Judge Laura A. Seigle, Case 21STCV38985 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 21STCV38985, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV38985 Hearing Date: February 16, 2023 Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Formosa Plastics Corporation (“Defendant”) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. At the January 13, 2023 hearing, the court continued the hearing to allow Plaintiffs to file a five-page supplemental opposition limited to the new issues raised in Defendant’s reply, with Defendant filing a three-page supplemental reply. Defendant’s supplemental reply is six pages long. Therefore, the court considers only the first three pages.

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).) “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.) A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.) Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.) “The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.]” (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

A defendant is subject to a state’s general jurisdiction if its contacts “are so continuance and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” (Saimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.) A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum “if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ [Citations.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.) This test does not require a “causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026.) The “arise out” of standard “asks about causation,” but “relate to” does not. (Ibid.) “[W]hen a corporation has ‘continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State’s] court[s]’ to defendant actions ‘based on’ products causing injury there.” (Id. at p. 1027.)

Most of the motion and opposition is about the attorneys’ wranglings over missteps in filing this motion. In their supplemental opposition, Plaintiffs continue to argue that the motion is late, making many of the same arguments Plaintiffs made in their original opposition. Plaintiffs named Formosa Plastics Corporation in the complaint but then served the complaint on Formosa Plastic Corporation U.S.A. in New Jersey, claiming Formosa Plastic Corporation U.S.A is the US Manager of Formosa Plastics Corporation. (Lin Decl., ¶ 3.) Formosa Plastics Corporation U.S.A. then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Defense counsel explains Formosa Plastics Corporation U.S.A. believed it had been served because the complaint was sent to its headquarters. (Lin Decl., ¶ 5.) On August 31, 2022, Plaintiffs and Formosa Plastic Corporation U.S.A. signed a stipulation to continue the hearing on the motion so they could meet and confer to resolve the dispute. Thereafter, Formosa Plastic Corporation filed this motion. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to either motion. Instead, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application saying Plaintiffs’ counsel had missed the opposition filing deadline because they were occupied with other work on other cases. Plaintiffs’ counsel asked for an opportunity to file an opposition. The court granted the ex parte application. During this time, the attorneys squabbled about who the proper defendant was and whether the proper defendant had been served.

Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a) authorizes a court for good cause to extend the time for a defendant to file a motion to quash service of summons. The timeline recited above shows defense counsel timely filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under the mistaken belief that Plaintiffs had intended to sue and serve Formosa Plastic Corporation U.S.A. Just as the court relieved Plaintiffs for Plaintiffs’ counsel’s mistake in failing to timely file an opposition, Plaintiffs should have accepted defense counsel’s statement that she had made a mistaken in believing Formosa Plastic Corporation U.S.A. had been sued. Therefore, to the extent the motion by Formosa Plastic Corporation was filed late, the court grants leave for the late filing and finds there is good cause to extend the time to file the motion pursuant to section 418.10, subdivision (a).

Defendant states it is a Taiwanese company not incorporated or headquartered in the United States. (Motion at p. 4; Index, Abbot Decl., ¶¶5-6.) Plaintiffs cite no evidence that Defendant is incorporated or headquartered in California.

Defendant states it has never made, sold, or distributed asbestos-containing products in California or anywhere. (Index, Abbot Decl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs do not contend that it did. Rather, Plaintiffs argue they believe Defendant purchased JM-Manufacturing Company, Inc. and is continuing JM-Manufacturing Company, Inc.’s business. (Opposition at p. 10.) Plaintiffs cite no evidence supporting this belief in the original opposition or supplemental opposition. Instead, in the supplemental opposition, they incorporate the arguments in their opposition to a motion for sanctions, thereby expanding their supplemental reply by another 15 pages. This is an abuse of the court’s page limits, and Plaintiffs provide no good grounds for not including those arguments in their original opposition to the motion to quash. Nothing in the opposition to the motion for sanctions is new evidence that did not exist when Plaintiffs filed their original opposition to the motion to quash.

Nevertheless, the court considers that evidence here. In the opposition to the motion for sanctions, Plaintiffs contend that Formosa Plastics Corporation U.S.A. was the parent of J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. from February 1984 until October 2005, those two companies shared funds and employees, Y.C. Wang was chairman of the boards of directors of Formosa Plastics Corporation U.S.A and J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc., and Y.C. Wang was a founder of Formosa Plastics Corporation. (Opposition to Sanctions Motion at pp. 12-13.) Plaintiffs also say that J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. and Formosa Plastics Corporation entered into a loan agreement. (Id. at p. 14; Bendon Decl. to Opposition to Sanctions Motion, Ex. M.) Exhibit M includes a February 1983 Co-Borrower Agreement signed by Formosa Plastics Corp., J-M A/C Pipe Corp., and J-M Manufacturing Co. Inc. (Bendon Decl. to Opposition to Sanctions Motion, Ex. M at pp. 44, 47.) That agreement does not state that Formosa Plastics Corporation owned J-M Manufacturing Co. Inc. There is also a 1984 Bank of America document referring to “Formosa Plastic Corp.” as “the parent company” in connection with “J-M Manufacturing/J-M A/C Pipe Corp.” (Id. at p. 49.) Also, Exhibit M shows that J-M A/C Pipe Corporation (not J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc.) may have been owned by Formosa Plastics Group (not Formosa Plastics Corporation). (Bendon Decl. to Opposition to Sanctions Motion, Ex. M at pp. 1-2.)

Thus, the evidence of a connection between Formosa Plastics Corporation and J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. is Y.C. Wang, who died in 2008 (Bendon Decl. to Opposition to Sanctions Motion, Ex. N), and a Bank of America document referring to Formosa Plastics Corporation as “the parent company.” That does not establish that Formosa Plastics Corporation owned J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. or is continuing J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc.’s business. Rather, Plaintiffs’ evidence establishes that Formosa Plastics Corporation U.S.A. acquired J-M Manufacturing, Inc. from Johns-Manville in 1984. (See, e.g., Bendon Decl. to Opposition to Sanctions Motion, Ex. K at pp. 13-14, 17-18; Ex. L at p. 10; Ex. Q at p. 3.)

As for Plaintiffs’ arguments that they believe Formosa Plastics Corporation was involved in Formosa Plastic Corporation U.S.A.’s purchase of J-M Manufacturing, Inc., Plaintiffs cite no law that being involved in another company’s purchase of a subsidiary is grounds for personal jurisdiction. Investors in a company are “involved” in that company’s business to the extent that they invested money in the company. That does not make the investor subject to personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs also ask for jurisdictional discovery. Because Plaintiffs failed to cite any evidence supporting their belief that Defendant purchased JM-Manufacturing Company, Inc. and is continuing its business, the court denies the request for jurisdictional discovery. There needs to be some basis in fact for jurisdictional discovery, some reason to conclude discovery is likely to produce evidence of California contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction. (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases (2005) 136 Cal.App.4th 100, 127 [“In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction”].) Otherwise practically any company could be sued for almost anything in California and then be subject to jurisdictional discovery, even if there is no basis in reality for California to have jurisdiction over the defendant.

The motion is GRANTED and the complaint against Formosa Plastics Corporation is DISMISSSED without prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (h).