Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 23STCV16340, Date: 2023-10-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV16340    Hearing Date: October 6, 2023    Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION TO QUASH (CUMMINS)

Plaintiffs Ramona Jellesed, Charlene Peterson, and Catherine Beard allege Terry Jellesed was exposed to asbestos from products of Defendant Cummins Inc.  Defendant filed a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the defendant.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).)  “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)  “The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.)  A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.) 

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.  (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.)  Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  (Ibid.)  “The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate.  [Citation.]  The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts.  [Citation.]”  (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

A defendant is subject to a state’s general jurisdiction if its contacts “are so continuance and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”  (Saimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)  A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum “if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’  [Citations.]”  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.)  This test does not require a “causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation.”  (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026.)  The “arise out” of standard “asks about causation,” but “relate to” does not.  (Ibid.)  “[W]hen a corporation has ‘continuously and deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State’s] court[s]’ to defend actions ‘based on’ products causing injury there.”  (Id. at p. 1027.) 

Defendant states it is incorporated and headquartered in Indiana, and Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise.

Defendant argues the complaint gives no details about the products from Defendant that Terry Jellesed used and whether he used them in California.  (Motion at p. 3.)  The complaint does not specify any product from Defendant.  The only detail specific to Jellesed in the complaint, which is otherwise generic boilerplate, is that Terry Jellesed used unspecified asbestos-containing products while working as an engineman in the Long Beach Naval Shipyard from 1960 through 1962.  (Complaint, Ex. A.)  Plaintiffs’ opposition repeats this allegation.  (Opposition at p. 3.)  But the opposition does not identify any product from Defendant that Terry Jellesed used or worked around.  Nor does the opposition attach any evidence showing that Terry Jellesed worked in the Long Beach Naval Shipyard and was exposed there to a product from Defendant.  Allegations are not enough.  (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.)

Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant consented to California’s jurisdiction in this case because it consented to California’s jurisdiction in other cases.  (Opposition at pp. 4-5.)  Plaintiffs cite no law for this concept that by consenting to jurisdiction in a prior case, a defendant consents to a state’s jurisdiction for future, yet-unfiled cases that will eventually be brought by completely different plaintiffs based on different allegations.  The court rejects this unsupported argument.

Plaintiffs ask for jurisdictional discovery.  There must be some basis in fact for jurisdictional discovery, some reason to conclude discovery is likely to produce evidence of California contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction.  (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases (2005) 136 Cal.App.4th 100, 127 [“In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction”].)  When a plaintiff is not able to make an offer of proof of the existence of “additional relevant jurisdictional evidence,” a court does not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery.  (Ibid.)  Here Plaintiffs have not made any such offer of proof because they do not even identify the products at issue.  The complaint is so vague about Defendant’s alleged conduct, it is impossible to determine the products at issue and thus the scope of jurisdictional discovery.  Plaintiffs do not demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to Defendant’s contacts with California. 

The motion is GRANTED and the complaint against Defendant Cummins Inc. is DISMISSSED without prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (h).

            The moving party is to give notice.