Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 20STCV49011, Date: 2024-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV49011    Hearing Date: August 8, 2024    Dept: 27

Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Hearing Date: 8/8/24 

CASE NO./NAME: 20STCV49011 BEHZAD SHIRALIAN et al. vs KASIM MOOSAI et al.

Moving Party: Defendant Getaround Inc. 

Responding Party: Plaintiffs

Notice: Sufficient 

Ruling: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED

Background

Plaintiffs Behzad Shiralian and Leila Heshmatpour have asserted two claims against Defendant Getaround, Inc. (“Getaround”) for motor vehicle negligence and general negligence. The claims arise from an alleged hit-and-run automobile accident involving a vehicle rented from the Getaround vehicle sharing platform to Defendant Cristian Mauricio Torresarias (“Torresarias”). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claim for negligent entrustment in which Plaintiffs’ motor vehicle negligence and general negligence causes of action are based upon fails on three grounds. First, Torresarias was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, negating proximate cause. Second, even if Torresarias had been driving, Getaround could not be held liable for negligent entrustment because its duty of care was limited to confirming that Torresarias had a valid driver’s license, which it has done. Third, the Graves Amendment bars Getaround from vicarious liability.

Defendant is seeking summary judgment and is not seeking summary adjudication as to certain defenses or issues in the alternative.

Legal Standard

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence. While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues. [Citation.] Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.  If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.) Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true. [Citation.] Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Evidentiary Objections 

The parties did not make any objections to evidence that were material to the Court’s ruling, as per CCP § 437c(q).

Gender of the Driver

Defendant has met its initial burden by presenting evidence from Police Officer Bakewell's deposition where the officer testified that the driver of the vehicle that crashed into Plaintiffs’ car was identified as female in the police report. (Def’s Ex. A, Officer Bakewell Depo, pp. 37:25-38:6; 39:9-17; 25:1-19.)

However, this is not the whole story. Plaintiffs' evidence provides additional context. Plaintiffs claim that it was actually Cristian Mauricio Torresarias, a male, who was driving and struck Plaintiffs’ car. Plaintiffs testified that Torresarias hit Plaintiffs’ car but did not immediately stop; Plaintiffs had to pursue Torresarias to get him to halt the vehicle. Once Torresarias stopped, he pretended to retrieve insurance information from the glove compartment and switched seats/position with the female passenger. Instead of exchanging information, Torresarias instructed his girlfriend/female passenger to get behind the wheel. They then fled the scene with the female driving the car. (Plf’s Ex. A, Heshmatpour Depo, pp. 40:19-41:15, 41:24-42:5, 46:1-6, 74:19-75:4; Plf’s Ex. B, Shiralian Depo, pp. 128:16 - 130:12, 130:13-133:21, 135:21-137:19, 141:5-15, 150:1-152:9.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the vehicle was once driven by a female, as indicated in the police report and Officer Bakewell’s deposition. However, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact, asserting that at the time of the collision, it was Torresarias, a male, who was driving the vehicle.

Graves Amendment

Graves Amendment, codified at 49 USC §30106(a) states:

(a) In general. An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if--

(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).

The Graves Amendment does not provide Defendant with relief when there is negligence on the part of the owner. Negligent entrustment is one such exception to the Graves Amendment. Negligent entrustment of a vehicle is imposed on a vehicle owner or permitter due to his own independent negligence, not the negligence of the driver. Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate it, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner. (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565.) Whether or not the Graves Amendment provides a complete defense to Plaintiff’s claims in this summary judgment depends on whether or not Defendant can successfully negate Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim.

Negligent Entrustment

To hold a defendant liable for negligent entrustment, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) that the defendant was an owner of the vehicle operated by the driver; (3) that the defendant knew, or should have known, that the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; (4) that the defendant permitted the driver to use the vehicle; and (5) that the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff.  (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 863-64.)  

In the moving papers, Defendant claims that California case law is clear that a rental company’s duty is expressly limited to determining whether the renter had a valid driver’s license at the time of rental (Motion at pg. 7), a duty Getaround claims that it has successfully carried out. This negates the element of constructive notice as the owner made a reasonable effort to ascertain whether the driver was unfit to drive. In support this claim, Defendant relies on California Vehicle Code - VEH § 14604 and 14608.

VEH § 14604 states that

(a) No owner of a motor vehicle may knowingly allow another person to drive the vehicle upon a highway unless the owner determines that the person possesses a valid driver's license that authorizes the person to operate the vehicle. For the purposes of this section, an owner is required only to make a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether the prospective driver possesses a valid driver's license before allowing him or her to operate the owner's vehicle. An owner is not required to inquire of the department whether the prospective driver possesses a valid driver's license.

(b) A rental company is deemed to be in compliance with subdivision (a) if the company rents the vehicle in accordance with Sections 14608 and 14609.

VEH § 14608 states that

(a) A person shall not rent a motor vehicle to another person unless both of the following requirements have been met:

(1) The person to whom the vehicle is rented is licensed under this code or is a nonresident who is licensed under the laws of the state or country of his or her residence.

(2) The person renting to another person has inspected the driver's license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared either the signature thereon with that of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented or the photograph thereon with the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented.

Defendant states in the moving papers that the Legislature has delineated, in Vehicle Code section 14608, the sole duty of a rental car company upon renting a vehicle is to check the potential renter’s license. (Motion at pg. 7.) However, part of checking the license includes the requirement that the person renting the vehicle inspects the driver's license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compares either the signature or the photograph on the license with that person. Defendant has not shown this in the evidence presented.

The only evidence Defendant presents regarding the license check is a declaration from Dennis Lewis, Director of Insurance and Claims at Getaround. He states that on or about November 2, 2019, Torresarias began the sign-up process with Getaround as a potential renter. As part of this process, Torres-Arias was required to pass a driving record check, which he completed successfully on November 2, 2019, confirming that he had a valid driver’s license. A copy of the DMV report was attached as Exhibit A. (Lewis Decl. 6.) On November 18, 2019, Torresarias booked a trip on the Getaround platform and successfully rented the subject 2008 Toyota Yaris. The rental concluded on November 21, 2019. A copy of the Vehicle Trip Page was attached as Exhibit B.

Neither Lewis's declaration, Plaintiff’s DMV report, nor the vehicle trip page demonstrate any cross-checking of Plaintiff's signature with those on his license or the photograph on the license with the individual. All Lewis states about the application process is that Plaintiff was required to pass a driving record check, but does not specify what passing entails, nor whether that includes cross-checking the signature and the photos. The DMV report is similarly lacking and only confirms the validity of Plaintiff’s license.                          Defendant's signup process satisfies only one of the requirements of Vehicle Code section 14608, ensuring the person to whom the vehicle is rented is licensed. However, it remains unclear from the declaration and the DMV report whether Defendant has fulfilled the second requirement of Vehicle Code 14608 by verifying Plaintiff’s signature and photograph. Thus, Defendant has not met its initial burden in negating the constructive notice element of Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim.

In the reply, Defendant argues that there is no obligation to physically hold the license, as it can be done electronically. However, the issue with Defendant's evidence is that Vehicle Code section 14608 requires comparing the picture or signature on the license with the driver or his/her signature, but Defendant has not demonstrated in the evidence provided that this has been done either physically or electronically.

Seeing that it might have failed to meet the requirement of Vehicle Code Section 14608, Defendant seems to backtrack and argue against the requirement of 14608, which it emphasized in the moving papers. Defendant contends that even if Defendant’s evidence failed to meet the requirements of 14608, Plaintiff nonetheless cannot show that Defendant must have known or should have known of the operator’s unfitness to drive, and that such unfitness must have been a substantial cause of Plaintiff's injury.

But the requirements for constructive notice of an operator's unfitness to drive is defined by statute. “In determining the scope of common law tort duties pertaining to those who allow unlicensed or unfit drivers to drive a vehicle, California courts have consistently referenced statutory law.” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 567.) Statutory law is vital in defining the scope of common law liability for negligent entrustment. (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 570.) In Dodge Center, the court held that Defendant was not liable for negligent entrustment because the statute only imposes a duty to inquire into renters' license status, not purchasers. (Dodge Center v. Superior Court (1988), 199 Cal.App.3d 332.) Similarly, the court concluded that an owner who violates section 14604 may be liable for negligent entrustment (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 574) and a rental car agency's violation of section 14608 could subject the agency to common law liability for negligent entrustment. (Id at 571.)

The statute requires that owners ensure drivers possess a valid driver's license authorized for vehicle operation and mandates that they make reasonable efforts to verify this. For rental agencies, reasonable efforts requires both 1) The person to whom the vehicle is rented is licensed and 2) verifying that the driver's license signature or photo matches the person intending to operate the vehicle. Defendant’s evidence shows that it has fulfilled only the first requirement. The evidence does not demonstrate that the driver's license signature or photo was verified either physically or electronically pursuant to the requirement of Veh 14605. Consequently, Defendant failed to meet the initial burden of negating the element of constructive notice for Plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim.

Conclusion

Summary judgment is denied because Defendant failed to meet its initial burden in negating Plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim, to which Defendant claims Plaintiff's motor vehicle negligence and general negligence causes of action is based upon. Although there could be grounds for summary adjudication as to certain issues or defenses, the notice of motion seeks only summary judgment. The Court may not summarily adjudicate claims or defenses for which no triable issue was raised unless such adjudication was explicitly requested in the notice of motion. (Homestead Sav. v. Sup.Ct. (Dividend Develop. Corp.) (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 494, 498.)

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: 

If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number.¿The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.

Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument.¿You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.

If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.