Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 22STCV15053, Date: 2022-09-15 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22STCV15053    Hearing Date: September 15, 2022    Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION TO QUASH

            On May 5, 2022, Plaintiffs Safieh Farshadnia, Azal Laal, Shiveh Servat Laal, and Dastan Namju Laal filed this action alleging Shahab Laal developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos in products from Defendant Scholl’s Wellness Company LLC.  On June 29, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to quash service of summons on the ground that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.  

            A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the defendant.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).) 

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)  “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.)  A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.) 

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.  (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.)  Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  (Ibid.)  “The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate.  [Citation.]  The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts.  [Citation.]”  (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

A defendant is subject to a state’s general jurisdiction if its contacts “are so continuance and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”  (Saimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)  A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum “if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’  [Citations.]”  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.)  This test does not require a “causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation.”  (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026.)  The “arise out” of standard “asks about causation,” but “relate to” does not.  (Ibid.)  “[W]hen a corporation has ‘continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State’s] court[s]’ to defendant actions ‘based on’ products causing injury there.”  (Id. at p. 1027.) 

Defendant provided evidence that it is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in New Jersey.  (Carpenter Decl., Ex. B.)  This evidence establishes California has no general jurisdiction over Defendant, and Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise.

Defendant argues there is no special jurisdiction because it did not exist until six years after Shahab Laal’s last purchase and use of Dr. Scholl’s foot powder.  (Motion at p. 6.)  Therefore, Defendant’s contacts with California after Defendant was formed in 2019 have nothing to do with Shahab Laal’s exposure.  (Ibid.)  Defendant claims that when it was created via an Asset Purchase Agreement, it did not assume any liability for claims arising out of related to exposure to asbestos.  (Motion at p. 7.) 

Plaintiffs respond that Defendant refuses to produce the Asset Purchase Agreement.  (Opposition at pp. 3-4.)  Plaintiffs ask for discovery on the issue of Defendant’s assumption of liability.  (Opposition at p. 7.) 

Plaintiffs are correct that they do not need to take Defendant’s assertion that it assumed no liability at face value.  Defendant bases this assertion on a declaration stating in conclusory fashion that Defendant does not hold “any liabilities arising from any claimed asbestos exposure as a result of the use or exposure to Dr. School’s products at any time before the closing Date in November 2019.”  (Yanagi Decl., ¶ 6.)  This statement is a legal conclusion, and as Plaintiffs point out, violates the rule against secondary evidence.  (Opposition at p. 6.)  Under Evidence Code section 1523, “oral testimony is not admissible to prove the content of a writing” unless certain conditions exist, such as the original writing has been lost or the proponent of the writing cannot obtain a copy of it.  Defendant did not show it cannot obtain a copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement.

The motion is continued until December 15, 2022 at 9 a.m. so that Plaintiffs can take discovery on the issue of Defendant’s assumption, or non-assumption, of liability.

The moving party is to give notice.