Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 21STCV32564, Date: 2022-08-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV32564    Hearing Date: August 17, 2022    Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

            Defendant California Institute of Technology filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Plaintiffs Michael Karmon, Galit Rubin, and Adina Kraus waived their claims against Defendant by stating in their complaint, “Plaintiffs hereby expressly define and limit the scope of injury to exclude any and all claims for damages arising from or connected to any federal territory, federal land, federal property, federal facilities and/or other federal enclave.”  (Complaint, ¶ 14.) 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent to a general demurrer.  (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of Am. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.)  Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

            The complaint alleges the decedent worked at Defendant’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory where he was exposed to asbestos.  (Complaint, ¶10.)  The parties do not dispute that JPL is owned by the federal government.  Defendant argues “Plaintiff used this waiver to keep the case out of federal court,” and in the federal court relied on the waiver in remanding the case.  (Motion at p. 3.)  Because the waiver covers claims arising from or connected to all federal properties and facilities, Defendant contends it includes Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant, which runs JPL.

            Plaintiffs argue they intended only to waive claims involving federal enclave jurisdiction, and that the federal court only relied on a different part of the waiver – “Plaintiffs hereby waive any and all claims for damages against Defendants, and each of them, relating to or arising from Decedent’s exposure to asbestos, if any, on a federal enclave.”  (Complaint, ¶ 14.)  Plaintiffs argue that while federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal enclaves, not all federal territories are federal enclaves.  (Opposition at p. 7.)  According to Plaintiff, the waiver should have only included federal enclaves.  (Motion at p. 8.) 

            Plaintiffs’ motion to remand filed in federal court states “Plaintiffs expressly disavow any claims that could have arisen on a federal enclave” (Defendant’s Ex. B at p. 3) and “Plaintiffs have expressly waived and disavowed any and all claims against Defendant arising from or related to any incident, act, or conduct arising out of the National institutes of Health located in Bethesda, Maryland, or any other federal enclave.”  (Id. at p. 7.)  The order granting the motion to remand stated, “in their complaint, Plaintiffs waived ‘any and all claims against defendants arising from or related to any incident, act or conduct arising out of or in connection with any federal enclave’ – i.e., Mrs. Karmon’s exposure to asbestos at the NIH.”  (Defendant’s Ex. C at p. 2.)  It also referred to “general language about waiving ‘any and all claims for damages against Defendants . . . relating to or arising from Decedent’s exposure to asbestos . . . on a federal enclave.”  (Id. at p. 7.)  The order did not cite the broader waiver at issue here.

            Thus, the federal court remand order relied on the federal enclave waiver, as well as a separate waiver specific to NIH.  (Defendant’s Ex. C at p. 7.)  In other words, even if the complaint had not contained the broader language waiving “any and all claims for damages arising from or connected to any federal territory, federal land, federal property, federal facilities,” the federal court would have remanded the case based on the waiver of claims arising out of exposure on a federal enclave.

            All that being said, the waiver in Paragraph 14 of the complaint is broad and on its face include the wavier of all claims for damages “arising from or connected to any . . . . federal property, federal facilities,” which includes JPL and the claims against Defendant based on the decedent’s work at JPL.  For this reason, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is sustained.

            However, the waiver was not included in a contract signed by the parties.  Defendant did not show any detrimental reliance based on the broader waiver language.  The federal court did not rely on the broader waiver language.  The position that Plaintiffs waived all claims arising out of or in connection with a federal enclave (the position Plaintiffs took in federal court) is not totally inconsistent with the position that Plaintiffs did not waive other claims arising out of or in connection with locations that are not federal enclaves (the position Plaintiffs take here).  Therefore, judicial estoppel does not apply.

Plaintiffs state they can amend the complaint to state more specifically that they waive only claims for damages relating to or arising from exposure on a federal enclave, such as the NIH.  (Opposition at p. 10.)

            The motion is GRANTED with 10 day’s leave to amend.

The moving party is to give notice.