Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 23STLC00563, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STLC00563 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Dept: 25
Hearing Date: Tuesday, March 12, 2024
Case Name: ERIC
ESLABAN ANTAY v. SPARTAK MELOIAN, GERASIM OHANYAN, and DOES 1 through 20,
Inclusive
Case No.: 23STLC00563
Motion: Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings
Moving Party: Defendant
Spartak Meloian
Responding Party: Plaintiff Eric Eslaban Antay
Notice: OK
Tentative Ruling: Defendant Spartak Meloian’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Complaint is
GRANTED.
Defendant Spartak Meloian’s is ordered to submit a proposed
form of Judgment within
10-days.
SERVICE:
[X]
Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK
[X]
Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a) OK
[X]
16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b)) OK
OPPOSITION: Filed as of February 27, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None
REPLY: Filed as of March 01, 2024 [ ] Late [X] None
BACKGROUND
On January 25, 2023, Plaintiff Eric
Eslaban Antay (“Plaintiff”) filed two causes of action against Defendants
Spartak Meloian (“Meloian”) and Gerasim Ohanyan (“Ohanyan”) (collectively “Defendants”)
for 1) motor vehicle; and 2) general negligence.
Defendants filed their Answer to
the Complaint on April 24, 2023.
On February 07, 2024, Meloian filed
the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff files in
opposition. Meloian reply.
MOVING PARTY
POSITION
Defendant Meloian prays for the Court to grant its motion on the pleadings
and enter judgment in their favor under CCP § 426.30 and 438. Meloian argues that Plaintiff’s entire
complaint against Defendant Meloian is barred because his claims against Meloian
should have been asserted in a compulsory
crossclaim in a separate case which was dismissed in June of 2022. Meloian asserts that by failing to file a
cross complaint in the previous matter, Plaintiff has waived all claims against
Meloian.
OPPOSITION
In opposition,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Meloian has waived his ability to raise CCP §
426.30 as a defense since Meloian chose to litigate for nearly a year before
deciding to raise CCP § 426.30 as a defense.
REPLY
In reply, Meloian
reasserts that the action is barred. Meloian points out that Plaintiff does not
dispute that the actions should have been filed as a compulsory cross-complaint
in compliance with CCP § 426.30. Meloian further argues that Plaintiff does not
provide any authority to support his contention that a defense under CCP 426.30
has to be filed within a certain time after the action has commenced.
ANALYSIS
I. Evidentiary
Motions
1. Meloian’s request for the Court to
take judicial notice of Exhibit A, a complaint filed by Spartak Meloian vs.
Eric Antay on March 07, 2022 (Case Number 22STLC01503), is GRANTED under Evidence
Code 452(d)(1) because it is a record of the LA Superior Court.
2. Meloian’s request for the Court to
take judicial notice of Exhibit B, the Answer filed by Defendant Erik Antay on
April 15, 2022 as to the Complaint in Case Number 22STLC01503, is GRANTED under
Evidence Code 452(d)(1) because it is a record of the LA Superior Court.
3. Meloian’s request for the Court to
take judicial notice of Exhibit C, the request for dismissal filed by Spartak
Meloian on June 06, 2022 as to Case Number 22STLC01503, is GRANTED under
Evidence Code 452(d)(1) because it is a record of the LA Superior Court.
II. Legal
Standard
The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer,
that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially
noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322,
citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
1205, 1216.) Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may
be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the
parties. Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified
in the notice of motion, the supporting points, and authorities, or as the
court otherwise permits. (Id.) The motion may not be supported by
extrinsic evidence. (Barker v. Hull (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 221, 236.)
When the moving party is a defendant,
he or she must demonstrate that either of the following conditions exist: (i) that
the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in
the complaint; or (ii) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438,
subd. (c)(1)(B).)
Additionally, a motion for judgment on the pleadings must
be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to
meet and confer in person or by telephone, at least five days before the date a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439.)
II. Discussion
A. Meet
and Confer Requirement
Before addressing the merits, the Court notes that the
Motion is accompanied by a “meet and confer” declaration as required by Code of
Civil Procedure Section 439(a). Here, Meloian provides the declaration of their
counsel who states that on January 15, 2024, counsel spoke with Plaintiff’s
counsel regarding Plaintiff’s failure to file a compulsory cross-complaint in Meloian
v. Antay as required under CCP Section 426.30 (Stacy Bandhold Decl. ¶ 2.) Counsel
subsequently followed up with an e-mail containing the relevant case law. (Id.)
The Parties spoke again on January 24, 2024, where Plaintiff’s counsel communicated
that Defendants needed to have alleged CCP
Section 426.30 as an affirmative defense and furthermore that it was too late
to challenge the complaint. (Id.) Counsel would later call Plaintiff’s
counsel on February 05, 2024, to advise her that after conducting additional
research, counsel had concluded that Defendants did not need to allege CCP
Section 426.30 as an affirmative defense to challenge the pleadings on this
basis. (Id. ¶ 3.) Counsel later avers that Plaintiff’s Counsel stated
that she would oppose the motion. (Id.) Here the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s declaration satisfies the meet and confer requirement under 439(a). Thus, the Court moves on to the merits.
B. Cause
of Action
Plaintiff brings two causes of
action for 1) motor vehicle; and 2) general negligence. The Court notes here
that since the elements for motor vehicle are similar to negligence, the Court
will analyze the complaint as one cause of action for negligence.
To state a claim for negligence,
Plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of
care,” (2) “breach of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an
injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific,
LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that
on April 03, 2021, Plaintiff’s vehicle was at a complete stop facing a red
light on Victory Blvd. going eastbound at the intersection of Woodman Ave. (Compl.
¶ 10.) When Plaintiff was prompted by the green light to proceed, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Meloian ran a red light and collided with Plaintiff’s
vehicle causing the vehicle to spin out of control. (Id.) The Complaint
further alleges that Defendants “carelessly and negligently owned, operated,
entrusted, leased, repaired, modified, maintained and/or controlled the Subject
Vehicle” and caused the Subject Vehicle to collide with Plaintiff’s vehicle
causing severe injuries and damages to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 13.)
Defendants’ Answer generally denies
all the allegations contained in the complaint. (Ans. 4/24/23) The Answer
additionally raises several affirmative defenses, alleging that Plaintiff’s
injury was proximately caused and contributed by Plaintiff’s failure to conduct
himself in a way that a reasonably prudent person would under the
circumstances. (Id. ¶ 2.) The Answer additionally alleges that Plaintiff
failed to mitigate his damages. (Id. ¶ 5.) Finally, the Answer asserts that the Complaint
fails to state a claim, and that the Complaint does not apportion the liability
of all defendants named or unnamed. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.)
Defendant Meloian argues that the
complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to state any cause of action because
under CCP Section 426.30(a), Plaintiff is barred from raising these claims as
he did not bring his claim as a compulsory crossclaim in the proceeding action,
Meloian v. Antay case no. 22STLC01503.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues
that Meloian waived the ability to raise section 426.30 as a defense by
delaying raising the defense. Plaintiff notes that Meloian points to no
authority that raises section 426.30 as a defense in a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Further in contrast to Meloian’s cited authorities, Meloian chose
not to seek an early disposition of the action instead opting to litigate the
action for nearly a year before deciding to raise section 426.30 as a defense. Plaintiff
finally asserts that allowing Meloian a defense under section 426.30 this late
in the litigation, undermines the policy against multiplicity of litigation.
In reply, Meloian points out that Plaintiff
does not dispute that section 426.30 applies to this matter. Moreover, neither
of the cases cited by Plaintiff provides a time frame for when a motion bringing
a challenge under section 426.30 must be filed.
Code of Civil Procedure Section
426.30(a) provides that,
[I]f a party against whom a
complaint has been filed and served fails to allege in a cross-complaint any
related cause of action which (at the time of serving his answer to the
complaint) he has against the plaintiff, such party may not thereafter in any
other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of action not
pleaded.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30.) Under
CCP section 426.10(c), a cross complaint is compulsory if the cause of action
arises out of the “ same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences as the cause of action … in [the] complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
426.10.) Here, Meloian provides the Court with
a copy of the complaint of the previous action filed in 2022. The complaint brings
two causes of action for 1) motor vehicle and 2) general negligence alleging
the same facts as alleged in the instant action. Here, the claims involve
common issues of law and fact because both actions revolve around the same car
accident involving the parties. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim arises from the same
transaction or occurrence as the complaint filed by Meloian in 2022 and would be considered barred under CCP section
426.30.
Plaintiff
cites Hulsey v. Koehler and Datta v. Staab to support his
contention that an affirmative defense under section 426.30 needs to be timely
raised before litigation has significantly progressed. However, the Court finds
such reliance to be misplaced. First the Hulsey court’s holding provides
that a defense under section 426.30 must be specially pleaded and cannot be
incorporated by reference to a failure to state the claim. The Datta
court held that a compulsory counterclaim defense needed to be raised seasonably
and properly to be mandatory (Datta v. Staab (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 613,
619.) Neither courts’holding imposes a strict timeframe of when a challenge
under section 426.30 can be raised. Here, Meloian properly pleads that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under section
426.30. Noting that the instant action arises from the same issues of fact as
the previous case identified as case no. 22STLC01503, the instant action
would be barred under section 426.30. Thus, since the claim is barred under
section 426.30, Meloian have shown that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action.
Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS Meloian’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
II. Conclusion
Defendant Spartak Meloian’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
as to Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED.
Defendant
Spartak Meloian is ordered to electronically submit a proposed form of judgment
within 10-days.
Moving party is ordered to give
notice.