Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 22STV24848, Date: 2023-11-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STV24848 Hearing Date: November 15, 2023 Dept: 15
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE DEMURRER AND MOTION TO STRIKE
Plaintiff
Olden Wallace filed this action against Defendant Inglewood Unified School
District on August 2, 2002, alleging a wrongful death case based on his wife’s
exposure to mold and asbestos while at work.
(See, e.g., Complaint at pp. 4-5.)
On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging
causes of action based on the wife’s exposure to mold and asbestos at work
resulting in cancer and her death. (See,
e.g., FAC at pp. 4-5.)
Plaintiff
served Defendant with the first amended complaint on July 5, 2023, and on
August 8, 2023, Defendant filed a demurrer and motion to strike. On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed an ex
parte application to continue the hearing on the demurrer and motion for thirty
days, which the court granted, continuing the hearing to October 10, 2023. Plaintiff then did not file oppositions. Instead, at the hearing on October 10, 2023,
Plaintiff’s counsel stated he had mis-calendared the hearing and thought it was
in November. Therefore, the court
continued the hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike to November 15, 2023. On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed an
opposition to the demurrer but not to the motion to strike.
Defendant
argues the claims that Plaintiff’s wife fell sick and died as a result of
exposure to mold and asbestos at work are barred by workers’ compensation
exclusivity.
In
his opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that the claims of alleged exposure
to asbestos resulting in his wife’s lung cancer and death are subject to
worker’s compensation exclusivity.
(Opposition at p. 3.) Indeed,
Plaintiff acknowledges his wife “filed for workers’ compensation benefits
against [Defendant] . . . alleging exposure to the job caused her cancer.” (Id. at p. 4.) However, Plaintiff argues he can plead a new
cause of action that Defendant “engaged in concealment of the exposure to mold
discovered in [his wife’s] classroom – which aggravated [his wife’s] lung
cancer,” and that such a cause of action is viable under Labor Code section
3602, subdivision (b)(2). (Id. at
p. 3.)
“Section 3602, subdivision (b)(2) provides a narrow
exception to this exclusivity rule and allows a civil suit ‘[w]here the employee’s
injury is aggravated by the employer’s fraudulent concealment of the existence
of the injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the
employer’s liability shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by
the aggravation . . . .’ This provision
was enacted in 1982 and codifies the common law fraudulent concealment
exception that was enunciated by our Supreme Court in Johns–Manville
Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465.” (Jensen v. Amgen, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.
App. 4th 1322, 1326.) “Three conditions are necessary for the
fraudulent concealment exception to apply: (1) the employer must have concealed
‘the existence of the injury;’ (2) the employer must have concealed the
connection between the injury and the employment; and (3) the injury must have
been aggravated following the concealment. [Citation.] If any one of these conditions is lacking, the
exception does not apply and the employer is entitled to judgment in its
favor.” (Jensen, supra, 105 Cal.
App. 4th at 1325.)
As the Jensen court explained, this exception
is extremely narrow. In almost all
cases, an employee will be aware of the existence of the injury and the fact
that the injury is connected to the employment.
The exception applies only in limited situations, such as where an
employer is aware that toxic chemicals are causing employees to become sick and
conceals the information from the employee.
In such a circumstance, an employer may know that an employee is injured
before the employee does and the employee may not be aware that symptoms the
employee is experiencing are related to workplace exposure. (See Jensen, supra, 105 Cal. App. 4th
at 1327.)
The first element requires that the defendant
“actually knew of [the plaintiff’s] injury before she did.” (Jensen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p.
1326.) Here, Plaintiff states his wife
was diagnosed with lung cancer in November 2020. (Wallace Decl., ¶6.) Thus by November 2020, Plaintiff’s wife knew
she had lung cancer. Plaintiff does not
state he can allege that Defendant knew that his wife had been injured before
his wife learned about her injury in November 2020.
The second element requires that the defendant “concealed
the connection between [the plaintiff’s symptoms] and her employment.” (Jensen, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p.
1327.) In Jensen, the plaintiff
informed her employer that she believed she was having reactions to her work
environment and “was the first person to associate her symptoms with mold after
she learned that it had been discovered” at her workplace, but she had no
evidence that her employer connected her symptoms to exposure to mold. (Ibid.) Likewise, here Plaintiff’s wife made the
connection between her workplace and her lung cancer. After her diagnosis, she told her principal
that she would need to miss some days to receive chemotherapy for her lung
cancer. (Wallace Decl., ¶ 9.) In August 2021 and November 2021, Plaintiff’s
wife told the principal that she “suspected that the hazardous work environment
led or contributed to her health issue (lung cancer) and [his wife] referenced
asbestos and toxic fumes that she was exposed to while [at work].” (Id., ¶ 13.) She “objected to being returned to the same
work environment and was worried about her health.” (Id., ¶ 14.) Defendant did not respond to her concerns and
did not remove her from that toxic environment.” (Id., ¶ 17.) While Plaintiff’s wife made these
connections, Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant knew before his wife did
that mold in her workplace was injuring her.
Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that he can allege facts
supporting the first two elements of the proposed claim. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s alleged facts
establish that his wife knew about her lung cancer and suspected its connection
to her workplace before Defendant did. Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without
leave to amend. The motion to strike is
MOOT.
Defendant is to file a proposed judgment of dismissal
within five court days.
The moving party is to give notice.