Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 23STCV10022, Date: 2023-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV10022    Hearing Date: January 26, 2024    Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTIONS TO QUASH (VANDERBILT MINERAL)

            Plaintiff Jesus Armando Vega Portillo alleges Jose Vega Enriquez was exposed to asbestos in talc supplied by Defendant Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC, Inc.  Defendant filed a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Plaintiff asked for jurisdictional discovery, so the court continued the hearing.  Thereafter, the parties filed supplemental briefs.

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).) 

“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)  “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.)  A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.) 

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.  (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.)  Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  (Ibid.)  “The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate.  [Citation.]  The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts.  [Citation.]”  (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

A defendant is subject to a state’s general jurisdiction if its contacts “are so continuance and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”  (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)  A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum “if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’  [Citations.]”  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.)  This test does not require a “causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation.”  (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026.)  The “arise out” of standard “asks about causation,” but “relate to” does not.  (Ibid.)  “[W]hen a corporation has ‘continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State’s] court[s]’ to defend actions ‘based on’ products causing injury there.”  (Id. at p. 1027.) 

Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC provided evidence that it is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Connecticut (Stewart Decl., ¶ 2), and therefore it is not a resident of California and not subject to its general jurisdiction. 

Defendant argues it is not subject to California’s specific jurisdiction unless Plaintiff can prove Vega Enriquez was exposed in California to asbestos in a product that contained Defendant’s talc.  (Motion at p. 5.) 

The first amended complaint provides no information about the specific products at issue.  Only in the opposition does Plaintiff identify general types of products – “Paco joint compound and DAP sealers, adhesives, caulks, and glazes.”  (Opposition at p. 1.)  Plaintiff says Vega Enriquez also used Georgia Pacific joint compounds.  (Id. at p. 2.)  Plaintiff cites evidence that Defendant sold talc to Kelly-Moore Paint Company in California, and Kelly-Moore used the talc in its joint compound products.  (Opposition at pp. 2-3.)  Plaintiff also cites evidence that Defendant sold talc to DAP, Inc. in California, which used it in various products, and Defendant sold talc to Georgia Pacific Corporation.  (Id. at pp. 3-4.)  Plaintiff does not cite evidence that Georgia Pacific used Defendant’s talc in any specific product that Enriquez Vega used.

Defendant argues the evidence shows only certain products used Defendant’s talc, such as Kelly-Moore’s Ready-Mix joint compound, but that Plaintiff does not identify the specific products Vega Enriquez used or that those specific products contained Defendant’s talc.  (Reply at p. 5.)

With his supplemental brief, Plaintiff filed a declaration of Antonio Flores, who stated he worked with Vega Enriquez, and they used Paco All-Purpose Joint Compound.  (Flores Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7.)  Plaintiff filed excerpts from a deposition of Douglas Merrill saying that Kelly-Moore purchased talc from Vanderbilt and used it in Paco all-purpose joint compound.  (Ex. J at pp. 1313-14, 1316-17, 1356.)

Defendant argues that some Paco joint compound did not contain Vanderbilt’s talc, and that the Merrill deposition does not say all Paco all-purpose joint compound contained Defendant’s talc.  That is an argument for summary judgment.  Plaintiff has shown that Defendant availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California and Plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to Defendant’s conduct in California.  Defendant did not show that exercising personal jurisdiction Defendant would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

The motion is DENIED.

The moving party is to give notice.