Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 20STCV12146, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV12146    Hearing Date: February 19, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background

This action arises from an incident on April 12, 2019, in which Ms. Thomas, a teacher at Young Empowered Scholars Academy, a school within the Los Angeles Unified School District ("LAUSD"), allegedly held Plaintiff down and allowed other students to punch, kick, and yell "shame on you!" at him.

On March 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint against LAUSD for general negligence, intentional torts, and premises liability. On May 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint, adding additional allegations and asserting the following causes of action against LAUSD: negligence, premises liability, civil rights violations under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Act, the Ralph Act, the Bane Act, the federal Rehabilitation Act, and the California Disabled Persons Act, as well as battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

LAUSD removed this action to district court based on Federal Question Jurisdiction, citing Plaintiff’s allegations of violations of multiple federal laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 701]. On August 20, 2024, Judge Otis Wright issued an order directing the parties to show cause, in writing, why this matter should not be remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff responded by clarifying that he was not pursuing any federal claims against LAUSD and that the third cause of action for civil rights violations is brought solely under the Bane Act [Cal. Civ. Code § 52] and the Ralph Act [Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7]. (Exhibit I.) The case was then remanded back to state court.

Defendant now moves the Court for summary judgment and summary adjudication on each cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff failed to meet the claims requirements and that Plaintiff cannot establish certain essential elements for each cause of action.

Legal Standard 

        In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) 

        “[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.) 

        To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) 

        “Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

        The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].) 

Evidentiary Ruling 

The Court overrules Defendant’s evidentiary objections.

Discussion

Claims Presentation

As a general rule, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action...until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.” (Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4; see also Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776.) “Failure to timely present a claim...to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738.)

On October 8, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a Claim for Damages to LAUSD. The pertinent portion of the claim states:

“Teacher Ms. Thomas held the hands of Plaintiff while other pupils punched him. The incident occurred because of lack of or poor supervision by Los Angeles Unified School District staff. LAUSD was negligent in the hiring, training, and retention of unqualified staff. LAUSD maintained an unsafe school premises.”

The claim was later supplemented, stating:

“LAUSD Teacher, Ms. Thomas, held down Amar’e Harper while other students assaulted him. The incident occurred because of lack of or poor supervision by Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) staff. LAUSD was negligent in the hiring, training, and retention of unqualified staff. LAUSD maintained an unsafe school premises and environment. This claim is made pursuant to Education Code Section 44807, California Code of Regulations, Title 5, Sections 5551, 5552, and California Government Code Sections 815, 820, 835, 840, et seq.”

There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s claim was timely presented to LAUSD and that the original complaint was filed within the statutorily mandated period after the claim was denied. The issue between the parties is whether the scope of the claim encompassed the new causes of action for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations, as alleged in the Second Amended Complaint filed in 2023.

When a civil action is filed following the rejection of a government claim, the complaint may elaborate on or provide additional details to the government claim, but it may not completely “shift [the] allegations” or base liability on facts that fundamentally differ from those specified in the government claim. (Stockett v. Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 447.) In other words, the factual basis for recovery in the complaint must be “fairly reflected” in the government claim. (Id. at p. 447; see also Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376.)

In Fall River Joint Unified School District v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431, the court ruled that a new cause of action for negligent supervision was not sufficiently similar to an original claim alleging a dangerous condition of public property. In that case, the plaintiff’s original Government Code claim alleged that a defective door closed with excessive force, causing injury. However, in the amended complaint, the plaintiff introduced a new factual basis—that horseplay among students led to the door slamming shut, and the school district was liable for negligent supervision in failing to prevent the horseplay. The Court found this to be a materially different factual theory because the original claim did not reference horseplay or inadequate supervision as contributing to the injury. Since the theory of liability shifted from a physical defect in the property to misconduct by students and failure to supervise, the Court held that the new allegations were not fairly reflected in the original claim and could not proceed.

By contrast, in Blair v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 221, the Court found that the expanded allegations in the amended complaint were sufficiently similar to the original claim because they elaborated on the same general theory of liability. The plaintiff’s tort claim broadly alleged negligent construction and maintenance of a highway. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff added additional specific roadway defects (e.g., lack of guardrails, slope issues, missing signs) as contributing factors. The Blair court held that these additional details were reasonably encompassed within the original theory of negligent construction and maintenance. Unlike Fall River, where the liability theory changed entirely, the Blair case merely provided further specificity regarding how the highway was negligently constructed or maintained.

Similarly, in Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, the Court ruled that the plaintiff’s tort claim sufficiently encompassed the allegations in the complaint, and the trial court erred in barring certain claims for failing to comply with the Government Claims Act. The Court distinguished Koussaya from Fall River by emphasizing that the plaintiff was not asserting a new theory of liability based on facts absent from the original claim. Instead, the complaint provided additional factual details supporting the same fundamental claims.

Here, Plaintiff’s government claim alleges that the teacher held Plaintiff down or held Plaintiff’s hands while other students attacked him. Plaintiff’s causes of action for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress stem directly from these facts.

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff explicitly references the teacher’s act of restraining him while other students attacked him.

Under Battery cause of action, Plaintiff alleges:

"Plaintiff Amar’e Harper hereby incorporates paragraphs 1 through 258 as though fully outlined herein.
On April 12, 2019, Yes Academy kindergarten teacher Ms. Thomas committed a battery on six-year-old first-grader Amar’e Harper by physically grabbing and restraining him in her kindergarten classroom, pinning his hands behind his back, and instructing one or more of her students to punch him. At least one of her students punched Amar’e Harper as hard as the student could hit." (TAC ¶ 260.)

Under Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress cause of action, Plaintiff alleges:

"She grabbed him, forcing him into her classroom, then restrained him, pinning his hands behind his back (like a police officer cuffing a criminal), and instructed one or more of her students to punch him. At least one of her students punched Amar’e as hard as he could. She also instructed her students to join her in humiliating Amar’e. As Amar’e Harper testified at his May 19, 2022, deposition:" (TAC ¶ 266.)

The purpose of the Government Claims Act is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” (Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 928.) Consequently, a claim need not contain the level of detail and specificity required in a pleading but must only “fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.” (Ibid.) As long as the claim provides sufficient notice for the public entity to investigate and evaluate the allegations, the statute should not be applied to bar meritorious claims simply because of a lack of precise wording. (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff’s original government claim, while not explicitly citing the legal theories of battery and IIED provided a factual foundation that reasonably encompasses these causes of action. The claim alleged that the teacher physically restrained Plaintiff while other students attacked him, forms the same core misconduct underlying these new claims and is expressly relied upon in the SAC. Because the factual basis for these claims was set forth in the original claim, LAUSD had adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to investigate the underlying incident. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for battery and IIED fall within the scope of the original claim and are properly asserted.

However, as to the Ralph Civil Rights Act in which “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons … on account of any characteristic” (Civil Code § 51.7), Plaintiff’s government claim does not allege that the teacher’s actions were motivated by discrimination based on his alleged autism or any other protected characteristic. There are no facts in the claim suggesting that the attack was carried out because of Plaintiff’s disability rather than as an instance of misconduct or negligence.

The Court finds the circumstances analogous to Fall River Joint Unified School District, supra., in which the plaintiff introduced an entirely new theory of recovery for negligent supervision that was not mentioned in the original claim for premises liability. Although both theories of recovery were related in that they involved the plaintiff’s head being jammed by the door, the new theory that children's horseplay allegedly caused the injury was not alleged in the original claim. Here, Defendant asserts a completely distinct factual basis for liability relating to discrimination, which was not alleged in the original claim and provided no basis for LAUSD to investigate a potential civil rights violation.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Ralph Act claim is not fairly reflected in the government claim and therefore barred under the Government Claims Act.

Statue of Limitation

The second amended complaint was filed in 2023, while the incident occurred in 2019. Unless the new causes of action in the second amended complaint relate back to the original complaint filed in 2020, the statute of limitations would bar the new claims.

Under the relation-back doctrine, an amendment relates back to the original complaint if it: (1) rests on the same general set of facts, (2) involves the same injury, and (3) refers to the same instrumentality (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 408–409 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79]). The Court agrees with Defendant’s argument that the new allegations regarding Plaintiff’s diagnosis of ADHD and autism, which rendered him disabled and impacted his ability to learn, as well as the claim that LAUSD discriminated against him based on his disability and race and that the incident with Ms. Thomas would not have occurred had he been assessed for special education placement, were not presented in the original complaint.

However, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s conclusion that the claims for battery and IIED are based on these new allegations. While this might be true for the Ralph Act claim, the allegations of battery and IIED for excessive force do not depend on these new facts. Rather, they are based on Plaintiff’s allegation that the teacher held him down while other students attacked him, an allegation that was already pled in the original complaint and included in the claims submitted to LAUSD.

Accordingly, Defendant’s statute of limitations argument is similar to its claim presentation argument and does not provide a basis for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s IIED and battery claims.

Bane Act

“The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or forced the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law” (Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 334). Civil Code section 52.1 requires “an attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion” (Id.).

In Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, the plaintiff was wrongfully detained due to a clerical error, but there was no additional evidence of intentional or coercive conduct beyond the detention itself. The Court held that mere wrongful detention, without additional coercion or threats beyond what is inherent in detention, was insufficient for a Bane Act claim.

Here, the teacher’s alleged act of holding Plaintiff down, while potentially constituting excessive force or unlawful restraint, does not, by itself, satisfy the Bane Act’s requirements. Under Shoyoye, force or coercion that is inherent in the act itself—without additional evidence of threats, intimidation, or other improper means—is insufficient to sustain a Bane Act claim. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Ms. Thomas engaged in additional coercive conduct beyond the alleged restraint, such as issuing threats, preventing Plaintiff from resisting or reporting the incident, or otherwise using intimidation to interfere with Plaintiff’s rights.

The only argument Plaintiff makes in opposition is that physical abuse denying a student equal access to education in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act constitutes sufficient coercion to support a Bane Act claim. However, this argument fails because Plaintiff's government claim, as originally presented to LAUSD, contains no factual allegations related to disability discrimination or denial of equal access to education. In fact, these allegations do not even pertain to the incident described in the original claim and presents LAUSD no opportunity to investigate such a claim. Accordingly, because Plaintiff's Bane Act claim is premised on facts outside the scope of the government claim, it is barred under the Government Claims Act.

Negligence

The main contention regarding negligence is whether LAUSD can be held liable for Ms. Thomas' actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, which states:

"(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative."

Defendant argues that, assuming arguendo that Ms. Thomas grabbed A.H.'s hands as alleged, her conduct was reasonably necessary to maintain order, protect the health and safety of her students, and maintain proper conditions conducive to learning. Accordingly, Defendant contends that Ms. Thomas' conduct was privileged under Education Code section 44807, Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 874, and the Coverdell Teacher Protection Act.

However, Defendant’s separate statement indicates that Ms. Thomas allegedly grabbed A.H. by the arm and took him to her classroom. Once inside, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Thomas held him down, instructed another student to hit him, and that the student complied. Ms. Thomas then allegedly instructed her class to say "shame on you" to Plaintiff (UMF 19-21). Defendant argues that even if these events occurred, they were reasonably necessary to maintain order and protect the health and safety of students. The Court finds this presents a triable issue for the jury, as reasonable minds could differ on whether Ms. Thomas' actions were reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

Defendant also argues that LAUSD could not have foreseen Ms. Thomas’ conduct, as she had taught for several years without any prior disciplinary actions. Defendant contends there was nothing in Ms. Thomas' background known to LAUSD that could have served as a specific warning that she posed an unreasonable risk to students. However, Defendant fails to explain how this argument relates to vicarious liability. If Defendant is arguing that Ms. Thomas was acting outside the scope of her employment, the Court finds otherwise, as the alleged conduct occurred while she was performing her job duties during school hours. An employer can be held liable for an employee’s intentional wrongful acts as long as the act is connected to the employee’s job duties (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 297). The focus is not whether the employer could predict the wrongful act, but whether the act resulted from risks inherent in the employment relationship, to which Defendant provided no analysis of.

Premises liability

Public property is deemed to be in a dangerous condition under Government Code section 835 if it "is physically damaged, deteriorated, or defective in such a way as to foreseeably endanger those using the property itself" (Cordova v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 850, 853-54). Additionally, public property may be considered in a dangerous condition if its design, location, or a physical feature while in use creates a danger (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 149).

In Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School District (1986), a student was stabbed by a nonstudent on campus and sued the school district, alleging that it failed to provide adequate security despite a history of violence. The Court held that a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code section 835 requires a physical defect or condition that increases the risk of injury and cannot be based solely on third-party criminal acts. The Court rejected the argument that the presence of violent individuals created a dangerous condition, stating that “courts have consistently refused to characterize harmful third-party conduct as a dangerous condition—absent some concurrent contributing defect in the property itself” (Id. at 718.) It further held that “Rodriguez’s allegations clearly have nothing to do with the physical condition of the property, or the misuse of it in any way, but relate only to ‘the condition of persons on that property’” (Id. at 720.)

Plaintiff alleges an unsupervised, dangerous school environment, which is similar to the allegations in Rodriguez, where the Court rejected the claim. Plaintiff does not identify any physical defect of the premises that contributed to the harm. Instead, the allegations focus on the actions of students and the teacher, which, like in Rodriguez, relate to “the condition of persons on that property” rather than a dangerous condition of the property itself.

Accordingly, adjudication on the premises liability claim is granted.

IIED

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) directed at Plaintiff by Defendant, (3) with the intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, (4) severe or extreme emotional distress (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903). Conduct is considered outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of what is usually tolerated in a civilized community (Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 130). Generally, conduct is actionable where reciting the facts to an average member of the community would arouse resentment against the actor and lead them to exclaim, “Outrageous!” (Id.).

In K.T. v. Pittsburg Unified School District (N.D. Cal. 2016) 219 F. Supp. 3d 970, 980, the court held that while “[g]rabbing, slapping, and kicking a child with special needs is deplorable,” the conduct was insufficient to state an IIED claim, as the abuse was “not so depraved” as to “shock the conscience.” However, this is a federal case and is persuasive authority only, not binding on this Court.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Thomas grabbed him by the arm and took him to her classroom. Once inside, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Thomas held him down, instructed another student to hit him, and that the student complied. Ms. Thomas then allegedly told the students in her class to say, "shame on you" to Plaintiff (UMF 19-21). Plaintiff provided additional evidence that Ms. Thomas restrained him “like how a cop would arrest someone” and instructed another student to “hit him as hard as you can.” Ms. Thomas also allegedly directed the other students to chant, “shame on you” (Depo. of Amar’e Harper, pgs. 25-27, 29-30, 36).

Further, Plaintiff's first-grade teacher, Cynthia Randall, witnessed a portion of the incident from outside the classroom and testified that there was "no doubt in her mind" that Plaintiff was abused by Ms. Thomas on April 12, 2019 (Pg. 120:1-14).

The Court finds that whether Ms. Thomas’ conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to exceed all bounds of what is usually tolerated in a civilized community is a question for the jury to decide. Without binding legal authority requiring dismissal, it is foreseeable that some members of the jury could find that Ms. Thomas’ actions, restraining Plaintiff as if making an arrest and instructing another student to hit him "as hard as you can", exceed what is usually tolerated in a civilized society. Accordingly, adjudication on the IIED claim is denied.

Battery

The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.” (So v. Shin(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that Ms. Thomas possessed the requisite intent to harm or offend him. Additionally, Defendant contends that the battery claim against LAUSD is not brought pursuant to a statute and is therefore barred as a matter of law under Government Code section 815(a).

First, the battery claim is brought under the doctrine of vicarious liability pursuant to Government Code section 815.2. Second, Defendant’s argument is contradicted by its own evidence, Second, Defendant’s argument is contradicted by its own evidence, which indicates that Ms. Thomas held Plaintiff down, instructed another student to punch him, and simultaneously directed the students to shout, "shame on you" (UMF 19-21). This evidence supports a reasonable inference that Ms. Thomas acted with intent to harm or offend Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendant’s MSA as this cause of action is denied.

Conclusion

Motion for summary judgment is denied. Motion for summary adjudication is granted as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for premises liability, the Bane Act, and the Ralph Act, and denied as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for IIED, battery, and negligence.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. 

__________________________ 

Hon. Lee S. Arian  

Judge of the Superior Court