Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 22STCV28136, Date: 2022-12-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV28136 Hearing Date: December 14, 2022 Dept: 15
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE DEFENDANT AMERON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION’S
DEMURRER
On August
29, 2022, Plaintiffs Gloria Toledo, Juan Toledo, Elizabeth Toledo and Jose
Toledo (“Plaintiffs”) filed this action for the wrongful death of Elio Toledo (“Decedent”)
against Defendant Ameron International
Corporation, Successor-in-Interest to Bondstrand (“Defendant”), among others.
On September 30, 2022, Defendant
filed a
demurrer on the ground that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted
by the workers’ compensation exclusivity remedy rule. Defendant failed to file a meet and confer
declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subd. (a)(2). Failure
to file the required declaration in the future may result in the motion being
placed off calendar.
Defendant filed a request for judicial
notice. Because the court did not rely
on any of those documents, it does not rule on the request.
Plaintiffs allege the Decedent
developed asbestos related mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos
while Decedent was employed by Defendant between 1974 to 1979. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Specifically,
Defendant argues that the workers’ compensation exclusivity remedy rule applies
because the complaint alleges facts demonstrating Decedent’s exposure to
asbestos occurred during the course and scope of his employment with Defendant.
(Demurrer, pp. 5-6.) Subject to certain exceptions, workers’
compensation is the exclusive remedy available to injured employees and their
dependents against an employer for injuries sustained “out of and in the course
of employment.” (Lab. Code §§ 3600-3602,
5300; see Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 18.) Workers’
compensation remains the employee’s exclusive remedy against his or her
employer so long as (1) “a substantial contributing cause” of the employee’s
injury (or illness) (2) arises out of the employment relationship. (Melendrez v. Ameron International Corporation
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 639-640.) This
is so even though another, nonworkplace cause for which the employer might
otherwise be liable in a civil suit also substantially contributed to the
injury. (Ibid.) The exclusive remedy provisions apply only
in cases of industrial personal injury or death. (Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at
p. 16.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the
complaint alleges exposure during the course of Decedent’s employment with
Defendant. Rather they contend the “dual
capacity” exception applies. (Opposition
at p. 2.) The dual capacity exception applies where the
injury stems from an employer-employee relationship that is distinct and
invokes a different set of obligations than the employer’s usual duties to its
employee. (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire
Protection District (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 161-162.) The
dual capacity exception allows an employee to bring a product liability action
against the employer where the injury was caused by an employer-manufactured
product sold (or otherwise transferred) to an independent third person who then
provided it for the employee’s use.
(Lab. Code. § 3602(b)(3).) The dual capacity
exception does not apply when the employer provides a third party’s product to
the employer. (Ashdown v. Ameron
International Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 868, 875-876.) Dual
capacity rule is an exception, which is strictly construed. (Behrens v. Fayette Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1574.)
Plaintiffs argue Defendant supplied
raw asbestos fiber to Gusmer Enterprises, Inc. (“Gusmer”), who produced mats
and sold them to Defendant to be used for producing the Defendant’s product. Defendant then provided the mats to Decedent for
use in producing Defendant’s final product.
(Opposition at pp. 2-3.) Because Decedent
obtained the mats from Defendant in the course of his employment and not from “an
independent third person,” the dual capacity exception does not apply. ((Ashdown, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at
p. 876.)
Plaintiffs
have the burden of showing how they can amend the complaint to resolve this
defect. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)
18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Plaintiffs request leave
to amend to allege Defendant sold asbestos to Gusmer, which made the mats sold
to Defendant, which then supplied to Decedent.
Because these allegations would still fall within the workers’
compensation exclusive remedy, Plaintiffs have not shown they can amend the
complaint to resolve the defect.
The demurrer is SUSTAINED without
leave to amend.
The moving party is ordered to give notice.