Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 21STCV04337, Date: 2025-05-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV04337 Hearing Date: May 14, 2025 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT
PULASKI STRINGFELLOW, Plaintiff, vs. OWENS-ILLINOIS,
INC., et al. Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE RULING] Dept. 27 1:30 p.m. May 14, 2025 |
Background
On February 3, 2021, Plaintiff Pulaski Stringfellow filed a single cause
of action for negligence against Owens Brockway Glass Container Inc. and
Frontier Transportation, Inc. Plaintiff alleges that on February 12, 2019, he
sustained injuries while unloading a trailer at Owens’ facility in Vernon,
California, and attributes his injuries to the negligence of both defendants.
Owens answered the Complaint on April 19, 2021.
On November 5, 2021, Owens tendered defense and indemnification to both
Dedicated Fleet Systems, Inc. and Frontier. On October 5, 2022, Dedicated
accepted the tender. Owens does not indicate whether Frontier has accepted the
tender. Owens alleges that Dedicated has not indemnified or defended Owens
since accepting tender.
Owens now seeks leave of court to file a cross-complaint against
Dedicated and Frontier for indemnity. Trial is set for November 3, 2025.
Legal Standard
CCP section 428.10 provides the following:
A party against
whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or cross-complaint may
file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the following:
a.
Any cause of action
he has against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint
against him. Nothing in this subdivision authorizes the filing of a
cross-complaint against the plaintiff in an action commenced under Title 7
(commencing with Section 1230.010) of Part 3.
b.
Any cause of action
he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such
person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his
cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts
a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject
of the cause brought against him.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10.)
After the trial date has been set, a party seeking
to file a cross-complaint must obtain leave of court. (Code Civ. Proc., §
428.50(c).) Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time
during the course of the action. (Id.)
Discussion
Owens’ claims for indemnity are permissive cross-complaints, and the
Court must find good cause to grant leave under Code of Civil Procedure section
428.50(c). However, the Court finds the timing of the motion troubling.
On November 5, 2021, Owens tendered defense and indemnification to both
Dedicated and Frontier. Owens’ counsel states that Dedicated accepted tender in
October 2022 but has since refused to defend the action and ignored Owens’
attempts to meet and confer. If that is the case, why did Owens wait approximately
two and a half years to file the present motion, particularly with trial only
six months away?
Additionally, Owens’ declaration does not state whether Frontier
accepted the tender. If Frontier rejected the tender or failed to respond,
Owens provides no explanation for waiting more than three years to seek leave
to file a cross-complaint.
Dedicated raises the issue of delay in its opposition. In reply, Owens
does not offer any reasonable explanation as to why, despite asserting that
Dedicated refused to defend and failed to respond to meet and confer efforts,
Owens waited over two years to bring this motion. (Roquemore Decl., ¶ 8.)
At the same time, the Court is concerned about the impact of Plaintiff’s
recent amendment of the Complaint to name a Doe defendant and how that action
impacts the current trial date. Accordingly,
the Court will hear from the parties.
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Hon. Lee S. Arian Judge of the Superior Court |