Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 23STLC02807, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STLC02807    Hearing Date: January 16, 2024    Dept: 25

Hearing Date:                         Tuesday, January 16, 2024

Case Name:                             ARMANDO MENDOZA v. CITY OF DUARTE, a Municipal corporation.

Case No.:                                23STLC02807

Motion:                                   Motion for City’s Fees and Costs

Moving Party:                         Respondent City of Duarte

Responding Party:                   None

Notice:                                    OK

Tentative Ruling:                    Respondent City of Duarte’s Motion for City’s Fees and Costs is DENIED

SERVICE: 

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                      OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                      OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                       OK 

OPPOSITION:          Filed as of January 03, 2024                           [   ] Late          [   ] None 

REPLY:                     Filed as of January 08, 2024                           [   ] Late          [   ] None 

BACKGROUND

On April 27, 2023, Appellant Armando Mendoza (“Appellant”) filed notice of his appeal of his administrative citation issued against him on February 22, 2023, by the City of Duarte (“Respondent” or “the City”).

On July 10, 2023, the City filed an Ex-Parte Application to confirm Court Process and obtain a brief continuance of the hearing. The Court granted the application on July 11, 2023, and continued the hearing date to August 25, 2023.

On August 16, 2023, the Parties jointly stipulated to continue the hearing on the appeal to October 06, 2023.

 On October 13, 2023, the Court affirmed the citation issued against Appellant.

On December 18, 2023, the City filed the instant Motion for City’s Fees and Costs. Appellant files in opposition. The City replies.

MOVING PARTY POSITION

            The City prays for the court to issue an order awarding the City attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $45,078.93. The City argues it is the prevailing party within the meaning of CCP § 1032(b) and 1032(a)(4), since Appellant did not recover any relief against the City and is therefore entitled to reimbursement of the City’s Reasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs pursuant to Duarte Municipal Code Section 1.08.140 and 1.08.130. The City additionally argues that its request for reimbursement of $45,078.93 is reasonable given the circumstances and is fully supported by the Declaration of its counsel.

OPPOSITION

            In opposition, Appellant argues that the City is not the prevailing party under CCP 1033.5 because the appeal of his administrative citation does not constitute an action defined by CCP § 1032. Alternatively, if the Court were to determine otherwise, the Court should deny fees because the City’s request is wholly unreasonable and excessive in the absence of accurate time records. Appellant further asserts the fees sought are prohibited by the Excess Fines Clause of the [18^th] Amendment. (sic) Appellant argues that the fine is simply disguised by the City to punish him for seeking an administrative review of his citations as a pro per litigant and that the motion seeks “100 times of the actual fine…therefore grossly disproportional to the offense and is excessive and cruel…” (Opp. p.3:4-6.) 

REPLY

            In reply, the City continues to assert that Duarte Municipal Code establishes that the city is entitled to reimbursement for their efforts to abate nuisances for the protection of the community. Moreover, the City argues that there can be no excessive fines clause violation because the City is not imposing a Fine or Forfeiture to punish Appellant. Further, Petitioner cites no supporting case law establishing that a city seeking reimbursement of its cost and fees, as a prevailing party, constitutes a fine for purposes of the 8th Amendment.

ANALYSIS

I.          Legal Standard

 A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, including attorney’s fees, as a matter of right.  (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1032(a)(4), 1032(b), 1033.5.)  Attorney’s fees are allowable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(10).)  

In a breach of contract action, attorney’s fees shall be awarded when a contract provides that one of the parties or the prevailing party shall be awarded attorney’s fees in an action on that contract.  (See Civ. Code § 1717.)  A prevailing party is “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.”  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1032(a)(4).)  However, “[w]here an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of [Civil Code section 1717].”  (Civ. Code § 1717(b)(2); see Shapira v. Lifetech Resources, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 429, 441 (“A trial court lacks discretion to award fees under section 1717(b)(2) where a case has been voluntarily dismissed.”); see also Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17¿Cal.4th 599, 615.) 

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Ibid. at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.) 

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154: 

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.] The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.] 

(Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140.) “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.  [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623624.)   

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.  (Ibid.; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 255.) 

II.        Discussion

As a preliminary matter the Court will not address Appellant's contention of supposed violations of the Excessive Fines Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence applies only to criminal matters and does not reach the issuance of fees and costs incurred by a prevailing party. (Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. (1989) 492 U.S. 257.)

The City cites to Duarte Municipal Code (DMC) 1.08.130(a) and 1.08.140 as relevant statutory authority in granting its request for attorney’s fees. DMC 1.08.130(a) provide that,

At its discretion, the city may pursue any and all available legal means to ensure collection of all fines issued under this chapter, including any applicable interest and penalties and costs of abatement or enforcement. Pursuit of any one remedy shall not preclude enforcement by any other legal means until the total amount due has been collected.

(Duarte Mun. Code § 1.08.130(a).) DMC 1.08.140 additionally states that, “In any hearing, proceedings, or action under this chapter, attorneys' fees may be recovered by the prevailing party; provided, however, that the award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party shall not exceed the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by the city in the action or proceeding.” (Duarte Mun. Code § 1.08.140.)

The City asserts that it is the prevailing party within the meaning of CCP § 1032(b) and 1032(a)(4), since Appellant did not recover any relief against the City. Here the City’s declaration in support of the motion states that the Court upheld the Hearing officer’s final administrative decision and entered the Notice of Decision. (Matther G. Trujillo Decl. ¶ 2.) Thus, the Court finds the City to be the prevailing party under CCP § 1032(b).

In opposition, Appellant argues that the City’s motion is time barred under CRC 3.1700 as the motion was filed 15-days after the court issued notice of its decision. (Opp’n p. 6:26-28.) The Court agrees the motion is time barred, however, the Court finds better authority under CRC rule 3.1702. CRC rule 3.1702(a) provides in relevant part that,

Except as otherwise provided by statute, this rule applies in civil cases to claims for statutory attorney's fees and claims for attorney's fees provided for in a contract. Subdivisions (b) and (c) apply when the court determines entitlement to the fees, the amount of the fees, or both, whether the court makes that determination because the statute or contract refers to “reasonable” fees, because it requires a determination of the prevailing party, or for other reasons.

(Cal Rules of Court Rule 3.1702 (a).) CRC rule 3.1702(b)(1) further provides that a notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the rendition of Judgement in the trial court, including attorney’s fees on an appeal before rendition of a judgement in the trial court must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case. (Cal Rules of Court Rule 3.1702 (b)(1).) CRC rule 8.822 provides that unless provided otherwise by statue or rule 8.823 a party must provide notice on or before the earliest of,

(A) 30 days after the trial court clerk serves the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date it was served.

(B) 30 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled “Notice of Entry” of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service: or

(C) 90 days after the entry of judgment.

(Cal Rules of Court Rule 8.822(a)(1).) Here, notice of the Court’s decision was given on October 13, 2023. The City did not file its motion for Attorney’s fees until December 18, 2023, well over the 30-day deadline to file a motion seeking attorney’s fees. Therefore, for that reason the Court DENIES the motion for Attorney’s fees.

III.       Conclusion

            Respondent City of Duarte’s Motion for City’s Fees and Cost is DENIED

Moving party is ordered to give notice.