Judge Lawrence Cho, Case Number: 19STCV41298, Date: 2024-01-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lawrence Cho, Case: 19STCV41298, Date: 2024-01-12 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 19STCV41298 Hearing Date: January 12, 2024 Dept: K

CASE NAME: LOPEZ v. LANDEROS

CASE NUMBER: 19STCV41298

HEARING DATE: 1/12/24

TRIAL DATES: 10/16/23 to 10/20/23

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TENTATIVE RULING

MOTIONS:

Plaintiff’s Motion JNOV DENIED
Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial DENIED
Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs DENIED

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is an auto accident case where Plaintiff’s (“P”) vehicle was struck by Defendant’s

(“D”) vehicle while D was exiting a parking lot and attempting to merge into the flow of traffic. The facts are simple and mostly undisputed. P testified that he was driving in his lane along the roadway when D’s vehicle entered his lane and scraped the side of his car. D testified that she was exiting a parking lot in her vehicle slowly and watching for oncoming traffic, but her vision thereof was obstructed by trucks parked curbside. After 5 days of jury trial, the jury found D not negligent and awarded judgment to D.

D now brings these motions for JNOV, new trial, and to tax P’s costs.

II. ANALYSIS

A. JNOV and New Trial

P brings both these motions on essentially identical grounds; specifically, that given the undisputed facts of this short trial, no reasonable jury could have reached the conclusion that D was not negligent. D counters that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict; specifically, D’s own testimony that she was carefully inching onto the roadway while aware of and watching out for oncoming traffic. D also testified that she was unable to get a clear view of oncoming traffic because several trucks parked up the roadway blocked her view. In spite of her best efforts, she did not see P’s vehicle as she entered the roadway and her car collided with P’s car.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, this Court finds that D’s testimony was substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that she was not negligent. This testimony was sufficient to meet the Basic Standard of Care CACI Instruction 401 given to the jury:

Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent harm to oneself or to others. A person can be negligent by acting or by failing to act. A person is negligent if that person does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation or fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation. You must decide how a reasonably careful person would have acted in defendant’s situation.

The jury was perfectly entitled to find that D acted reasonably given the circumstances in her situation. Just because P had the right of way and was not to blame whatsoever for the accident does not mean that this Court must reject the jury’s conclusion and find that D was negligent as a matter of law. As an illustration of this point, at closing P suggested that given her obstructed view D should have gotten out of her vehicle and walked to a better vantage point to see oncoming traffic. D countered that P’s suggestion was not reasonable. The jury was given the exclusive province as factfinder to decide “how a reasonably person would have acted in defendant’s situation,” concluded that a reasonably careful person did not have to get out to get a better view and that it was reasonable for D to carefully proceed as she did even with her obstructed view.

P’s negligence per se argument is rejected in that no instruction regarding this theory nor any instruction or evidence regarding Vehicle Code 21804. The jury’s verdict cannot be attacked for failing to consider a legal theory never presented to them.

P’s assertion with respect to Juror #7’s alleged statement is inadmissible hearsay in the absence of a Declaration from that juror. Furthermore, without any further context or detail, this Court cannot even apply Evid. Code § 1150 (Evidence to test a verdict). That Section allows evidence of “any statements made, or conduct or conditions, or events occurring,” but bars any evidence “concerning the mental processes by which [the verdict] was determined.” Simply put, P has failed to meet his burden in introducing admissible evidence of the alleged juror misconduct.

P’s motions for JNOV and New Trial are DENIED.

B. P’s Motion to Tax Costs

P’s motion to tax costs is DENIED as moot because D has never filed a Memorandum of Costs to tax. Per Cal.R.Ct. § 3.1700(a)(1), Memorandums of Costs are due within 15 days of service of the Clerk’s Notice of Entry of Judgment. If such Notice is sent by mail (as this one was), the 15 day deadline is extended an additional 5 days to 20. Here, the Clerk sent Notice of Entry of Judgment on 11/9/23. The 20 day deadline to file D’s Cost Memorandum therefore expired on November 29, 2023. Taking judicial notice of this Court’s filing records, no Memorandum of Costs has ever been filed in this matter. As such, D has waived her right to costs and therefore no costs will be awarded to D.