Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 23STCV17882, Date: 2023-10-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV17882 Hearing Date: March 8, 2024 Dept: 15
[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (PAREX)
On July 28, 2023,
Plaintiff Phyllis Gafford filed this action alleging she developed mesothelioma
from exposure Defendant Parex USA, Inc. fka LA Habra Products, Inc.’s
asbestos-containing products.
A defendant seeking
summary judgment must “conclusively negate[] a necessary element of the
plaintiff’s case, or . . . demonstrate[] that under no hypothesis is there a
material issue of fact that requires the process of trial.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 317, 334.) To show that a
plaintiff cannot establish an element of a cause of action, a defendant must
make the initial showing “that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot
reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) “The defendant may, but need not, present
evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of
action. The defendant may also present
evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,
needed evidence – as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive
discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855.) A plaintiff’s deposition testimony that the
plaintiff has no knowledge of any exposure to the defendant’s products may be
sufficient to shift the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of
triable issues of fact. (McGonnell v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104.) The
plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he did not recall ever working with a
product manufactured by the defendant may not be sufficient to shift the burden
if the plaintiff is able to prove his case by another means. (Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439.) “ ‘If
plaintiffs respond to comprehensive interrogatories seeking all known facts
with boilerplate answers that restate their allegations, or simply provide
laundry lists of people and/or documents, the burden of production will almost
certainly be shifted to them once defendants move for summary judgment and
properly present plaintiff’s factually devoid discovery responses.’” (Id. at p. 1440.)
Defendant contends
Plaintiff has no evidence that she was exposed to asbestos from Defendant’s
products, citing Plaintiff’s standard interrogatory responses. (Motion at p. 2.) In response to Standard Interrogatory No. 18 asking
for a description of each product (including trade name, product type, asbestos
content, packaging, and manufacturer) that exposed Plaintiff to asbestos, Plaintiff
responded that she was exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing products due
to her proximity to her husband’s home remodeling and construction work,
automotive repair and maintenance, and clothing coated with asbestos-containing
dust between the 1950s and the 1980s. (Defendant’s Index, Ex. B at pp. 6-7.) In an amended and supplemental response,
Plaintiff identified and detailed her exposures to asbestos, but did not list
Defendant as a source of exposure. (Defendant’s
Index, Ex. C at pp. 6-9, 9-10.)
Plaintiff argues her
discovery responses are not factually-devoid, and she cites her responses to
special interrogatories. (Opposition at
p. 4.) Defendant propounded a special
interrogatory asking for all facts supporting the contention that Defendant
exposed Plaintiff to asbestos-containing products. (Eyerly Decl., Ex. I at p. 3.) Plaintiff responded that she “may have been
exposed to asbestos-containing products that were distributed, manufactured,
and/or supplied by defendant Parex USA, Inc.”
(Id. at p. 4.) Plaintiff
did not identify the products. Plaintiff
referenced its responses to the standard interrogatories. (Id. at p. 5.) This special interrogatory response is as
equally factually-devoid as Plaintiff’s standard interrogatory response.
In her standard
interrogatory response and special interrogatory response, Plaintiff lists
herself, her coworkers, and Defendant’s agents, employees, and custodians of
records as persons with knowledge. (Defendant’s
Index, Ex. C at p. 6; Eyerly Decl., Ex. I at p. 6.) Her standard interrogatory response generally
identified Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s records, discovery responses, and
deposition testimony. (Defendant’s
Index, Ex. C at pp. 6-7.) Her special
interrogatory response did not identify any documents. (Eyerly Decl., Ex. I at pp. 8-9.)
Plaintiff testified that
she was not familiar with the names Parex or La Habra. (Defendant’s Index, Ex. D at pp. 100-101.) She had no information that she ever worked
with or around products manufactured by Defendant. (Id. at p. 101.) She did not know of any witnesses or documents
that could provide any information about her work with or around any of
Defendant’s products. (Id. at p.
102.)
The deposition testimony
and discovery responses provide no evidence that Plaintiff used or was exposed
to a specific product from Defendant that contained asbestos, and they show
that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain such evidence. They are factually-devoid on that point, and
thus, Defendant shifted the burden.
In opposition, Plaintiff merely
argues her discovery responses are not factually devoid. (Opposition at p. 5.) The opposition does not identify any product
from Defendant that exposed Plaintiff to asbestos, let alone submit evidence of
such exposure. Because Plaintiff failed
to show any disputed issue of material fact, the motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. Defendant is to file a proposed
judgment within five days.
The moving party is to
give notice.