Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 20STCV32519, Date: 2022-12-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV32519 Hearing Date: December 13, 2022 Dept: 48
SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
|
FABIOLA YANI, Plaintiff, vs. BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY DIRECT CORPORATION,
et al., Defendants. |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE
ARBITRATOR’S AWARD, MANDATORY RECUSAL OF ARBITRATOR VOGEL, AND DETERMINATION OF
MS. CHARLES AS A PARTY TO THE ARBITRATION Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. December 13, 2022 |
On
August 26, 2020, Plaintiff Fabiola Yani (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against
Defendants Burlington Coat Factory Direct Corporation and Laura Charles (collectively,
“Defendants”), alleging (1) discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) harassment in violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation
of FEHA; (4) unlawful retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5; (5) wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy; and (6) failure to provide employee records.
On
February 18, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.
On
November 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order (1) to vacate orders by
arbitrator Robert D. Vogel (“Arbitrator Vogel”) for Plaintiff to sign two subpoenas
pertaining to third parties California In-Home Support Services (“IHSS”) and EDD;
(2) of mandatory recusal of Arbitrator Vogel in the current arbitration proceedings;
and (3) finding that Ms. Charles is a party to the current arbitration proceedings.
The
parties agree that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to this arbitration. (See, e.g., Feb. 18, 2021 Order at p. 2; Motion
at p. 10; Opposition at pp. 4-5.)
Under
the FAA, the Court may vacate an arbitration award only (1) where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made. (9 U.S.C. § 10(a).)
“The
arbitrator’s award must normally be final and binding before such review is undertaken. [Citation.]
Only in the most extreme cases will judicial review of a nonfinal award be
proper. [Citation.] To allow judicial intervention prior to the final
award would contravene the fundamental federal labor policy of deference to contractual
dispute resolution procedures, and would interfere with the purpose of arbitration:
the speedy resolution of grievances without the time and expense of court proceedings.” (Millmen Local 550, United Broth. of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO v. Wells Exterior Trim (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d
1373, 1375, footnote omitted.)
Plaintiff
argues that partial or interim awards may be enforceable in this action even while
the arbitration remains pending. (Reply at
p. 2.) “[A]n interim award may be deemed
final for functus officio purposes if the award states it is final, and if
the arbitrator intended the award to be final.”
(Bosack v. Soward (9th Cir. 2009) 586 F.3d 1096, 1103 (Bosack).) This may be demonstrated by language in the order
instructing the parties to seek further relief in court, or if only minor adjustments
or clarification of the award remain. (Legion
Ins. Co. v. VCW, Inc. (8th Cir. 1999) 198 F.3d 718, 720 [functus officio
criteria adopted and cited by the Ninth Circuit in Bosack].) However, as discussed below, none of the orders
for which Plaintiff seeks intervention are interim awards—they are procedural orders
and decisions issued during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.
A. Vacating Discovery Order to Sign Authorization
In
January 2022, Respondents in the arbitration issued a deposition subpoena for production
of business records to California IHSS. (Villarreal
Decl., Ex. F.) Arbitrator Vogel issued Discovery
Order No. 5 on August 19, 2022, ordering Plaintiff to immediately execute appropriate
authorizations consenting to the release of documents. (Villarreal Decl., Ex. G.)
Plaintiff
argues that third-party subpoenas are not authorized under the FAA or the California
Arbitration Act (“CAA”). (Motion at pp. 10-13.) However, there is no final and binding arbitration
award yet for this Court to review. This
is a procedural order governing discovery and does not finally decide the issues
between the parties. If Arbitrator Vogel
engaged in misconduct or exceeded his powers, that may be grounds for this Court
to vacate a final award later. (9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a).) But there is no authority for this
Court to interfere with and vacate discovery orders now.
B. Recusing Arbitrator
Plaintiff
argues that Arbitrator Vogel is the only principal in Jackson Lewis P.C.’ Utah and
Los Angeles offices who handles both traditional labor law and employment litigation,
and Defendants’ counsel in this action is also from Jackson Lewis. (Motion at pp. 16-17.) Citing both AAA’s rules and the California Rules
of Court, Plaintiff argues that Arbitrator Vogel must be subject to mandatory recusal. (Id. at pp. 17-18.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has waived
any objections to Arbitrator Vogel because she has been on notice about his affiliation
with Jackson Lewis since April 2021, she never objected during the selection
process, and she never moved to disqualify him.
(Opposition at pp. 7-9.)
On
October 10, 2022, AAA issued a determination stating that Arbitrator Vogel would
be reaffirmed as an arbitrator. (Villarreal
Decl., Ex. L.) The arbitration remains ongoing,
and there is no final arbitration award yet for this Court to vacate. It is very unusual for the arbitrator to be
from the same firm as one party’s counsel, and any potential future challenge
to a final award will be given careful consideration. But the Court makes no findings on the merits
now at this premature procedural stage.
C. Ms. Charles as a Party to the Arbitration
Plaintiff
argues that Ms. Charles joined the motion to compel arbitration, but now she is
avoiding arbitration. (Motion at pp. 9-10.)
Plaintiff’s
March 9, 2021 demand for arbitration identified only “Burlington Coat Factory Direct
Corporation” as the Respondent. (Villarreal
Decl., Ex. E.) On October 4, 2022, Arbitrator
Vogel issued an order addressing whether Ms. Charles is a party to the arbitration. (Villarreal Decl., Ex. H.) He concluded that Plaintiff did not meet her burden
of showing that Ms. Charles was a party, and he set forth three options for Plaintiff
if she wished to assert claims against Ms. Charles. On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended
demand for arbitration, naming Burlington Coat Factory Direct Corporation and Laura
Charles as Respondents. (Villarreal Decl.,
Ex. I.)
There
is no final order for this Court to vacate or amend, and Plaintiff’s request that
this Court issue an order stating that Ms. Charles is a party to the current arbitration
proceedings was not one of the options that Arbitrator Vogel presented to Plaintiff.
D. Conclusion
The
motion is DENIED.
Moving
party to give notice.
Parties
who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org
indicating intention to submit. Parties intending
to appear are encouraged to appear remotely and should be prepared to comply with
Dept. 48’s new requirement that those attending court in person wear a surgical
or N95 or KN95 mask.
Dated this 13th day of December 2022
|
|
|
|
|
Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior
Court |