Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 20STCV12435, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV12435 Hearing Date: September 11, 2023 Dept: 15
[TENTATIVE] ORDERS RE MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 53, MOTION
TO BIFURCATE
MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 53
Defendants
filed a motion in limine to limit the testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert David
Rosner. Although the motion is 12 pages
long, it does not identify specific documents or testimony to be excluded.
The
motion seeks to exclude all testimony that is not “the widely held opinion and
predominant view of the scientific and medical community.” (Motion at p. 5.) This is too vague. The motion does not identify any specific
exhibit or testimony to be excluded.
The
motion seeks to exclude all documents not dated between 1976 and 1999 because
any documents before or after those dates would not include knowledge that is
“reasonably scientifically knowable.”
(Motion at p. 5.) This makes
little sense. Why wouldn’t documents written
in 1974 or 1975 be scientifically knowable in 1976? Again, the motion does not specify the
documents to be excluded.
The
motion seeks to seeks to exclude testimony about asbestosis, lung cancer, and
“asbestos in general.” (Motion at p.
6.) This is too vague and overbroad. This case is about asbestos. The court cannot exclude testimony about
“asbestos in general.” While evidence
about asbestosis and lung cancer very well may be irrelevant and consume an
undue amount of time, Defendants is simply guessing that Plaintiffs will have
the jury “sit through hours of testimony concerning hundreds of articles,
publications, newspaper reports, and trade journals related to the disease’s
[sic] asbestosis and/or lung cancer.”
(Motion at p. 7.) Given that
Plaintiffs listed two hours of testimony for Rosner on the witness list,
Plaintiffs are not going to spend hours on hundreds of articles about other
diseases. In any event, if at trial
Plaintiffs start asking questions about asbestosis and lung cancer, Defendants
can object at that time.
The
motion seeks to exclude “all testimony and documents that do not pertain to
when the medical and scientific community widely held the predominant opinion
that asbestos exposure from Defendants’ Products could cause mesothelioma or
that exposure to Defendant’s Products could increase the risk of that
disease.” (Motion at p. 8.) This is too vague. The motion does not list the specific documents
or testimony to be excluded. And it is
likely to be disputed whether particular (unspecified) documents pertain or do
not pertain to that issue.
The
motion seeks to exclude all evidence about products not at issue in this case,
citing Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1991) 53 Cal.3d
987. (Motion at p. 9.) Defendant contends that case held “that the
state of the art evidence must also relate to the product in question.” (Motion at p. 9.) Defendant does not provide a page cite for
that assertion. The case held that “a
defendant in a strict products liability action based upon an alleged failure
to warn of a risk of harm may present evidence of the state of the art, i.e.,
evidence that the particular risk was neither known nor knowable by the
application of scientific knowledge available at the time of manufacture and/or
distribution.” (Anderson, supra,
53 Cal.3d at p. 1004.) The case does not
hold that a plaintiff is precluded from presenting any particular
evidence. Nor does the case hold that
only evidence about a particular product is admissible. In any event, Defendants’ motion is too
vague. For example, an expert may be
able to establish at trial that studies about asbestos exposure from other
products are relied upon by experts in the field. And Defendants do not define what they mean
by “the product in question.” For
example, if a defendant made a particular brand of asbestos-containing gasket,
must the state of the art evidence discuss only that particular brand of
gasket? Or can the state of the art
evidence concern gaskets generally? If
Defendants assert that the evidence must address the particular brand of gasket,
that is too narrow, and they have not cited legal authority requiring such a
narrow definition.
The
motion contends that Rosner’s testimony is “pure speculation” and
irrelevant. (Motion at p. 11.) Pursuant to the July 8, 2022 CMO, motions to
exclude speculative and irrelevant evidence are deemed made and denied. Defendants did not show good cause to depart
from that order.
The
motion seeks to exclude “general testimony” not related to Strand Lighting
LLC. (Motion at p. 12.) Strand Lighting LLC is now in bankruptcy and
the claims against it are stayed.
Therefore, little if any testimony will be about Strand Lighting. In any event “general testimony” is too vague
a category of testimony to exclude.
The
motion is denied without prejudice to objections at trial.
The
moving party is to give notice.
MOTION TO BIFURCATE
Defendant Vari-Lite, LLC
filed a motion to bifurcate the issue of its liability as a successor to Strand
Lighting LLC, asking that this issue be tried to the court before starting the
jury trial. “[T]he question whether it
is fair to impose successor liability is exclusively for the trial court,” and
it is error to instruct the jury on the elements of whether successor
liability. (Rosales v.
Thermex-Thermatron, Inc. (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 187, 196.)
Plaintiffs did not file
an opposition and therefore did not show any reason not to try the issue of
successor liability first to the court.
Therefore the motion is granted.
The moving party is to
give notice.