Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 21STCV21966, Date: 2023-09-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV21966    Hearing Date: February 8, 2024    Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION TO QUASH (PTI)

            Plaintiffs Stephen Anderson and Robin Anderson alleges Stephen Anderson was injured as a result of asbestos exposure from Defendant PTI Union, LLC’s products.  Defendant filed a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs asked for jurisdictional discovery, which the court granted.  The court continued the hearing date, and the parties then filed supplemental briefing before the new hearing date.

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).) 

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)  “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.)  A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.) 

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.  (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.)  Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  (Ibid.)  “The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate.  [Citation.]  The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts.  [Citation.]”  (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

A defendant is subject to a state’s general jurisdiction if its contacts “are so continuance and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”  (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)  A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum “if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’  [Citations.]”  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.)  This test does not require a “causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation.”  (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026.)  The “arise out” of standard “asks about causation,” but “relate to” does not.  (Ibid.)  “[W]hen a corporation has ‘continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State’s] court[s]’ to defend actions ‘based on’ products causing injury there.”  (Id. at p. 1027.) 

Defendant states there is no general jurisdiction over it because it is a Delaware company located in Missouri.  (Motion at p. 4.)  Plaintiffs do not dispute this.

Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot prove specific jurisdiction because Defendant blended talcum products in Missouri for customers, those customers directed the shipment of their products, and Defendant had no role in the release, distribution, sale, or marketing of those products.  (Motion at p. 7; Brasher Decl., ¶¶ 7, 8.)  Plaintiffs argue Anderson was exposed to Gold Bond powder from the late 1980s into the 2000s, and Defendant manufactured and packaged Gold Bond powder for Chattem.  (Opposition at pp. 2, 4; Supp. Opposition at p. 3.)  Defendant knew Chattem was selling Gold Bond in California.  (Opposition at p. 6; Supp. Opposition at pp. 4-5.)  Plaintiffs contend these facts make this case like Jayone.  (Supp. Opposition at pp. 7-8.)

The court in Jayone explained, “In the products liability context, merely placing a product into the stream of commerce, even with knowledge that the product might enter the forum state, is not a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.  [Citations.]  On the other hand, ‘if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.’  [Citation.]”  (Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 558-559.)  “[T]he indirect placement of products into the stream of commerce does not necessarily insulate a foreign manufacturer from the jurisdiction of California courts.  Even an indirect effort to serve a California market for a manufacturer's product may reasonably make that manufacturer subject to suit in California if its product has caused injury.”  (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 115.)  “A nonresident defendant's indirect sales through its California distributors constitutes economic activity in California as a matter of commercial actuality when the defendant earned substantial gross income from that activity.”  (Id. at p. 116.) 

In Jayone, the court explained the defendant had “not merely place[d] its products into the stream of commerce with an awareness that they might end up in California.”  (Jayone, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p 559.)  The defendant “purposefully directed its activities toward California businesses when it repeatedly sold its products to various California distributors over a seven-year period,” and “generated almost $2 million in revenue from those California sales.”  (Ibid.)  The distributor was located in California, the defendant shipped the products to that distributor in California, the defendant knew the final destination of the products was California, the defendant visited the distributor’s facility in California to discuss increasing the volume of exports to the distributor, and the defendant visited a retail store in California to see its products being sold there.  (Id. at pp. 556-557.)  The court held this was enough to show the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California.  (Id. at p. 559.) 

Plaintiffs did not provide comparable evidence that Defendant repeatedly sold its products to California-based distributors and focused on increasing sales to California.  Here the only evidence about California is a 2019 certificate of analysis from a lab to Pharma-Tech Industries concerning kaolin testing and stating the testing was for “Lead for CA Prop 65.”  (Supp. Opposition at pp. 4-5; Adams Decl., Ex. 16.)  The 2019 date of this document is after Plaintiff stopped using Gold Bond in 2017 (Supp. Opposition at p. 2) and therefore does not show Defendant purposefully directed its activities to California during the time of Plaintiff’s exposure.  Plaintiff did not show Defendant sold products to distributors based in California or generated substantial gross income from California sales, as in Jayone.  “[K]nowledge the product might enter the forum state” is not enough.  (Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 591, 602.)

Plaintiffs also state Defendant’s website discusses a partnership with Clorox, and Clorox has headquarters in California.  (Supp. Opposition at p. 5.)  Plaintiffs submitted no evidence of those assertions.  In any event, even if the partnership with a California business meant that Defendant availed itself of the forum benefits of California at some unknown time, Plaintiffs did not show their claims against Defendant arise out of or relate to the partnership with Clorox.  There is no evidence Clorox made or distributed the product at issue here (Gold Bond) or any other asbestos-containing product.

In sum, Plaintiffs did not show Defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum benefits of California.

The motion is GRANTED and the complaint against Defendant PTI Union LLC is DISMISSSED without prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (h).

The moving party is to give notice.