Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 22STCV18569, Date: 2023-02-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV18569 Hearing Date: February 6, 2023 Dept: 15
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant
Metalclad Insulation LLC filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that
Plaintiffs Anthony Adams and Janice Adams have no evidence of exposure to
asbestos from a product from Defendant.
A defendant seeking
summary judgment must “conclusively negate[] a necessary element of the
plaintiff’s case, or . . . demonstrate[] that under no hypothesis is there a
material issue of fact that requires the process of trial.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334.) To show that a
plaintiff cannot establish an element of a cause of action, a defendant must
make the initial showing “that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot
reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) “The defendant may, but need not, present
evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of
action. The defendant may also present
evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,
needed evidence – as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive
discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855.) A plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the
plaintiff has no knowledge of any exposure to the defendant’s products may be
sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of
triable issues of fact. (McGonnell v.
Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104.) The plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he
did not recall ever working with a product manufactured by the defendant may
not be sufficient to shift the burden if the plaintiff is able to prove his
case by another means. (Weber v. John
Crane, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439.) “ ‘If plaintiffs respond to comprehensive
interrogatories seeking all known facts with boilerplate answers that restate
their allegations, or simply provide laundry lists of people and/or documents,
the burden of production will almost certainly be shifted to them once
defendants move for summary judgment and properly present plaintiff’s factually
devoid discovery responses.’” (Id.
at p. 1440.)
Defendant states
Plaintiffs’ discovery responses are factually devoid. (Motion at p. 7; Undisputed Material Fact
(“UMF”) 2, 5.) Defendant served an
interrogatory asking Plaintiffs for all facts supporting the contention that
Anthony Adams was exposed to asbestos from a product from Defendant. (Ex. C at p. 2.) Plaintiffs responded that he was exposed to
asbestos through working in close proximity to Defendant’s workers who were
handling asbestos-containing insulation.
(Ex. I at p. 2.) The response
does not identify evidence supporting this contention that Anthony Adams worked
near Defendant’s workers. The interrogatory
response also identifies Plaintiffs, certain family members, certain co-workers
including Richard W. Johnson, Henry Mandel, Mike Barnes, Gail Mandel, Joyce
Barnes, Doug Nelms, Burl Holley, Wayne Slaughter, Gary Bach, and Chuck Arntz as
having knowledge. (Ex. I at p. 4.) Nelms has no knowledge of exposure to
Defendant’s product. (Motion at p.
12.) In response to a supplemental
interrogatory, Plaintiffs stated they have no further information. (UMF 22.)
The interrogatory response does not specify the information these people
have and does not state they have knowledge that Anthony Adams was exposed to
Defendant’s asbestos-containing products.
Defendant also points to
Anthony Adams’ testimony that he never heard of Metalclad and has no information
he ever worked with or around any Metalclad products. (Ex. N at p. 525-526.)
Plaintiffs argue that the
interrogatory response identifies 13 coworkers who worked with him and six
employees of Defendant who worked at the locations where Anthony Adams worked. (Opposition at pp. 1-2.) However, Plaintiffs cannot merely provide a
laundry list of people to avoid burden shifting. (Weber, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p.
1440.) Also, Plaintiffs’ discovery
responses do not contain evidence that Defendant’s employees worked at those
locations at the same time Anthony Adams was working at the locations.
Because the discovery
responses and deposition testimony do not contain evidence supporting the
conclusion that Anthony Adams worked nearby Defendant’s employees who were
handling asbestos-containing insulation, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs. In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not
present any evidence showing the existence of a disputed issue of material
fact.
The motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED.
The moving party is to
give notice.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant
Regal Beloit America, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground
that Plaintiffs Anthony Adams and Janice Adams have no evidence of exposure to
asbestos from a product from Defendant.
A. Objections
Plaintiffs’
Objections
No.
1: Sustained. See below.
No.
2: Sustained. The witness did not establish that his
knowledge of Marathon motors was obtained from his experience working with the
motors. The witness did not establish
that the documents he reviewed were not hearsay or were business records or were
otherwise admissible.
No.
3: Overruled.
Defendant’s
Objections
Nos.
1-22: Many of these are not objections
or the court did not rely on the evidence.
Nos.
23-35: Overruled.
Nos.
36-58: The court did not rely on this
evidence.
B. Summary Judgment
A defendant seeking
summary judgment must “conclusively negate[] a necessary element of the
plaintiff’s case, or . . . demonstrate[] that under no hypothesis is there a
material issue of fact that requires the process of trial.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334.) To show that a
plaintiff cannot establish an element of a cause of action, a defendant must
make the initial showing “that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot
reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) “The defendant may, but need not, present
evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of
action. The defendant may also present
evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,
needed evidence – as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive
discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855.) A plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the
plaintiff has no knowledge of any exposure to the defendant’s products may be
sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of
triable issues of fact. (McGonnell v.
Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104.) The plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he
did not recall ever working with a product manufactured by the defendant may
not be sufficient to shift the burden if the plaintiff is able to prove his
case by another means. (Weber v. John
Crane, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439.) “ ‘If plaintiffs respond to comprehensive
interrogatories seeking all known facts with boilerplate answers that restate
their allegations, or simply provide laundry lists of people and/or documents,
the burden of production will almost certainly be shifted to them once
defendants move for summary judgment and properly present plaintiff’s factually
devoid discovery responses.’” (Id.
at p. 1440.)
Defendant states
Plaintiffs discovery responses are factually devoid. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 9, 10.) Defendant served an interrogatory asking
Plaintiffs for all facts supporting the contention that Anthony Adams was
exposed to asbestos from a product from Defendant. (Index, Ex. B at p. 2.) Plaintiffs responded that he was exposed to
asbestos from Defendant’s motors when he worked at Allied Electric Motor
Service between 1980 and 1987. (Index,
Ex. C at p. 2.) The response does not
identify evidence supporting the contention that the motors were from
Defendant.
The interrogatory response
identifies Plaintiffs, certain family members, certain co-workers including Richard
W. Johnson, Henry Mandel, Mike Barnes, Gail Mandel, Joyce Barnes, Doug Nelms,
Burl Holley, Wayne Slaughter, Gary Bach, and Chuck Arntz as having knowledge. (Index, Ex. C at pp. 5-6.) However, Plaintiffs cannot merely provide a
laundry list of people to avoid burden shifting. (Weber, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p.
1440.) Also, Plaintiffs’ discovery
responses do not specify what knowledge these witnesses have about Anthony
Adams’ work on Defendant’s motors. The
discovery responses are factually-devoid and the burden shifted.
Defendant argues the
Leeson motors Anthony Adams encountered did not contain asbestos based on the
declaration of Neil Roberts. (Motion at
p. 8.) Roberts states he “examined
records and documentation concerning Leeson motors and determined that Leeson
never used any asbestos-containing parts in Leeson motors.” (Roberts Decl., ¶ 6.) That statement lacks personal knowledge and
is based on hearsay. Roberts did not
establish that the unidentified documents he reviewed were business records or not
hearsay or are otherwise admissible.
In opposition, Plaintiffs
presented evidence that Anthony Adams worked on Marathon motors that contained
asbestos. (See, e.g., Plaintiffs
Undisputed Material Facts (“PUMF”) 8-10.)
Defendants argue that Anthony Adams’ declaration is not admissible
because he failed to identify motor models at his deposition. (Reply at p. 6.) However, Defendants did not show that the
statements in his declaration contradict his deposition testimony. Also, a jury could reasonably infer that
motors brought in for maintenance in the 1980s were made before 1979. Because Plaintiffs showed a disputed issue of
material fact, the motion is denied.
The motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
The moving party is to
give notice.
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant
Emerson Electric Co. filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that
Plaintiffs Anthony Adams and Janice Adams have no evidence of exposure to
asbestos from a product from Defendant.
A defendant seeking
summary judgment must “conclusively negate[] a necessary element of the
plaintiff’s case, or . . . demonstrate[] that under no hypothesis is there a
material issue of fact that requires the process of trial.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334.) To show that a
plaintiff cannot establish an element of a cause of action, a defendant must
make the initial showing “that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot
reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) “The defendant may, but need not, present
evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of
action. The defendant may also present
evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,
needed evidence – as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive
discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855.) A plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the
plaintiff has no knowledge of any exposure to the defendant’s products may be
sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of
triable issues of fact. (McGonnell v.
Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104.) The plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he
did not recall ever working with a product manufactured by the defendant may
not be sufficient to shift the burden if the plaintiff is able to prove his
case by another means. (Weber v. John
Crane, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439.) “ ‘If plaintiffs respond to comprehensive
interrogatories seeking all known facts with boilerplate answers that restate
their allegations, or simply provide laundry lists of people and/or documents,
the burden of production will almost certainly be shifted to them once
defendants move for summary judgment and properly present plaintiff’s factually
devoid discovery responses.’” (Id.
at p. 1440.)
Defendant states Anthony
Adams has no memory of working on an asbestos-containing motor from
Defendant. (Motion at p. 6.) He testified he worked on Emerson Electric
brand motors between 1983 and 1997, does not know the horsepower or model of
those motors, worked on motors from U.S. Motors, does not know the horsepower
of those motors, does not know the number of U frame or T frame U.S. Motors motors
he worked on, does not remember working on Alco motors, worked on small Doerr
motors, does not remember White-Rodgers motors, worked on Leroy Somers motors,
does not remember working on particular motors with brakes, and has no
documents about these motors. (Carpenter
Decl., Ex. D at pp. 181-188, 556, 559, 561, 562.) Plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses are
similarly lacking in specific evidence that Anthony Adams worked on Defendant’s
asbestos-containing motors. (Carpenter
Decl., Ex. F.) Defendant argues that
because Anthony Adams does not remember particular motors, he cannot prove any
of them contained asbestos. (Motion at
p. 6.)
Defendant has shown that
Plaintiffs’ discovery responses do not contain evidence that Anthony Adams
worked on motors from Defendant that contained asbestos. Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiff submits
evidence that all motors from U.S. Motors contained asbestos before 1964. (Morse Decl., Ex. 2 at pp. 82-83, 86-87.) Anthony Adams’ co-worker worked with him on
motors from U.S. Motors that were between ten and thirty, forty or fifty years
old. (Morse Decl., Ex. 5 at pp. 37-38,
Ex. 6 at p. 72.) This is sufficient to
show the existence of a disputed issue precluding summary judgment.
The motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
The moving party is to
give notice.