Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 20STCV41794, Date: 2024-01-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV41794    Hearing Date: January 8, 2024    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

I.                   INTRODUCTION

On November 02, 2020, Plaintiff Deeana Linsmaier (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Wail Bushara (“Defendant”). Trial is currently scheduled for May 28, 2024. Plaintiff seeks an order continuing the trial date to the first available trial date thirty days past the December 30, 2024, hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and to reset expert discovery cut off dates based on the new trial date.

On December 12, 2023, Defendant filed an Amended Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (“Opposition”) and Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant’s Opposition (“Reply”) on December 18, 2023.

II.                LEGAL STANDARD

“A party seeking a continuance of the date set for trial, whether contested or uncontested or stipulated to by the parties, must make the request for a continuance by a noticed motion or an ex parte application under the rules in chapter 4 of this division, with supporting declarations. The party must make the motion or application as soon as reasonably practical once the necessity for the continuance is discovered. [¶] Although continuances of trials are disfavored, each request for a continuance must be considered on its own merits. The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b) & (c).)

“A showing of good cause requires a demonstration that counsel and the defendant have prepared for trial with due diligence.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.) “A party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts” may indicate “good cause” for a continuance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c)(6).)

Other factors the court must consider include the proximity of the trial date, whether there were previous continuances, the length of the continuance requested, the availability of alternative means to address the reason for the continuance, potential prejudice to the parties or witnesses, the court’s own calendar, and whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance or by imposing conditions on the continuance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(d).)

“[W]hile delaying litigation is generally disfavored in light of efficiency concerns (Gov. Code, § 68607), those concerns are secondary to the primary function of the courts—to adjudicate disputes on their merits.” (Mai v. HKT Cal, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 504, 526.)

III.             DISCUSSION

Here, Plaintiff asserts that December 30, 2024, was the earliest available date for her Motion for Summary Judgment hearing. (Linsmaier Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff further contends that she contacted the court to request an earlier specially set hearing date but was informed that the Court does not provide specially set dates for MSJs. (Linsmaier Decl. ¶ 5.)

A trial court cannot refuse to hear a summary judgment motion filed within the time limits of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 918. 919.) Further, as explained in Cole v. Superior Court (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 84, 88, MSJs that are electronically served must be served at least 107 days before trial. Plaintiff filed and served the MSJ on December 01, 2023, more than five months before the current trial date, which is well before the time limit required. When a petitioner moved to continue trial based on an MSJ hearing that would interfere with the trial date, the court ordered the trial be continued because the solution to calendaring problems cannot be a refusal to hear timely motions. (Sentry Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 526, 530.) Here, Plaintiff’s MSJ hearing on December 30, 2024 interferes with the current trial date because it is scheduled on May 28, 2024, after the trial date.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof to establish good cause because she delayed in filing the MSJ. (Graham Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant does not cite authority to support this argument. A court held that even under an argument that petitioner purposefully delayed filing for MSJ, “the fact remains that the motion was timely filed, and calendaring issues are not a basis on which the trial court can refuse to hear a timely filed summary judgment motion.” (Cole, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 84 at pp. 88.) As stated above, Plaintiff timely filed her MSJ, and in her Reply noted that documents critical to the MSJ were obtained in April 2023 and not solely based on documents she received two years ago as Defendant claims. (Reply Exhibit A; Linsmaier Decl. ¶ 2; Graham Decl. ¶ 3.) Thus, Plaintiff has shown good cause and diligence in filing her MSJ once she discovered it was appropriate.

Other factors to consider include proximity to the trial date, prior continuances, and length of the continuance. Here, Plaintiff filed the instant motion five months before the current trial date as opposed to waiting until the eve of the trial. The court has already continued this trial five times, which is a factor to consider not continuing trial. The length of the continuance requested is about seven months. The Defendant argues that this length is unreasonable; however, this length is based on the date of the MSJ hearing, and the currently scheduled MSJ hearing is the earliest date Plaintiff could obtain. (Linsmaier Decl. ¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff attempted to reserve an earlier MSJ hearing date but was unable to. (Linsmaier Decl. ¶ 5.) Thus, the factors of proximity and length favors granting continuance, while the factor of number of continuances disfavors granting continuance.

There are no alternative means identified to address the reason for continuance. The court cannot refuse to hear a timely filed MSJ hearing, and the court cannot move the MSJ hearing earlier, so the reasonable solution would be to continue the trial until after the MSJ hearing.

Potential prejudice to the parties is another factor considered. Here, Defendant argues that he will be prejudiced because of the need for further expense, discovery, depositions, expert witness retention and evaluation, lay witness interviews and testimony preparation. (Graham Decl. ¶ 6.) While Defendant’s identified prejudice is a noted factor in favor of denying Plaintiff’s motion, it should also be noted that discovery is already closed and Defendant would still need to prepare for trial by performing the above-mentioned preparation even without the continuance.  (Reply, pp. 3 line 6-13.)

The analysis above favors granting Plaintiff’s motion.

IV.             CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Continue Trial is GRANTED. (FATD 1/30/25).

Moving party to give notice.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Dated this 26^th day of December 2023