Judge: Lawrence Cho, Case: BC685351, Date: 2022-09-01 Tentative Ruling

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling. Please call the court no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, leave a message with the court clerk at (310) 260-3501, or via e-mail at samdeptk@lasuperiorcourt.org advising that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing, and finally, serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing personally or by Court Call.

Case Number: BC685351    Hearing Date: September 1, 2022    Dept: K

CASE NAME:           LEHRER-GRAIWER v. SHOKRIAN

CASE NUMBER:     BC685351                                          

HEARING DATE:   9/1/22                                       

FSC DATE:               9/1/22

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION:      Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

HELD:           GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART

I.                    Background

            This is a contract case arising from a residential lease agreement for a property in the City of Los Angeles (“the House”).  Plaintiffs are the landlord/lessors (“LL”) and Defendant is the tenant/lessee (“T”).   The complaint alleges that the lease agreement at issue was entered into by the parties in August 2016 for a fixed term of 1 year until 8/31/17, at a rate of $2,750/month.  (Complaint ¶¶ 6-9).  On 8/30/17, LL served T with a 60 day “Notice of Termination of Tenancy” (hereafter referred to as a Notice to Quit or “NTQ”), but T refused to leave and is still in possession at this time.  (Complaint ¶ 12).

            LL’s first Cause of Action is for Breach of Contract, alleging that T refused to abide by  an addendum to the lease agreement, somewhat confusingly titled “Settlement and Release Agreement” (henceforth referred to as “Addendum”).  ¶ 1 of the Addendum states that T agrees to vacate the House within 60 days of LL’s service on T of a NTQ.  T asserts in this motion that this provision is void as against public policy as it is contrary to Los Angeles rent control laws.

            LL’s second Cause of Action is for Fraud in the Inducement, alleging that T fraudulently represented to LL that she would vacate the House upon service of a 60 day NTQ as required by ¶ 1 of the Addendum.  LL alleges that T had no intention of honoring that provision at the time she entered into the Addendum and that LL relied upon this misrepresentation.  (Complaint ¶¶ 16-18).  T also asserts that this Cause of Action should similarly be awarded a defense judgement per this motion.

II.     ANALYSIS

A.    Breach of Contract Cause of Action

This Court GRANTS T’s motion for judgement on the pleadings as to this cause of

action as ¶ 1 of the Addendum is void as against public policy.  Specifically, T’s Answer alleges

that this House is subject to the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”) which

sets forth a limited group of permissible bases for eviction, none of which this lease falls under. 

LAMC § 151.09(A).  LL’s assertion of the expiration of a fixed term tenancy as the basis for an

eviction fails because LARSO does not recognize that basis as a permissible basis for eviction. 

Furthermore, LAMC § 151.09(A)(2)(a) specifically prohibits the enforcement of lease agreement

covenants that require tenants to “surrender possession upon proper notice,” which is precisely

what ¶ 1 of the Addendum requires – surrender after service of a 60 day NTQ after expiration of

the 1 year lease in 2017.  Thus, the provision of the Addendum that LL claimed has been

breached is unenforceable as against public policy as it is directly prohibited by LARSO.

            Moreover, to the extent LL is relying upon Addendum ¶ 2 whereby T agrees to waive any

and all protections under LARSO, that paragraph purporting waiver of LARSO is itself void as

against public policy.  LAMC § 151.07(F)(“[a]ny agreement . . . waiving any of the provisions

contained in this Article shall be void as contrary to public policy”). 

            Accordingly, T’s motion for judgement on the pleadings is GRANTED without leave to

amend the complaint as LL has not demonstrated how they may plead around the issue of

unenforceability due to public policy.  Judgment shall be entered for T/Defendant as to this first

Cause of Action.

B.     Fraud in the Inducement Cause of Action

While this Court agrees with T’s cited authority that a court cannot and should not

enforce the contractual obligations of an illegal contract, it is not convinced that an action for fraud in the inducement to enter an illegal contract is not actionable.  In this cause of action, LL is not asking this Court to enforce any provisions of the illegal lease agreement; instead, it is asking for relief from having been allegedly induced into entering the illegal lease agreement.  The fact that provisions of a contract are unenforceable as against public policy does not excuse a party who fraudulently induced another into entering into the unenforceable contract in the first place. 

            T’s alternative argument that LL’s claims of fraud were not pled with specificity or particularity also fails.  First, a challenge to specificity in the pleading should have been brought via demurrer (which it wasn’t) rather than on the eve of trial through a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  T has had ample opportunity pre-trial (4.5 years to be exact) to request a bill of particulars or utilize the discovery process to ascertain the details of the alleged fraud.  Any claim by T that she has suffered any prejudice from this allegedly insufficiently pled cause of action would ring resoundingly hollow.  Second, and most importantly, this cause of action was sufficiently pled.  The Complaint sets forth in ¶¶’s 16-19 what the exact misrepresentation was (that T would leave after a 60 day NTQ); that LL relied upon that promise (by renting the House to T at a reduced rental amount); that T acted with fraudulent intent (never intended to honor promise to leave); and that as a result LL suffered damages. 

            As such, T’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to this second cause of action is DENIED.