Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 23NWLC09416, Date: 2024-03-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23NWLC09416 Hearing Date: April 10, 2024 Dept: 25
Hearing Date: Wednesday, April 10, 2024
Case Name: IFE
GROUP D/B/A SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RESTAURANT DESIGN GROUP v. VICTORIA ALLEN and
JEFF ALLEN
Case No.: 23NWLC09416
Motion: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Defendants Victoria Allen and
Jeff Allen
Moving Party: Plaintiff
IFE Group dba Southern California Restaurant Design Group
Responding Party: None
Notice: OK
Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff IFE Group’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.
SERVICE:
[X]
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK
[X]
Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[X]
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: None filed as of March 27, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None
REPLY: None filed as of April 03, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None
BACKGROUND
On
April 06, 2023, IFE Group dba Southern California Restaurant Design Group (“Plaintiff”),
filed two causes of action for breach of contract and common counts against
Defendants Victoria Allen (“Victoria”)[1],
and Jeff Allen (“Jeff”) (collectively “Defendants”).
Defendants,
in propria persona, separately filed an Answer to the Complaint on May 17, 2023.
On
November 09, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Deem Request for Admissions as
to both Defendants as Admitted. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion on January
12, 2024.
On
December 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Responses to Plaintiff’s
Request for Production from both Defendants. The Court granted Plaintiff’s
motion and ordered Defendants to pay sanctions in the amount of $838.00.
On
January 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.
On
January 19, 2024, the Court determined that the matter was not a “collection
hub case as defined by California Rules of Court, rule 3.740(a)” and ordered
the matter transferred to Department 1 at the Stanley Mosk Courthouse for
reassignment.
On
January 24, 2024, the Court reassigned the matter to Limited Civil Non-Collections
Hub to Commissioner Latrice A.G. Byrdsong in Department 25 at the Spring Street
Courthouse.
On
February 01, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Amended Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings.
No
opposition has been filed.
MOVING PARTY
POSITION
Plaintiff prays
for an order from the Court to grant its motion for judgment on the pleadings
and enter judgment in the amount of $6,658.99 against the Defendants pursuant
to CCP § 438(b)(1). Plaintiff asserts that based on the deemed admittances,
Defendants’ answers entirely fail under CCP §§ 438(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2)(B) as
Defendants admit that they owed the amounts prayed for in Plaintiff’s April 06,
2023, Complaint and they have no defense thereto.
OPPOSITION
No opposition has been filed.
REPLY
No reply has been filed.
ANALYSIS
I. Evidentiary
Motions
Plaintiff’s
requests for the Court to take judicial notice of the Court’s January 12, 2024,
Minute Order, the Court’s March 19, 2024, Minute Order, CCP § 2033.280, and Del
E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604-05
are DENIED
because Plaintiff’s requests do not comply with CRC rule
3.1113(l) requirement for judicial notice requests to be made in a separate
document. Here Plaintiff’s requests are improperly attached to Plaintiff’s
instant motion. Thus, the requests are denied under CRC rule 3.1113(l).
II. Legal Standard
The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer,
that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be
judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322,
citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
1205, 1216.) Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may
be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the
parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be
specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points, and authorities, or
as the court otherwise permits. (Id.) The motion may not be
supported by extrinsic evidence. (Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d
221, 236.)
When the moving party is a
plaintiff, he or she must demonstrate that the complaint states sufficient
facts to constitute a cause of action against the defendant and that the answer
does not state sufficient facts to constitute a defense to the complaint. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Additionally, a motion for judgment on the pleadings must
be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to
meet and confer in person or by telephone, at least five days before the date a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439.)
III. Discussion
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes
Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on February 01,
2024. Since the amended motion has been served on the Defendants, the Court
will proceed to address the motion based on Plaintiff’s amended moving papers
filed on February 01, 2024.
A. Meet and Confer Requirement
Before addressing the merits, the Court notes that the
Motion is accompanied by a “meet and confer” declaration as required by Code of
Civil Procedure Section 439(a). Here, Plaintiff provides the declaration of its
counsel who states that the Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiff’s “meet
and confer” efforts or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (02/01/24
Declaration of Demurring Party Regarding Meet and Confer.) The Court finds that
Plaintiff’s declaration satisfies the meet and confer requirement under 439(a)
and thus proceeds to the merits of the instant motion.
B. Causes
of Action – Breach of Contract and Common Counts
Plaintiff brings two causes of
action for 1) breach of contract and 2) common counts.
To state a cause of action for
breach of contract, Plaintiff must be able to establish “(1) the existence of
the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3)
defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011)
51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
If
a breach of contract claim “is based on alleged breach of a written contract,
the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of
the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circumstances, a plaintiff may also “plead
the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language.” (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v.
TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)
“The essential
allegations of a common count ‘are (1) the statement of indebtedness in a
certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3)
nonpayment’” (Allen v. Powell (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 502, 510.)
As to
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that on or
about February 25, 2019, a written agreement was made between Plaintiff and
Defendants for design services of a food service facility. (Compl. p. 3 BC-1;
Exh. A.) On or about August 13, 2019, Defendants breached the agreement by
failing to pay $2,500.00. (Id. BC-2.) The Complaint further alleges that
Plaintiff has performed all obligations to the Defendants except those for the
obligation Plaintiff was prevented or excused from performing. (Id.
BC-3.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges it has suffered $2,500.00, plus
prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent per annum per Civil Code
section 3289(b) in damages legally and/or proximately caused by the Defendants’
breach of agreement. (Id. BC-4.)
The Complaint
further alleges that Defendants became indebted to Plaintiff within the last
four years on an open book account for money due because an account was stated
in writing by and between the parties in which it was agreed that Defendants
would be indebted to Plaintiff. (Id. CC-1(a).) The Complaint also
alleges that Defendants became indebted for work, labor, services, and
materials rendered at the special instance and request of the Defendants and
for which Defendants promised to pay Plaintiff $2,500.00. (Id. CC-1(b).)
The $2,500.00, which the Complaint alleges as the reasonable value of
Plaintiff’s services, is due and unpaid despite Plaintiff’s demand, plus
prejudgment interest at the rate of ten (10) percent per year. (Id.
CC-2.)
In both
Defendants’ Answers, Defendants deny each allegation contained in both Plaintiff’s
first and second causes of action. (Ans. p. 2) Defendants’ Answers specifically
allege that the parties did enter into an agreement on or about January 25,
2019. (Id. p. 2 ¶ 1; Exh. A.) Defendants hired Plaintiff to design and
develop a computerized aided design (“CAD”) for their commercial kitchen
located in the city of Torrance. (Id. ¶ 2.) Defendants paid Plaintiff a
deposit of $2,500.00 to develop and design a commercial kitchen. (Id. ¶
3.) Per page 2 paragraph 3 of the agreement “If Dealer is
required to dimension the existing space as separate fee will be charged for
this service and can be quoted if needed.” (Id.; Exh A.) The Answers
further allege that Defendants explained to Plaintiff that their services were
needed to measure the room for the design and development of the commercial
kitchen and that Plaintiff did not perform any work. (Id. ¶ 3.)
Defendants contacted Plaintiff several times by phone and Plaintiff did not
reply or do any work pursuant to the agreement.
Plaintiff
argues it has met its burden and that, based on Defendants’ answers, judgment
on the pleadings should be granted. Specifically, based on responses to requests
numbers 6 through 9, Defendants have admitted that they owe the amounts prayed
for in Plaintiff’s April 06, 2023, Complaint. Moreover, under the one final
judgment rule, the monetary sanctions owed should be merged into the final
judgment entered against both Defendants.
The Court
finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive and improper as it seeks a
determination of evidentiary issues. “In ruling on a
demurrer, a court may consider facts of which it has taken judicial notice.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a).) This includes the existence of a
document. When judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the
truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.” (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corporation
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660.)
Although the Court denies the judicial notice requests on
separate grounds, here, the Defendants’ answers clearly contradict the
judicially noticed admissions deemed admitted.
“[A] court ruling on a demurrer cannot decide
a question that may depend on disputed facts by means of judicial notice.” (Fremont
Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 115, 55
Cal.Rptr.3d 621.) Indeed, the Richtek
court found that the trial court erred by using judicially noticed
documents to draw conclusions that were contradictory to the express
allegations in the operative pleadings. (See Richtek USA, Inc. v. uPI Semiconductor Corporation
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 651, 660-661.) Therefore,
notwithstanding the Court’s decision to decline taking judicial notice of
Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem RFAs as Admitted, and the Court’s order deeming
Plaintiff’s RFAs as admitted, they are still disputed by Defendants’ answers,
and cannot form the basis for the Court’s granting Plaintiff’s Motion.
The function of a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
similar to a demurrer, is to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. (Id.
at 660.) A hearing on a demurrer, and thus motion for judgment on the
pleadings, may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the
guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness
or proper interpretation may be disputable. (Id.) A motion for judgment
on the pleadings is not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of
disputed facts. (Id.)
Here, Plaintiff has not carried its
burden under CCP § 438(c)(1)(A). Both Defendants’ Answers provide an
affirmative defense indicating that Plaintiff did not perform under the parties’
agreement and that they are still expecting performance on the parties’
agreement. Thus, under the state of the pleadings,
since the Defendants do have a defense to the complaint, Plaintiff is not
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff IFE Group’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.
TRIAL SETTING CONFERENCE;
Trial in tis action is reset for
OCTOBER 7, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. in Department 25 of the Spring Street Courthouse.
Discovery and all other trial related deadlines
are to comport with the new trial date.
Parties must comply with
the trial requirements as set forth in the court's Third Amended Standing Order
for Limited Civil Cases (effective February 24, 2020).
All trial documents are
to be electronically filed at least ten (10) days prior to the trial date.
Parties should be
prepared to submit a JOINT Trial Readiness Binder / Exhibit Binder, and to
personally appear on the date of trial.
Moving party is ordered to give notice.
[1] The
Court uses the Defendants first names to differentiate their actions as both Defendants
go by the surname Allen. The Court in no way means any disrespect to the
parties but on the contrary holds all parties with the highest respect.