Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 21STCV34891, Date: 2024-02-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV34891    Hearing Date: February 27, 2024    Dept: 27

Complaint Filed:         9/22/2021

Trial Date:                   4/23/2024

Hon. Lee Arian

Department 27

Confidential – Court-Privileged Document

Hearing Date:                              2/27/2024 at 1:30 p.m.

Case Name:                             INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE WEST vs HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP

Case No.:                                21STCV34891

Motion:                                   Motion for Leave to Intervene

Moving Party:                         Plaintiff ABDELRAHMAN MUSTAFA ABDELRAHMAN

Responding Party:                   Defendant, PACIFIC TRAFFIC CONTROL, INC.

Notice:                                                 Sufficient

Tentative Ruling:                           PLAINTIFF IN INTERVENTION JERRY ALBERT ALONZO’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IS GRANTED

BACKGROUND

On September 22, 2021, Plaintiff, an insurance carrier, filed a complaint against Defendant Healthcare Service Group for its negligence in causing Jerry Albert Alonzo to slip and fall at work; as a result, Alonzo filed a worker's compensation claim for which Plaintiff was compelled to pay. Plaintiff is seeking not only worker's compensation payment made to Alonzo but also general and special damages that Alonzo has sustained.

Alonzo alleges that he became aware of the present case in June of 2023 when his deposition was noticed. After attempting but failing to get Defendant to stipulate to Alonzo’s intervention, the present motion was filed asking the court to grant Alonzo leave to intervene.

SUMMARY

Alonzo brings forth this motion for compulsory intervention under Code of Civil Procedure §387(d)(1)(A), which mandates that the Court grant intervention where there is a provision of law conferring an unconditional right to intervene. The provision conferring such a right is Labor Code §3853, allowing an injured employee to intervene in the employer’s workers' compensation carrier’s civil lawsuit at any time prior to the commencement of trial.

Additionally, under Code of Civil Procedure § 387(d)(1)(B), the Court must grant intervention when the intervening party satisfies three elements: (1) the intervening party claims an interest in the underlying lawsuit; (2) the intervening party is so situated that the disposition of the underlying lawsuit may impair or impede their ability to protect that interest; and (3) the intervening party's interests are not adequately represented by an existing party to the case.

Furthermore, Alonzo brings forth the motion under Code of Civil Procedure §387(d)(2), pursuant to which the court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.

In the opposition, Defendant does not object to the grounds on which Plaintiff brings forth the motion, such as Alonzo’s claim of interest in the underlying lawsuit, but only raises the issue of the timeliness of the present motion.

ANALYSIS

1.      Intervention As of Right Pursuant To Labor Code Section 3853

Defendant argues that intervention as of right under Labor Code § 3853 and CCP § 387(d)(1)(A) is subject to the same “timely application” requirement as permissive intervention under CCP § 387(d)(2) or compulsory intervention under CCP § 387(d)(1)(B). (Opposition at pg.5.) This is incorrect. Mar v. Sakti Internat. Corp, a case cited to by defendant itself, clarifies how to interpret "timely application" under CCP § 387 in conjunction with statutes that grant an unconditional right to intervene, such as Labor Code § 3853. (Mar v. Sakti Internat. Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1785.)

When a statute grants an unconditional right to intervene and specifies a standard for, both the right and the standard are incorporated into CCP § 387. (Id.) Specifically, Section 3853 allows for intervention "at any time before trial on the facts." (Id.) This timeliness standard, as incorporated into section 387, constitutes the governing rule of decision. (Id.)  Any other result would turn the plain language of section 3853—“at any time before trial on the facts”—into meaningless surplusage. (Id.) The trial court had no discretion to disregard the express command of that statute and refuse the employer leave to become a formal party to the pending action. (Id.)

Moreover, Mar v. Sakti Internat. Corp. already considered the cases Defendant cited to in its opposition. (Opposition at pg.5.) First, when the complaint in intervention is filed, it will be subject to whatever defenses and procedural objections defendants may choose to assert, just as happened in State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Selma Trailer & Manufacturing Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 740. (Mar v. Sakti Internat. Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1785.) Second, the ruling in Mar v. Sakti Internat. Corp. does not limit the judiciary's ability to address procedural manipulation, as seen in Bishop v. Silva (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1317. (Id.)

Accordingly, Alonzo’s motion for leave to intervene as of right under Labor Code § 3853 is timely.

2.  Prejudice To Existing Parties

 “Prejudice to existing parties is ‘the most important consideration in deciding whether a motion for intervention is timely.’ ” (Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 560, 574.) This does not, however, include prejudice that would result from allowing intervention. (Id.) Rather, only the “ ‘prejudice caused by the movant's delay’ ” should be considered. (Id.) Courts have found intervention to be timely based solely on the absence of such prejudice. (Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 342, 351.) On the other hand, prejudice was found when intervention was sought 2 years after discovery of the case and when the original parties were in the midst of settling the matter. (Ziani Homeowners Assn. v. Brookfield Ziani LLC (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 274, 280.)

Defendant is the only existing party claiming prejudice from the intervention. Plaintiff Insurance Company of the West consented to the intervention and does not allege any prejudice. (Exhibit A to Declaration of Pamela Rodriguez ISO Reply (Rodriguez Decl.).) Furthermore, Plaintiff became aware of the lawsuit in June 2023 and, following due diligence, retained counsel in October 2023. (Rodriguez Decl. ¶ ¶ 5-6.) Defendant does not offer anything other than speculation that Plaintiff was aware that his interest would no longer be adequately protected by the existing party before June 2023. (Opposition at pg. 4). In November 2023, Alonzo started reaching out to Defendant for a stipulation to intervene but Defendant refused to stipulate as of December 27, 2023. (Rodriguez Decl. ¶ ¶ 7-8.) The delay here amounts to approximately 5 months when Plaintiff waited to seek a stipulation in November 2023 instead of filing the present motion directly in June 2023. In the opposition, Defendant did not show how this 5 to 6-month delay caused any prejudice. Defendant's argument is that it needs to litigate its case again, however that does not constitute the type of prejudice contemplated as a basis to deny Alonzo’s request.  See Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 560, 574. Thus, intervention is timely based on an absence of showing of prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff in intervention Jerry Albert Alonzo’s motion for leave to intervene is GRANTED.