Judge: Latrice A. G. Byrdsong, Case: 23STLC03804, Date: 2024-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STLC03804    Hearing Date: February 5, 2024    Dept: 25

Hearing Date:                         Monday, February 05, 2024

Case Name:                             DOUGLAS L. HALLETT, and individual v. VCA Inc., a Delaware corporation; MARIE KERL, DVM, an individual, MICHAEL KWAN, DVM, an individual; and DOES 1-20,

Case No.:                                23STLC03804

Motion:                                   Motions to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production and Requests for Monetary Sanctions

Moving Party:                         Plaintiff Douglas Hallett, In Pro-per

Responding Party:                   Defendants VCA Animal Hospitals, Inc. (erroneously sued as VCA, Inc.), Marie Kerl, DVM, and Michael Kwan, DVM  

Notice:                                    OK


 

Tentative Ruling:      Plaintiff Douglas Hallett’s Motions to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

 

Defendants are ordered to provide further responses to Requests Nos. 3 and 4. Defendants are NOT required to provide further responses to Requests No. 1 and 2.

           

Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions is DENIED.   

______________________________________________________________________________

 

SERVICE: 

 

[X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300)                      OK

[X] Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013a)                                      OK

[X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP §§ 12c, 1005(b))                       OK 

 

OPPOSITION:          Filed as of January 23, 2024               [   ] Late          [   ] None 

REPLY:                     Filed as of January 29, 2024               [   ] Late          [   ] None 

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiff Douglas L. Hallett (“Plaintiff”) filed this Complaint against Defendants VCA, Inc. (“VCA”), Marie Kerl, DVM (“Kerl”), and Michael Kwan, DVM (“Kwan”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The action arises out of the death of Plaintiff’s pet dog, Rosie, which occurred on October 6, 2022.

 

On August 07, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint. The motion sought to strike the allegations supporting the claim for exemplary damages under Civil Code § 3340 as well as the request for judicial referral of the individual defendants to the California Veterinary Medical Board for disciplinary action. (See Notice of Motion at pg. 2.) On September 27, 2023, the Court denied the motion in its entirety.

 

Defendants filed their Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint on October 06, 2023.

 

On December 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motions to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production and Requests for Monetary Sanctions. Defendants filed in opposition. Plaintiff files in reply to the opposition.

 

MOVING PARTY POSITION

 

            Plaintiff prays for the Court to issue an order compelling Defendants to serve further responses, without objections to Plaintiff’s Request for Production, Set No. 1, served on each Defendant on August 26, 2023. Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed without justification to serve proper responses to Plaintiff’s requests despite receiving numerous opportunities to respond properly, especially after receiving specific advice as to the inadequacy of the responses they did provide. Plaintiff additionally requests that the Court award monetary sanctions against Defendants and their counsel for $4,561.65.

 

OPPOSITION

 

             In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Motion is without merit as Plaintiff’s Request is overbroad, not relevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer in compliance with CCP § 2031. 230. Finally, Defendants argue that Sanctions are not warranted in this case as Plaintiff’s motion is without merit, and Defendants’ objections are justified under the circumstances. Defendants specifically do not seek sanction if they prevail in opposition, preferring to continue to litigate with the hope that future discovery disputes can be resolved informally.

 

REPLY

 

            In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendant misstated the import of Plaintiff’s indication that he did not then need further responses and that Defendants have no valid objection to producing relevant diagnostic and treatment materials from all VCA hospitals and Clinics other than VCA Foothill. Plaintiff additionally argues that Defendants continue to ignore their obligations to at least identify the documents it has provided to Plaintiff. Further, the Defendants themselves concede that their prior responses to Plaintiff’s request were inadequate by repeatedly amending them and that since Defendants’ January 23 responses remain defective, sanctions should be awarded to deter their chronic misconduct.

 

ANALYSIS

 

I.          Legal Standard  

 “Any party may obtain discovery . . . by inspecting, copying, testing, or sampling documents, tangible things, land or other property, and electronically stored information in the possession, custody, or control of any other party to the action.”¿  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010(a).) 

 

“The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following: 

 

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities. 

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item. 

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.” 

 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210(a).) 

“On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: 

 

(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. 

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. 

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” 

 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(a).)¿ 

 

A demanding party’s motion for an order compelling a further response must “set forth the facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., §¿2031.310(b)(1).)¿ Further, a demanding party’s motion for an order compelling a further response must “be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”¿ (Ibid. at §¿2031.310(b)(2).) ¿ Pursuant to Section 2016.040, “[a] meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”¿  (Ibid., § 2016.040.)¿ 

 

A demanding party’s motion for an order compelling a further response must, additionally, be accompanied by a separate statement.¿  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(3).)¿  The separate statement must comply with the requirements set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).¿ (Ibid.) 

 

Further, “[u]nless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, ¿or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.”¿  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).) 

 

“Except as provided in subdivision (j), the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”¿  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(h).) 

 

II.        Discussion

 

A. Notice of the Motions

 

Notice of the motion to compel further must be given “within 45 days of service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or any specific later date to which the requesting party and the responding party have agreed in writing,” otherwise, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c); § 2031.310, subd. (d).)

 

Here, Defendants served initial identical discovery responses electronically on October 2, 2022. (Motion, Hallet Decl., ¶3.) Following “meet and confer” efforts, the parties agreed Plaintiff would have an additional 45 days after Defendant’s production of additional documents by December 15, 2023, to file the instant Motions. (Motion, Hallet Decl., Ex. N.) The Motions were timely filed and served on December 28, 2023.

 

B. Meet and Confer Requirement

 

Next, the Motions must be accompanied by a “meet and confer” declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (b)(1); 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).)

 

As noted above, the supporting declaration demonstrates an effort by Plaintiff to obtain further responses from Defendant after service of the original responses for almost three months, with agreements by defense counsel to provide supplemental responses. (Motion, Hallet Decl. ¶¶18-23) Specifically Plaintiff states that on October 5, 2023, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter to Defendants’ counsel, outlining the deficiencies within Defendant’s responses. (Id. ¶ 5, Ex. D) This was subsequently followed by a telephonic meet and confer and additional correspondence dealing with issues related to the defective production. (Id. ¶ 6; Exhs. F,M) Despite this, Plaintiff states that Defendants’ counsel has not offered a substantive response to Plaintiff’s repeated advice about the deficiencies in Defendants’ responses and production. (Id. ¶¶ 18-23.) Thus, the meet and confer requirement is satisfied.

 

C. Separate Statement Requirement (CRC Rule 3.1345)

 

Finally, Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1345 requires all motions or responses involving further discovery to contain a separate statement with the text of each request, the response, and a statement of factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345, subd. (a).) Alternatively, “the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(3).)

 

Here, the Motions are accompanied by separate statements. (12/28/23 Separate Statements.) In the Separate Statement, Plaintiff sets forth the Requests for Production for which he seeks an order compelling further response.  

 

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to his Requests for Production because Defendant’s responses consisted only of meritless and boilerplate objections, failing to comply with the requirements under CCP § 2031.240. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ responses continue virtually the same general boilerplate objections to all of Plaintiff’s requests without any effort to explain or identify how each objection applied to any request or part of the request. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s responses improperly rely upon a myriad of meritless, overbroad, and general objections to entire categories of documents without providing a valid reason for Defendants’ inability to comply and that Defendants fail to identify persons or organizations who have or are believed to have, possession, custody or control of these unproduced items.

 

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request is overbroad, irrelevant, and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s requests are so overbroad that Defendants do not know or have a reasonable belief of who would be in possession, custody, or control of the items Plaintiff requests even after a diligent search and reasonable inquiry. Defendants emphasize that Plaintiff admits that his requests seek “information from each of Defendants’ more than 1,000 hospitals and clinics,” which is incredibly overbroad, thus justifying Defendants’ objections. Defendants additionally state in their supporting declaration that they are serving further responses indicating Lifelearn Inc. and ProSites Inc. may have documents responsive to Request No. 4. (Burdine Decl. at ¶ 8, Ex. B, C, and D.)

 

i. Request for Production No. 1 and 2

 

Plaintiff firstly requests “Documents reflecting, relaying, discussing, and/or referring to triage procedures and protocols, Urinary Tract Infection diagnosis and treatment procedures and protocols, and Ovarian Remnant Syndrome diagnosis and treatment procedures and protocols, including those sent to and/or received from any person, in effect at VCA Foothill Veterinary Hospital (“VCA Foothill”) and/or at any other VCA Inc. hospital or clinic one year before and extending through July 15, 2022.”

 

Plaintiff secondly request “Documents reflecting, relaying, discussing, and/or referring to triage procedures and protocols, Urinary Tract Infection diagnosis and treatment procedures and protocols, and Ovarian Remnant Syndrome diagnosis and treatment procedures and protocols, including those sent to and/or received from any person, in effect at VCA Foothill and/or at any other VCA Inc. hospital or clinic after July 15, 2022, through the date of production.”

 

Plaintiff states in his separate statement that Requests 1 and 2 seek the same information for two periods. Plaintiff argues that the information is essential because it is incontestable that Defendants maintained both UTI and ORS diagnosis and treatment procedures and protocols and misrepresented that truth here. Plaintiff further argues that these misrepresentations constitute an improper statement of compliance, an inability to comply, and an abuse of the discovery process within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure Section 2023.030(f). Plaintiff prays for the Court to order Defendants, in addition to withdrawing general and boilerplate objections, to further respond to Requests 1 and 2, including information developed from VCA hospitals and clinics other than VCA Foothill as such material is vital to understanding VCA's institutional knowledge of standard diagnostic and treatment protocols, and shed light on whether VCA hospitals and clinics other than VCA Foothill share VCA's corporate misunderstanding of their medical obligations and have taken action to correct VCA's deficient and substandard medical policies.

 

In opposition, Defendants cite Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter, issued on October 05, 2023, in which Plaintiff states, “At this time, I do not need any further responses from your clients as to Requests 1 and 2 (other than from VCA hospitals and clinics not already surveyed as discussed in the paragraph immediately below), but will be exploring this matter at trial as further explained below.” (Opp. Separate Statement; Hallet Dec, Exhibit E, pg. 2; emphasis added.) Defendants argue that VCA has approximately 189 hospitals in California alone and that Plaintiff’s pet was not treated at dozens of different VCA hospitals, thereby providing no conceivable justification for Defendants to incur the unjust costs of surveying hospitals that had nothing to do with the care a single hospital that provided Plaintiff’s pet. Defendants additionally argue that the information that Plaintiff requests is publicly available on VCA’s website.

 

In reply, Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to the material requested from each of Defendants’ 1,000-plus hospitals and clinics. He has reserved this entitlement in his initial meet and confer letter and has tried to enforce it. Plaintiff continues that Defendants are the best sources for that information, citing Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (1986) Cal App 3d 313. Plaintiff argues that he seeks tightly defined limited information from each of Defendants’ more than 1,000 hospitals and clinics material relating to specific diagnostic and treatment protocols that are relevant to Rosie’s treatment and that such materials are highly relevant to the question of the proper standard of care and whether VCA locations other than VCA foothill recognize the impropriety of the care administered to Rosie.

 

The Court finds that Defendants’ responses are code compliant as they have explained their inability to comply with this request. While Plaintiff’s request seeks to find discoverable information relevant to showing the standard of care for Rosie, the Court fails to see the relevance considering the volume of the requested information, and the amount of time and expense it would take for Defendants to provide the relevant information to Plaintiff. Defendants correctly point out that Rosie was not treated at every VCA location but rather at VCA Foothill. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED as to Request No. 1 and 2.

 

ii. Request for Production No. 3

 

Plaintiff requests “Documents reflecting, relaying information about, discussing and/or referring to asking party and/or his late dog Rosie and/or the contentions that you or anyone acting on your behalf did or did not provide Rosie care and treatment consistent with the standard of care between July 12, 2022 and October 6, 2022, including internal and external communications by and/or to, among others and without limitation, Todd Lavender, DVM, Natalie Reinert, DVM, medical staff members of VCA Foothill, Trina Sutton, and Estelle Gaebler referring to asking party and/or Rosie and/or to such care and treatment (e.g. if you or anyone acting on your behalf disputes any of the contentions specified in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and/or 42 of the Complaint, please provide documents supporting such position as to each such disputed contention.)”

 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not provided sufficient information to perform such an evaluation. Defendants' privilege log is not sufficiently particularized to a specific Request. It gives Plaintiff no basis for determining which Request 3 documents legitimately fall within any claim of privilege or how the privilege claim is justified in relationship to the specific Request. Defendants have not met the requirements for a proper privilege log. The Request is neither vague nor ambiguous, and Defendants have not attempted to explain how it can be so characterized. The information sought also clearly falls within the scope of discovery California law recognizes.

 

In opposition, Defendants argue that it is clear from their privilege log that these communications are between VCA’s in-house counsel and various VCA employees. Plaintiff himself is aware of both of VCA’s in-house counsel(s) as Plaintiff has communicated directly with them. Defendants emphasize that the only response that refers to Defendants’ privilege log is Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 3. Thus, Plaintiff already has the information. Further, Plaintiff’s argument that the subject matters are “vague” on Defendants’ privilege log is irrelevant as the subjects are the subject line from the attorney-client privilege emails Defendants are withholding. Further description of the subject of the communications would invade the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine. The only reason Defendants placed these privileged communications on a privilege log in the first place was to meaningfully meet and confer with Plaintiff in the hope of not wasting the Court’s resources on such a frivolous motion.

 

In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have offered no proof that all of its hospitals and clinics are unaware of Rosie’s case when Plaintiff has provided evidence that at least 60 have been informed. The fact that none of the documents have been produced raises the question of whether any diligent search has been made for responsive documents and if more discoverable documents would surface.

 

Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.240(c)(1) provides that if an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240(c)(1).) Here, the Court notes that while Defendants reference their privilege log in their declaration and separate statement, Defendants do not provide the privilege log in their supporting documents. The Court finds that Plaintiff has good cause for seeking production of documents requested. Thus, Defendants are ordered to provide a code-compliant response to the request.  Parties may stipulate to a protective order to protect the rights of non-litigants and other confidential and personal information and may provide a privilege log, as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.240. 

 

iii. Request for Production No. 4

 

Plaintiff requests, “Documents reflecting, discussing, and/or referring to VCA Inc.’s licensing of marketing and and/or [sic] other intellectual property from ProSites Inc. and/or LifeLearn Inc. for use on VCA Inc.’s website and/or on the websites of its affiliated hospitals and clinics, and to such use, including, without limitation, contracts and/or agreements defining VCA Inc.’s right to use such materials and the terms of such use, procedures and practices in effect to evaluate and assure the accuracy and quality of such intellectual property, and disclaimers and other warnings communicated from and/or to any person about the appropriate use of such intellectual property.”

 

Plaintiff argues that there needs to be a specific identification of what documents they have produced and what documents they have that do not fall within the language of the Request and within the meaning of the statement of compliance/noncompliance requirements. Plaintiff is entitled to a valid statement and production covering both Defendants' compliance and their noncompliance.

 

In opposition, Defendants argue that contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion that the referenced protective order to this request was without legal basis, as seen in Plaintiff’s Request No. 4, Plaintiff is requesting intellectual property (and licensing materials) between VCA and ProSites Inc. and LifeLearn Inc. Such a request is inherently confidential, and Defendants objected as such. Plaintiff also requests all contracts or agreements defining VCA’s right to use such materials from these third-party companies. Consequently, Plaintiff’s request is overbroad and irrelevant to the subject of this litigation. Second, Defendants’ further response to Request No. 4 noted that agreements would be produced pursuant to a protective order. (Burdine Decl., ¶ 6.) Defendants agreed to produce responsive documents in their possession, custody, or control (VCA0089-109) without a protective order. Defendants redacted the documents as necessary to protect confidential information. Defendants are serving second further responses noting that Lifelearn Inc. and ProSites Inc. may have additional responsive documents. (Burdine Decl., ¶ 8, Exs. B, C, and D.) This second further response does not reference a protective order.

 

            In reply, Plaintiff argues that the financial terms of VCA’s relationship with Lifelearn, Inc. are relevant to this case as the information will shed light on VCA’s cavalier approach to medical and scientific knowledge and willingness to pay for professional peer-reviewed medical research. Plaintiff further argues that nothing is automatically private about the financial terms of Defendants’ commercial business relationship, and they do not involve potentially protected personal information. Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s argument of trade secrets protection constitutes bad faith as Defendants have not listed any documents that allegedly fall within the trade secrets privilege even after three failed attempts to provide a meaningful one.

 

            According to Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.060(a)-(b), a party that receives a discovery request “may promptly move for a protective order” that will protect the party from “unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense,” and may also protect the party from having to divulge trade secrets or other confidential or commercial information.  Here, Defendants have not promptly moved for a protective order and have not stipulated to a protective order to protect any private or proprietary information. Though the Court notes that Defendants do provide a copy of their drafted protective order, such protective order was never sought in this case. Furthermore, Defendant has not provided a privilege log, per §¿2031.240, or identified “any documents or category of documents being produced that are responsive to this request for production,” per § 2031.280. Thus the Court finds that Defendant has good cause for seeking production of documents requested.  Thus, Defendants are ordered to provide a code-compliant response to the request.  The parties may stipulate to a protective order to protect any trade secrets and business and proprietary information and may provide a privilege log in response. 

 

D. Sanctions

 

Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $4561.65.  (Hallet Decl. ¶ 24.)  Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides that, “the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (h).)

 

Given that the Motion is granted in part and denied in part, the Court does not find that Defendants have unsuccessfully opposed the Motion. Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2023.010 and 2023.030 list the available discovery sanctions but do not independently authorize a court to impose specific sanctions.  (City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2022) 84¿Cal.App.5th¿466, 503-504.) Thus, a court’s authority to impose the sanctions specified in §§¿2023.010 and 2023.030 must arise from a statute governing a particular method of discovery.  (Id.) Here, since neither party has successfully made or opposed the motion, the Court order will not reach the issue of sanctions. For this reason, the Court does not grant sanctions for misuse of discovery solely based on § 2023.010.  Moreover, the Court finds that imposition of sanctions given the extensive meet and confer efforts is not warranted in this instance.

 

III.       Conclusion

           

            Plaintiff Douglas Hallett’s Motions to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

 

Defendants are ordered to provide further responses to Requests Nos. 3 and 4. Defendants are NOT required to provide further responses to Requests No. 1 and 2.

           

Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions is DENIED.   

 

Moving Party is ordered to give notice.