Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 21STCV19390, Date: 2025-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV19390    Hearing Date: April 18, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background[1]

This case involves a slip and fall incident in which Plaintiff slipped on small leaves of unknown origin at a Costco location. Defendant now moves the Court for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. Defendant argues that summary judgment is warranted because a Costco employee conducted a floor walk and inspected the area where Plaintiff fell, finding nothing on the floor just nine minutes before Plaintiff’s fall. In the event that summary judgment is not granted, Defendant seeks adjudication on the following issues: Issue No. 1: Plaintiff’s first cause of action for general negligence fails as a matter of law because Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition on the floor. Issue No. 2: Plaintiff’s second cause of action for premises liability fails because Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition on the floor.

Legal Standard 

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

Notice

A property owner is not the insurer of the safety of its guests.¿(Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205.)  The owner’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is key to establishing liability.¿ (Hall v. Rockcliff Realtors (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1139-40.)  The jury instruction on ”Constructive Notice Regarding Dangerous Conditions on Property” states:

In determining whether [a defendant] should have known of the condition that created the risk of harm, [the jury] must decide whether, under all the circumstances, the condition was of such a nature and existed long enough that [the defendant] had sufficient time to discover it and, using reasonable care: (1) repair the condition; or (2) protect against harm from the condition; or adequately warn of the condition.  A defendant must make reasonable inspections of the property to discover unsafe conditions.  If an inspection was not made within a reasonable time before the accident, this may show that the condition existed long enough so that [store] using reasonable care would have discovered it. 

(CACI No. 1011.)  It is generally a question of fact for the jury as to whether, under all the circumstances, a defective condition existed long enough such that a reasonable person, exercising reasonable care, would have discovered it.  (Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 124, 128-129 (Hale).)  

        In Girvetz v. Boys’ Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829 (Girvetz), the Court of Appeal stated:  

The defendant market owner was not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, but owed them the duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises safe for his invitees. To impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to the defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises. His negligence in such cases is founded upon his failure to exercise ordinary care in remedying the defect after he has discovered it.  Whether, under all the circumstances, the defective condition had existed long enough so that a reasonable man exercising reasonable care would have discovered it, is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by the jury. The fact alone that a dangerous condition existed at the time the accident occurred will not warrant an inference that the defendant was negligent. There must be some evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the conclusion that the condition had existed long enough for the proprietor, in the exercise of reasonable care, to have discovered and remedied it.   

        And “[w]here the only evidence is that the foreign object has been on the floor of the market for a minute and a half, it must be held that it is insufficient to support an inference that the defendant proprietor failed to exercise the care required of him.”  (Id. at 831.)   

        On the other hand, where the evidence fails to show how long the dangerous condition existed prior to the injury, “evidence of the owner’s failure to inspect the premises within a reasonable period of time is sufficient to allow an inference that the condition was on the floor long enough to give the owner the opportunity to discover and remedy it. [Citation.]” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1203 [employees usually walked the aisle where plaintiff slipped every 15 to 30 minutes]; Sapp v. W.T. Grant Co. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 89, 91-92 (Sapp) [whether 15-to-25-minute interval between inspections was commensurate with the exercise of reasonable care was a question properly left to the trier of fact].)

Evidentiary Ruling 

Defendant did not object to any evidence material to the Court’s ruling. (CCP § 437c(q).) Plaintiff merely stated “object” without setting forth the grounds for the objections.  That is not a proper objection, and the Court does not consider those objections as a result.

Discussion

The issue in this case comes down to whether or not Defendant conducted a reasonable inspection of the location of Plaintiff’s fall.  Defendant presented the Declaration of Marleene Segovia, stating the following:

·         On the day of the incident, Marleene Segovia (“Segovia”), Defendant’s employee,, began a floor walk at 2:21 p.m. and completed it at 2:39 p.m. (UMF ¶ 4.)

·         Segovia inspected the area where Plaintiff alleges she fell at approximately 2:30 p.m., about nine minutes before the incident. (UMF ¶ 5.)

·         During her inspection of the area near the center clothing displays, Segovia observed no hazards on the floor. The floor was clean and in a safe condition when she walked through the area. (UMF ¶ 6.)

Defendant has met its burden based on this evidence.

Plaintiff disputes whether Segovia actually inspected the subject location in the minutes leading up to the fall. During the depositions of Segovia and Defendant’s person most knowledgeable (PMK), Plaintiff directed both witnesses to review Defendant’s security footage from 2:21 p.m. to 3:35 p.m., which shows Plaintiff falling near the top right corner of the T-shirt display in the upper right section of the footage. Segovia was unable to identify herself inspecting the north aisle during the relevant timeframe. (Segovia Depo at 14:42:50 to 14:44:13.) Likewise, Defendant’s PMK reviewed the same footage, zoomed in on the subject location, and confirmed that she did not observe Segovia inspecting the area during that time. (PMK at 10:10:26 to 10:12:15.)

The Court also reviewed the security footage for the relevant time period and did not observe anyone matching Segovia’s description in the area where the incident occurred. The security footage at 2:28 p.m. shows Segovia inspecting the southern aisles. She appears as a slender, young female with her hair in a knot, wearing a blue T-shirt, white gloves, blue jeans, sneakers, and carrying a brown checkerboard item. (PMK Depo at 09:49:47, 10:07:52.)

The Court reviewed the close-up security footage of the subject location for the relevant time frame, as shown during the PMK deposition, and did not identify anyone in the top right corner of the footage, where the incident occurred, who looked like Segovia. The only individual who somewhat resembled Segovia appears at 9:44:15 but is later seen at 9:45:15 wearing a purse and grabbing a cart at 9:45:54. This individual is unlikely to be Segovia. No other individuals observed in the footage appear to be Segovia. A few individuals were observed wearing blue T-shirts, but each had distinguishing features, such as carrying a purse or having long hair, that did not match Segovia’s appearance.

Although the footage quality could be better and facial features are not discernible, clothing, hairstyle, and other physical characteristics appear reasonably observable. For example, the footage clearly shows whether an individual is wearing jeans or shorts, the style and color of their clothing, whether they are carrying a purse, and whether they have long or short hair. The Court, Defendant’s PMK nor Segovia herself identified anyone matching Segovia in the subject location during the relevant time frame. Moreover, Defendant has not identified any timestamp in the security footage showing an individual matching Segovia’s description near the site of the fall.

Plaintiff has therefore raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the area was inspected within a reasonable period of time such that a person exercising due care would have discovered and corrected the hazard. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1212.)

Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is denied.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org.  Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue.  If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.