaintiff’s motion improperly seeks a determination of evidentiary issues. “In ruling on a demurrer, a court may consider facts of which it has taken judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a).) This includes the existence of a document. When judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.” (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corporation (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660.)

Plaintiff’s reliance on Pang v. Beverly Hsp., Inc. to support its motion is misplaced. In Pang, the court found that it could consider matters that may be judicially noticed, including a party’s admissions or concessions which cannot reasonably be controverted.” (See Pang, at 990) (emphasis added). Specifically, the court judicially noticed the declarations of plaintiff and her sister, excerpts of plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and her separate statement of undisputed fact, to the extent they bore on her need for family leave at issue in the case. The judicially noticed documents in Pang are distinguishable from those in the instant case. Here, Defendant’s answer clearly contradicts the judicially noticed admissions deemed admitted. “[A] court ruling on a demurrer cannot decide a question that may depend on disputed facts by means of judicial notice.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 115, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621.) Indeed, the Richtek court found that the trial court erred by using judicially noticed documents to draw conclusions that were contradictory to the express allegations in the operative pleadings. (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corporation (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660-661.) Therefore, notwithstanding the Court’s taking judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem RFAs as Admitted, and the Court’s order deeming Plaintiff’s RFAs as admitted, they are still disputed by Defendant’s answer, and cannot form the basis for the Court’s granting Plaintiff’s Motion.

The function of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, similar to a demurrer, is to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corporation (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660.) A hearing on a demurrer, and thus motion for judgment on the pleadings, may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation may be disputable. (Id.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings is not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts. (See id.) To the extent Plaintiff relies on Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal App 4th 446 and Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal App 4th 205 to support the argument that Defendant’s deemed admittances cannot be contradicted by Defendant’s answer, the Court disagrees. Such discrepancy is an evidentiary issue. The more proper vehicle for arguments based on these admissions would be a motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff brings a subrogation action against the Defendant for damages Plaintiff’s insured sustained in a motor vehicle accident allegedly involving the Defendant.

The essential elements of an insurer's cause of action for equitable subrogation are as follows: 1) the insured suffered a loss for which the defendant is liable, either as the wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the loss or because the defendant is legally responsible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer; 2) the claimed loss was one for which the insurer was not primarily liable; 3) the insurer has compensated the insured in whole or in part for the same loss for which the defendant is primarily liable; 4) the insurer has paid the claim of its insured to protect its own interest and not as a volunteer; 5) the insured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the defendant which the insured could have asserted for its own benefit had it not been compensated for its loss by the insurer; 6) the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or omission upon which the liability of the defendant depends; 7) justice requires that the loss be entirely shifted from the insurer to the defendant, whose equitable position is inferior to that of the insurer; and 8) the insurer's damages are in a liquidated sum, generally the amount paid to the insured.

(Interstate Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 23, 33–34.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that on or about December 18, 2019, at Broadway St., Los Angeles, CA 90291, Defendant caused the insured to incur a loss that was covered under Plaintiff’s insured’s policy. (Compl. p. 1-2; ¶ 6.) The Complaint alleges that Defendant negligently operated a certain motor vehicle (“Vehicle”) by driving inattentively or otherwise by driving without the due care required of a reasonably prudent driver and thereby caused the accident. (Id.) Defendant’s driving legally, foreseeably and proximately caused the insured to suffer damages in the amount of $21,730.16. (Id.) On Plaintiff’s information and belief, and/or in the alternative, Defendant was the registered owner and/or bailees of the Vehicle which at the time of the accident, was being driven with owner’s express or implied permission. (Id.) At all relevant times, the insured had a policy of insurance with Plaintiff covering the damages which are the subject of this action. (Id. ¶ 8.) As required by both the policy and Plaintiff's duty of good faith and fair dealing with its insured, Plaintiff investigated the loss, determined it was covered and paid the claim. (Id.) The total loss was $21,730.16. (Id.) Plaintiff now seeks subrogation of its payment (and recovery of any uncovered property damage claims assigned by the insured), from all defendants, the parties responsible for causing the loss. (Id.)

Defendant’s Answer generally denies the allegations pleaded in Plaintiff’s Complaint and alleges that he was sick and hospitalized due to a stroke, heart attack and other health issues around April 2019. (See Answer. ¶3(g).) Upon his release in July 2019, Defendant alleges that his wife picked him up and took him to Arkansas to live with her. (Id.) Defendant gave the Vehicle to his stepson Jermaine Hightower and gave Jermaine the Vehicle paperwork releasing his liability. (Id.) The Answer alleges that Jermaine said he went to the DMV and registered the Vehicle in his name. (Id.) The Answer further alleges that State Farm contacted the Defendant and told him that there was an accident involving the Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant informed them that since July 2019, he no longer had ownership of the Vehicle and gave them Jermaine’s information. (Id.) When Defendant called Plaintiff to get an update on the car, Plaintiff said they had spoken with Jermaine who had accepted responsibility and made payment arrangements. (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that it has met its burden and Defendant’s answer does not state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the complaint because upon the Court taking judicial notice of the Court’s minute order deeming Plaintiff’s RFAs as admitted, when read with the facts, the admitted admissions remove any issue raised by Defendant under his general denial or any affirmative defenses raised in his Answer. However, Plaintiff mistakes the purpose of the Court taking judicial notice in motions for judgment on the pleadings. As mentioned above, it would be improper for the Court to take the RFAs deemed admitted at face value.

Here, Plaintiff has not carried its burden under CCP § 438(c)(1)(A). Defendant’s Answer provides an affirmative defense indicating that Plaintiff does not have a cause of action against the Defendant because he was not the legal owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Moreover, Defendant’s Answer additionally provides that Defendant had previously put Plaintiff on notice of who was the actual and legal owner of the Vehicle, and that Plaintiff assured him that the matter had been settled with the party responsible for the accident. Thus, under the state of the pleadings, since Defendant does have a defense to the complaint, Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Auto’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.