Judge: Laura A. Seigle, Case: 23STCV28081, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV28081    Hearing Date: January 18, 2024    Dept: 15

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE MOTION TO QUASH

Plaintiff Alfredo Waltower filed this action alleging that he developed mesothelioma from asbestos in talc mined and supplied by Defendant Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC. On December 20, 2023, Defendant filed its motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.

A defendant may move to quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)  The court may dismiss without prejudice the complaint in whole, or as to that defendant, when dismissal is made pursuant to Section 418.10.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (h).)

"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."  (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)  "The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations."'  (Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 471-472.)  A state court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a party under circumstances that would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."  (Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 113.)

When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.  (Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 553.)  Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.  (Ibid.)  "The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts.  [Citation.]"  (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 222.)

A defendant is subject to a state's general jurisdiction if its contacts "are so continuance and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)  A nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum "if the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the 'controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum.' [Citations.]"  (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446.)  This test does not require a "causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the litigation." (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1026.)  The "arise out" of standard "asks about causation," but "relate to" does not.  (Ibid.)  "[W]hen a corporation has 'continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury there."  (Id. at p. 1027.)

"In a case raising liability issues, a California court will have personal jurisdiction over a successor company if (1) the court would have had personal jurisdiction over the predecessor, and (2) the successor company effectively assumed the subject liabilities of the predecessor."  (CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1120.)

Defendant is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Connecticut.  (Stewart Decl., ¶ 2.)  Therefore, it is not a resident of California and not subject to its general jurisdiction.

Defendant argues it is not subject to California’s specific jurisdiction unless Plaintiff can prove that he was exposed in California to asbestos in a specific product that contained talc supplied by Defendant.  (Motion at p. 5.)  Defendant correctly argues that the complaint itself does not allege the specific products at issue.  (Id.)  

Only in its opposition papers does Plaintiff identify the product – Sherwin Williams paint containing Defendant’s asbestos-containing talc.  (Waltower Decl., ¶ 2.)  Plaintiff argues Defendant assumed the liability of R.T. Vanderbilt Company, which had a talc mine and sales office in California.  (Opposition at p. 2; Eyerly Decl., Ex. 3 at pp. 39-40.)  According to Plaintiff, the talc contained asbestos.  (Eyerly Decl., Ex 3 at p. 166; Ex. 4 at p. 126.)  R.T. Vanderbilt supplied its talc to Sherwin-Williams.  (Eyerly Decl., Ex 8 at p. 63.)

In its reply, Defendant acknowledges it mined and sold talc in California.  (Reply at p. 2.) Thus, it availed itself of the benefits of the forum.  However, Defendant contends Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendant’s talc was in the Sherwin-Williams paint to which Plaintiff was exposed.  (Reply at p. 5.)  Defendant cites deposition testimony of Sherwin-Williams’ corporate representative, Cathy Cole, where she testified Sherwin Williams obtained talc from various entities, including Defendant.  (Kaplan Supp. Decl., Ex. 2 at pp. 39, 40.)

Plaintiff requests jurisdictional discovery to obtain evidence that Defendant’s talc was in the Sherwin-Williams paint to which Plaintiff was exposed.  Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s request.  (Reply at p. 5.)  Thus, the motion is CONTINUED to April 17, 2024 for discovery on the contents of the type of Sherwin-Williams paint to which Plaintiff was exposed during the period of his exposure..  Plaintiff and Defendant may file supplemental opposition and reply briefs based on regular notice.

            The moving party is to give notice.