Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 23STCV23202, Date: 2023-12-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23202    Hearing Date: January 18, 2024    Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION TO QUASH

Plaintiff Alicia Miranda Bojorquez alleges she developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos in talc mined and supplied by Defendant Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC.  Defendant filed a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).)

"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."  (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)  "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."'  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.)  A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."  (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.  (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.)  Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  (Ibid.)  "The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate.  [Citation.]  The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts.  [Citation.]"  (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

A defendant is subject to a state's general jurisdiction if its contacts "are so continuance and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)  A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum "if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum.' [Citations.]"  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.)  This test does not require a "causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026.)  The "arise out" of standard "asks about causation," but "relate to" does not.  (Ibid.)  "[W]hen a corporation has 'continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury there."  (Id. at p. 1027.)

"In a case raising liability issues, a California court will have personal jurisdiction over a successor company if (1) the court would have had personal jurisdiction over the predecessor, and (2) the successor company effectively assumed the subject liabilities of the predecessor."  (CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1120.)

Defendant is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Connecticut.  (Motion at p. 5; Stewart Decl., ¶ 2.)  Therefore, it is not a resident of California and not subject to its general jurisdiction.  Plaintiff does not dispute that there is no general jurisdiction over Defendant.

Defendant argues it is not subject to California’s specific jurisdiction unless Plaintiff can prove that she was exposed in California to asbestos in a specific product that contained talc from Defendant.  (Motion at p. 5.)  Defendant points to the complaint which generally alleges that defendants, including Vanderbilt, were engaged in in the business of manufacturing or selling asbestos-containing products, but does not identify the particular products.

Only in its opposition does Plaintiff identify the product at issue – DAP joint compound that alleged contained Defendant’s asbestos-contaminated talc.  (Opposition at p. 2.)  Plaintiff cites her brother-in-law’s declaration identifying DAP, Paco, and UDG joint compound as well as DAP caulking and/or sealer products.  (Moreno Decl., ¶¶ 5-8.)  Plaintiff cites evidence that Defendant sold talc to DAP, Inc. in California.  (Hunt Decl., Ex. G at pp. 173.)  Plaintiff also cites evidence that DAP, Inc. used Defendant’s talc in its caulking products.  (Hunt Decl., Ex. C.) Plaintiff argues, but does not provide evidence, that DAP, Inc. used Defendant’s talc in its joint compound.  (Opposition at p. 4.)

            In its reply, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s evidence shows the formulation for caulk and window glazing, not Dap’s joint compound.  (Reply at p. 2.)  

            Plaintiff requests jurisdictional discovery to obtain evidence that Defendant’s talc was in the specific products to which she was exposed.  The motion is CONTINUED to April 17, 2024 for discovery on the contents of the DAP products to which Plaintiff was exposed during the period of her exposure.

Plaintiff may file a supplemental opposition and Defendant may file a supplemental reply on regular notice.   

The moving party is ordered to give notice.