Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 20STCV37658, Date: 2025-03-03 Tentative Ruling

This lawsuit concerns an alleged injury that occurred on January 13, 2020, during a physical education class at Arroyo Seco Junior High School, operated by Defendant William S. Hart Union High School District. At the time of the incident, Defendant Andy Keyne was the principal, and Defendant Troy Best was the school coach.

On July 14, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a government tort claim to the District, asserting that he was injured on January 15, 2020, during physical education class while running the Mile Run. After the District denied Plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff filed the Complaint on September 30, 2020. Defendants subsequently filed their Answers.

On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Errata, correcting the date of the incident from January 15, 2020, to January 13, 2020. During discovery, Plaintiff also testified that the incident occurred in the middle of the field rather than along the perimeter and that he was playing Capture the Flag rather than running the Mile Run.

Defendants District, Keyne, and Best argue that these factual discrepancies constitute a failure to properly present the factual basis of a government claim and move for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes. Trial is set for June 4, 2025.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

The Court overrules the parties’ objections, except for Defendant’s objections Nos. 6, 8, 11, 13, and 14, which were not material to the Court’s ruling. (CCP § 437c(q).)

As a general rule, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action...until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.” (Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4; see also Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776.) “Failure to timely present a claim...to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738.)

The parties do not dispute that the claim was timely presented or that the subsequent complaint was timely filed. Rather, the issue is whether Plaintiff substantially complied with the claims requirement despite a number of errors in the claim.

On July 14, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a Claim for Damages to the District. The pertinent portion of the claim states:

"On January 15, 2020, Claimant was running during physical education class at the Premises. BEST was the teacher in charge of the physical education class on the date of the incident. There is no separate track for the physical education area, therefore the students, including Claimant, were required to perform their physical education activities, including running, in the muddy/wet grass area of the Premises.

On January 15, 2020, the students, including Claimant, were required to run a mile and were timed for the same as part of the physical education class. As Claimant was running through the muddy/wet grass, he felt a 'pop' and immediate pain in the top of his left hip/groin area. Claimant was in severe pain and could barely walk. BEST contacted another employee and/or agent of WSHUHSD, who arrived by golf cart to transport Claimant to the nurse." (Exhibit A.)

The purpose of the Government Claims Act is “to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” (Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 928.) Consequently, a claim need not contain the level of detail and specificity required in a pleading but must “fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.” (Ibid.) As long as the claim provides sufficient notice for the public entity to investigate and evaluate the allegations, the statute should not be applied to bar meritorious claims simply because of a lack of precise wording. (Ibid.)

The complaint may elaborate on or provide additional details to the government claim, but it may not completely “shift [the] allegations” or base liability on facts that fundamentally differ from those specified in the government claim. (Stockett v. Association of California Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Auth. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 447.) In other words, the factual basis for recovery in the complaint must be “fairly reflected” in the government claim. (Id. at p. 447; see also Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376.)

The "substantial compliance" exception to the strict claims requirement does not apply when a plaintiff attempts to hold a public entity liable based on an entirely different set of facts than those initially presented. This undermines the purpose of the claims act, which is to provide the government agency with an opportunity to investigate and assess its potential liability. (Fall River Jt. Unified School v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431, 435-436.)

The Court will hear further argument and will likely invite further briefing for the parties to provide any case which involves more than one clam error as a basis for summary judgment.

The Court is persuaded that one of the errors in the claim presented here would likely, standing alone, not be sufficient for summary judgment. The problem here is that Plaintiff got virtually nothing right in its claim, and, as Defendants contend, that failure undoubtedly hampered, and perhaps entirely defeated, the purpose of the claims process – to allow the government entity to make an investigation to quickly determine whether it should seek to settle the claim. As Defendants reasonably persuasively argue in their Reply at pages 7-8, the failure to provide accurate information about the date, location, and activity underlying the claim prevented an accurate investigation.

On the other hand, the Court recognizes two factors that weigh in Plaintiff’s favor: (1) the “muddy, wet grass area” referenced in the claim was the location of the incident, even if other language in the claim appears to infer that the specific location may be elsewhere – the uncertain location is generally not a basis for denial (see Parodi v. City & County of San Francisco (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 577 (claim stated the incident occurred 11 blocks away from its actual location); and (2) while Defendants’ argument at pp. 7-8 of the Reply is somewhat persuasive, it is not based on an actual declaration describing that what is argued is what occurred here.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court