Judge: Lawrence Cho, Case: 18STCV05226, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 18STCV05226    Hearing Date: April 28, 2023    Dept: K

CASE NAME:           LOPEZ v. ELIZALDE-GANTES

CASE NUMBER:                              18STCV05226

HEARING DATE:                                                    4/28/23                          

TRIAL DATES:                    2/4/23 TO 2/27/23

 

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TENTATIVE RULING

 

MOTIONS:  

 

  1. Defendant’s Motion JNOV                                                              DENIED
  2. Defendant’s Motion for New Trial                                                 DENIED

 

 

 

 

I.                 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

            This was a motor vehicle collision in which Defendant Elizalde-Gantes (“D”) admitted negligence for colliding with Plaintiff Lopez’s (“P”) vehicle but disputed damages and causation. Specifically, P claimed he suffered a shoulder injury from the collision which necessitated various medical treatments including surgery.  After an 8 day jury trial, on 2/27/23 the jury returned a verdict finding that D’s negligence had caused harm to P, but awarded no monetary damages.

 

            P now brings the instant motions for JNOV and for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was not supportable by the evidence.  D argues that these motions are time barred procedurally and in the alternative that the verdict was supported by the evidence admitted.

 

 

II.             ANALYSIS

 

A.    D’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice of the Clerk’s Register of Actions

 

This motion for judicial notice is unopposed and is in any event proper and so it is

GRANTED.

 

 

B.    Timeliness of Motions

 

D initially asserts that P’s motions are time barred under CCP §§ 659 (new trial motion)

& 629 (Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict), both of which require a movant to file with the clerk a notice of intention to move for a new trial and/or a JNOV motion “within 15 days of the date of the date of mailing notice of entry of judgment by the clerk . . . or service upon him by any party of written notice of entry of judgment . . . .” 

 

            Here, Judgement in this matter was entered on 3/14/23 and defense counsel subsequently served such Judgment on P’s counsel on 3/20/23 (see Proof of Service sworn to by Adriana Daleo, executed on 3/20/23).  The 15 day response period elapsed at the end of 4/4/23.  However, P’s motions for JNOV and new trial were not filed until 4/11/23, 1 week beyond the expiration of the filing deadline.  As such, both of P’s motions are time barred.

 

 

C.    Even if P’s Motions for JNOV/New Trial Were Timely, There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Verdict

 

Even assuming arguendo that P’s motions were timely made, P’s argument in essence

boils down to the argument that a jury cannot find that harm was caused (as it did) and award no monetary compensation for that harm.  P relies upon Dodson v. J. Pacific, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 931 in support of this argument.  However, that case is unavailing to P because it stands for the proposition that where the jury finds that a plaintiff underwent serious medical procedures due to a defendant’s negligence, then some attendant pain and suffering must have occurred and therefore the jury cannot award zero damages for pain and suffering.  Id. at 936-938.  Dodson does not stand for the proposition, as P urges, that merely finding that a D caused some harm to P must result in an award of non-economic damages above zero.  The key distinguishing factor is whether or not the jury found that the D’s negligence caused medical procedures to be undertaken which must therefore have resulted in some pain and suffering.  Id. at 938 (“A plaintiff who is subjected to a serious surgical procedure must necessarily have endured at least some pain and suffering in connection with the surgery . . . the extent [thereof] . . . cannot be zero”). 

 

            Here, unlike in Dodson, this jury awarded no economic damages for any of the medical procedures that P claimed resulted from the accident with D.  In the words of Dodson, there was no “proof that the medical expenses were incurred because of defendant’s negligent act.”  Id. at 937.  Indeed, Dodson commented that “a verdict may properly be rendered for an amount less than or equal to medical expenses in cases where, ‘even though liability be established, a jury . . . may conclude that medical expenses paid were not occasioned by the fault of the defendants.’”  Id.  That is the exact scenario here:  the jury found causation and “harm” but found that none of P’s medical expenses was occasioned by the fault of D.  As there were no medical expenses attributable to D’s negligence, there is no requirement that any non-economic damages be awarded. 

 

            P makes a similar related argument that the jury’s finding on the verdict form that D’s negligence was “a substantial factor in causing harm” is necessarily inconsistent with a finding of 0 damages; in other words, if there was harm caused by D’s negligence, the value to compensate for that harm cannot be zero.  D counters this argument by pointing out that the verdict form did not encompass all harms incurred (such as body damage to P’s vehicle), but rather limited the damages listed to medical expenses and non-economic damages.  From this limited verdict form, D argues that the jury could have found that D’s negligence caused harm to P’s vehicle, but not to the physical harm and medical expenses claimed by P.  From this perspective, the jury’s verdict of finding harm suffered to property but not physical bodily injury would be consistent.

 

            To further support this theory and in support of the jury’s rejection of P’s shoulder injury, D points out the testimony of defense witnesses who testified that, inter alia, that P’s shoulder injury was pre-existing and had resulted from degeneration and/or prior overuse and therefore not caused by this accident.  Furthermore, in support of her theory that D suffered no bodily injury from the accident, she testified that immediately after the accident P got out of his vehicle on his own power, kneeled down on the ground to survey the damage to his car, declined any emergency services, and drove home from the accident scene.  Lastly, in furtherance of D’s theory that P’s shoulder injury was not caused by this accident, D elicited an admission from P that he had been in a subsequent motor vehicle accident in 2019 (2 years after this 2017 accident), and that his shoulder surgery was not performed until 2021 (4 years after the accident with P and 3 years after the 2019 car crash). 

 

            In light of the arguments above and the defense evidence before the jury, this Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict rendered and that there has not been a miscarriage of justice. 

 

 

            III.     ORDER

 

            D’s motions for New Trial or JNOV are DENIED.