Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 21STCV30667, Date: 2025-01-03 Tentative Ruling

On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present gun discharge case against multiple defendants, including Richard Pranada and Denise Pranada. On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this case. The causes of action against the Pranada Defendants are negligence and premises liability.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Richard and Denise Pranada own a home located at 24669 Moon Avenue, Lomita, California. From March 1, 2018, to the present, the Pranadas have leased their home to Defendants Caroline Ngo and Craig Finley pursuant to a written lease agreement. On May 31, 2020, Plaintiff attended a barbecue hosted by tenants Ngo and Finley at the property. During the event, Finley displayed a collection of unsecured and loaded firearms that he stored in a closet in a bedroom. While Finley was handling a gun, it discharged and injured Plaintiff. (The parties dispute which gun it was that discharged – Finley contends it was actually a gun brought by Plaintiff; Plaintiff contends it was one of the cache of guns that Finley displayed.[1]) The Pranadas were not present at the barbecue and do not reside at the property.

The Pranada Defendants now move for summary judgment on the basis that they owed no duty to Plaintiff, a third party. Trial is currently set for March 3, 2025, and Defendant Ngo’s motion for summary judgment is set to be heard on January 14, 2025.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

The Court overrules Defendants Objections 36-40. The Parties did not make any other objections to evidence that were material to the Court’s ruling. (CCP § 437c(q).)

· On May 31, 2020, Finley accidentally discharged a bullet from weapon at 24669 Moon Ave., Lomita, CA 90717-1415 (the “subject Premises”); the bullet struck Plaintiff (the “Incident”).

· At the time of the Incident, Defendants Ngo and Finley resided at the Subject Premises.

· The Subject Premises is owned by Defendant Richard Pranada and his wife, Defendant Pranada.

· The Pranadas began leasing the Subject Premises to Defendants Ngo and Finley in or about March of 2018.

· The Panadas had no knowledge of the alleged discharge of any guns, firearms, or weapons on the Subject Premises until after the incident.

· The Pranadas had no knowledge of any prior discharges of any weapons at the property.

· Prior to the Incident, the Pranadas had no knowledge of Defendant Finley or Defendant Ngo discharging any guns, firearms, or other weapons at the Subject Premises.

· Prior to the Incident, the Pranadas had no knowledge of Defendant Craig Finley ever employing a firearm against a person on the premises or otherwise.

Defendant introduces the framework for analyzing duty in the context of third-party acts by distinguishing between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance." (Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol (2001) 26 Cal.4th 703, 716.) "Misfeasance exists when the defendant is responsible for making the plaintiffs position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention." (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49.)

A legal duty may arise from affirmative acts "where the defendant, through his or her own action (misfeasance) has made the plaintiffs position worse and has created a foreseeable risk of harm from the third person. In such cases the question of duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care." (Pamela L. v. Farmer (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 206, 209; see Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 716; Weirum, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 49.)

By contrast, nonfeasance generally does not give rise to a legal duty. The underlying premise is that "a person should not be liable for `nonfeasance' in failing to act as a `good Samaritan.'" (Pamela L. v. Farmer, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 209.) In other words, "one `who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another' from the acts of a third party." (Garcia, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at 1453, fn. 3, quoting Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23.) Thus, absent misfeasance, "as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties." (Delgado v. Trax Bar Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235.)

Even in the case of nonfeasance, there are "recognized exceptions to the general no-duty-to-protect rule," one of which is the special relationship doctrine. (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 235; see Weirum, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 49.) "A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third parties if he or she has a `special relationship' with the other person." (Delgado, at p. 235.)

Where there is a legal basis for imposing a duty — as in cases of misfeasance or when a special relationship exists — the court considers the foreseeability of risk from the third party conduct. (Melton v. Boustred, (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 532.) Generally, "a duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated." (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 676; see Wiener, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1146; Rest.2d Torts, § 314A, com. e, p. 120.) Acts by third parties are not foreseeable absent prior similar incidents. (See e.g. Wingard v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 37, 43.) For example, in Ann M., the California Supreme Court held that a landowner’s duty to control third-party conduct depends on whether the landowner had notice of prior similar incidents. (Ann M., supra, at p. 676.) In that case, the plaintiff, who was raped at her workplace located in a secluded area of a strip mall, alleged that prior assaults and robberies had occurred on the premises. However, she failed to produce evidence showing that the defendant landowner had notice of these alleged incidents. (Id. at p. 679.)

Plaintiff, in contrast, introduces a framework for analyzing landlord responsibility under Civil Code section 1714(a), which provides: "[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person." This principle imposes a duty on property owners to prevent or address foreseeable risks created by known dangerous conditions on their property, provided they have the opportunity and ability to mitigate the harm.

Plaintiff cites three cases clarifying the extent of a landlord’s liability to third parties, particularly under Civil Code section 1714(a): Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, Rosales v. Stewart (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 130 and Hernandez v. Jensen (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1056. In Uccello, a five-year-old neighbor was attacked by a tenant's dangerous dog. The landlord, who knew the dog posed a risk and had the legal right to terminate the lease, was found to owe a duty to protect third parties. The court held the landlord liable because the landlord knew about the dangerous condition and had the ability to eliminate the danger by terminating the lease.

In Rosales, a young child was fatally struck by a stray bullet fired by a tenant using the yard as a shooting range. The landlord was held liable because the landlord had knowledge of the tenant's dangerous activity and the ability to address it through warnings, lease termination, or other measures to prevent harm.

In Hernandez, a home healthcare worker was injured by an unsecured, loaded firearm openly hanging in a closet. The homeowners, who were aware of the firearm and failed to warn or protect the worker, were held to have a duty of care because they knew of the danger and could have prevented the injury.

Ultimately, both Defendants’ and Plaintiff’s frameworks for analyzing duty hinge on whether the defendant had prior knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition.

The Pranadas met their initial burden by demonstrating they had no prior knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition.

First, the Pranadas do not reside at the subject premises. (Declaration of Richard Pranada, ¶4; Declaration of Denise Pranada, ¶3, Compendium of Documentary Evidence.) Second, the Pranadas had no prior knowledge of the presence, discharge, or ownership of firearms or other weapons on the premises prior to the incident. They further declare they were unaware of any prior incidents involving weapons on the property or any use of firearms by Craig Finley, Caroline Ngo, or any other individual associated with the premises. (Declarations of Richard and Denise Pranada, ¶¶ 5–9, Compendium of Documentary Evidence.) This evidence establishes that the Pranadas had no knowledge of any dangerous condition involving firearms on the property, thereby satisfying their initial burden to demonstrate an absence of duty under the applicable legal standards.

The evidence presented by Plaintiff is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact regarding Defendant’s knowledge of prior incidents or the possession of firearms on the premises. Plaintiff relies on the general presence of vendors, including a gardener, plumber, and handyman, who entered the property during the tenancy, as well as the allegation that weapons were openly displayed in a closet. (Lahmani Dec., Ex. H [Finley’s Response to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories (Set No. Two) Nos. 54 & 57; Lahmani Dec., Ex. C at 41:14-42:1.) However, Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence that these vendors observed the firearms, were aware of their presence, or reported them to Defendants. The mere fact that individuals entered the property at some point and may have seen firearms does not establish that Defendants had knowledge of any dangerous condition. Plaintiff’s argument relies entirely on speculation that someone might have observed the firearms and conveyed that information to Defendants, but speculation and conjecture cannot create a triable issue of fact. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.)

Plaintiff argues that the Pranadas could be subject to liability per se under Penal Code section 626.9, the Gun-Free School Zone Act, which prohibits any person from possessing a firearm in a location the person knows, or reasonably should know, is within a school zone. Plaintiff invokes the negligence per se doctrine and contends that the tenant’s alleged violation of this statute should be imputed to the Pranadas as landlords. However, Plaintiff fails to establish a legal basis for this imputation or demonstrate how the statute imposes any duty on landlords.

To impose liability under negligence per se, Plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant violated a statute; (2) the violation proximately caused the injury; (3) the harm suffered was the kind the statute was designed to prevent; and (4) the plaintiff was in the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. (Scripps Health v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 529, 536.) Here, Plaintiff relies on alleged statutory violations by Finley, including firearm registration and safety certification requirements, but provides no evidence that the Pranadas themselves violated Penal Code section 626.9 or any other statute. Plaintiff fails to bridge the gap between the tenant’s independent actions and any direct statutory violation or duty on the part of the Pranadas.

Plaintiff attempts to bridge this gap by arguing that the Pranadas’ lease agreement did not require Ngo or Finley to secure firearms on the premises or take steps to prevent accidents involving loaded weapons. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the Pranadas did not take precautions to ensure their tenants complied with the Gun-Free School Zone Act or other firearm-related laws. However, there is no provision in Penal Code section 626.9—or any other statute cited by Plaintiff—that imposes such requirements on landlords. Plaintiff has not provided authority, and the Court is not aware of any case law or statutes, that mandates landlords to include firearm-specific clauses in their leases, or to inspect premises without suspicion or prior knowledge to ensure that tenants comply with all applicable state and federal laws.

Plaintiff also argues that the Pranadas failed to fulfill their duty as landlords to comply with the law and protect third parties, such as Guerrero, based on the language of the lease agreement. Plaintiff contends that the lease agreement, which required tenants to obey all federal, state, and local laws and authorized the landlords to inspect the premises, created a duty for the Pranadas to prohibit or monitor firearm possession on the property. However, this argument is unsupported by the language of the lease.

The relevant lease provisions require tenants to ensure compliance with applicable laws and prohibit unlawful activities on the premises. Specifically, the lease states:
“Tenant shall not, and shall ensure that guests and licensees of Tenant shall not, disturb, annoy, endanger or interfere with other tenants of the building or neighbors, or use the Premises for any unlawful purposes, under federal, state, or local law including, but not limited to, using, manufacturing, selling, storing or transporting illicit drugs or other contraband, or violate any law or ordinance, or commit a waste or nuisance on or about the Premises.” (Dec., Ex. G [Pranada Depo., Ex. A at §§ 15 & 19.])

This language clearly imposes obligations on the tenants—not the landlords—to comply with the law and ensure lawful conduct on the premises. While the lease grants the landlords the right to inspect the premises, it does not impose an affirmative obligation to do so. The plain language of these provisions does not create a duty for the landlords to police tenant behavior or monitor compliance with specific laws, such as firearm regulations. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority to support the contention that a tenant’s obligations under a lease create a corresponding duty on the part of the landlord to enforce or monitor tenant compliance. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact establishing that the lease imposes a duty on the landlords to ensure that the tenants did not possess firearms on the premises.

Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the element of duty, and summary judgment is therefore granted.

If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the court at sscdept27@lacourt.org with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number. The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.

Unless all parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument. You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.

If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion without leave.

[1] This dispute regarding which gun Finley fired is one of the issues Plaintiff points to as a basis to deny summary judgment, arguing that it is one of several disputed facts that need to be decided by a jury. But, it, like others Plaintiff contends require the insight of a jury, is immaterial to the issue of whether Defendants had a duty. And, duty (or, more accurately, lack thereof) is the basis for the Court’s ruling.