Judge: Lawrence Cho, Case: 22STCV6392, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV6392    Hearing Date: February 23, 2024    Dept: K

CASE NAME:           WELCH v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

CASE NUMBER:                              22STCV6392                                     

HEARING DATE:                                                    2/23/24   

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                                                           TENATIVE RULING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTYS FEES:                                         DENIED

INTRODUCTION

This was a personal injury trial in which the jury found that Plaintiff (“P”) was injured due to a defect in Defendant City of Los Angeles’ roadway.  P now moves for $292,100 in “cost-of-proof” attorney’s fees based on D having denied several Requests for Admission (“RFA’s”) in discovery. 

                                                                    ANALYSIS

A.    Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees/Cost of Proof Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks “cost of proof” attorney’s fees and costs per § CCP 2033.420 based on Defendant’s failure to admit certain Requests for Admission.  Defendant asserts that the motion should be denied as it “had reasonable ground to believe . . . [he] would prevail on the matter,” and/or that he had “other good reason for the failure to admit.”  CCP 2033.420(a)(3) & (4).   

With respect to D’s failure to admit RFA’s 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, this Court finds that D had reasonable grounds to believe it would prevail on those issues.  The evidence was hotly contested and argued before the factfinder and this Court finds D’s positions on these issues, although not ultimately successful, were nevertheless reasonable at the time of the RFA responses.  D answered P’s complaint on 7/20/22 and provided responses to RFA’s 1 and 3 on 11/21/22, about 4 months from appearing in this case.  According to D, these responses were submitted before D began investigating the allegations.  Subsequently, on 2/15/23, D responded to P’s second set for RFA’s, specifically RFA’s 7, 8, 9, 11, and 13.  RFA’s 1 and 13 are a closer call and analyzed below.

With respect to RFA 1 (City’s roadway), this Court finds it was unreasonable for D’s to have denied the request that the roadway at issue was its responsibility.  However, this Court also finds that D ultimately admitted as much at the start of trial and therefore P expended no resources to prove this issue as it was admitted before the start of evidence. 

With respect to RFA 13 (upraised roadway was substantial factor in causing injury), D asserts that those requests were made before P’s deposition and IME.  This Court agrees that sufficient time had passed for D to have investigated the accident.  Had the RFA simply requested D to admit that P suffered some physical injury from the fall, this Court would likely award cost-of-proof sanctions.  However, RFA 13 requests that D admit that the roadway defect was a substantial factor in causing P’s harm.  The only witness who had first-hand knowledge of how she fell was P herself as there were apparently no other eyewitnesses to the fall.  Nothing within the knowledge of D alone would allow it to opine about or conclude how P fell and the role the asphalt played in the fall, if any.  In other words, the deposition of P was critical in supplying D with the knowledge of how the upraised asphalt caused P to trip.  Moreover, there was also the issue of whether the raised asphalt was visible to P; indeed, there was testimony that P had not worn her prescription eyeglasses on this occasion and may not have seen the hazard because of her own contributory negligence.  Given the wording of RFA13 and the fact that D had not yet deposed P on these critical issues, this Court finds D had “good reason not to admit” RFA 13 on 2/15/23.

Plaintiff’s motion for cost-of-proof attorney’s fees is DENIED.