Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 21STCV35918, Date: 2024-12-23 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Carlos Manrique and Christa Trostle, each individually, and as Successors in Interest to Decedent Janet Trostle-Manrique and Decedent Imogene Haley (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), move for leave to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”) in this action against Defendants Saav Appliance Installers, Inc. (“SAAV”), Saul Samano Quintero, individually and doing business as Saav Appliances Installations (“Quintero”), Humberto Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), and DOES 1-100 (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs seek to amend the pleading by: (1) adding the following additional parties as defendants: the Estate of Decedent Humberto Gonzalez (“Estate of Gonzalez”), Best Buy Stores, L.P., Best Buy Co. Inc., and Best Buy Warehousing Logistics Inc. (together the “Best Buy Defendants”), and (2) limiting damages to the amount of insurance coverage available to the Estate of Gonzalez (Probate Code § 554). (Notice of Motion, p. 5, Exh. B [Proposed SAC].)

On September 29, 2021, Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendants based on a fatal automobile collision. On January 18, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their FAC alleging that on June 23, 2021, Janet-Trostle Manrique and Imogene Haley’s vehicle was fatally struck by Humberto Gonzalez, as he drove Defendants’ commercial pickup truck under the influence of drugs. (FAC, ¶ 18.) Defendant Gonzalez was in prison when this action commenced and died in prison on November 27, 2022. (Declaration of Mitchell L. Felton (“Decl. of Felton”) ¶ 2; Opposition, Exh. A [Death Certificate].)

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on November 25, 2024, with a hearing set for December 25, 2024. On December 11, 2024, counsel for Gonzalez filed an opposition, to which Plaintiff filed a reply on December 16, 2024. Trial is set for May 12, 2025

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (Civ. Code §473(a)(1).)

“Trial courts are vested with the discretion to allow amendments to pleadings ‘in furtherance of justice.’ That trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been established policy in this state since 1901.” (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489.) Indeed, “[t]he policy favoring amendment is so strong that denial of leave to amend can rarely be justified: ‘If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.’” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group June 2020 Update), Chapter 6 § 6:639.5.)

CRC Rule 3.1321(a) requires that a motion to amend must: “[i]nclude a copy of the proposed… amended pleading… [and] state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be [deleted and/or added], if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the [deleted and/or additional] allegations are located…” CRC Rule 3.1324(b) provides, as follows: “[a] separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify: (1) The effect of the amendment; (2) Why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Plaintiffs’ motion complies with CRC Rule 3.1321(a) because Plaintiffs’ motion includes a copy of the proposed SAC, and addresses which allegations are proposed to be added and/or deleted. (Notice of Motion, p. 5, Exh. B [Proposed SAC].)

Plaintiffs’ motion does not fully comply with CRC Rule 3.1324(b). Plaintiffs include a separate declaration from their counsel Todd F. Nevell (“Nevell”), which specifies the effect of the amendment is to continue this case to trial by (1) adding the Estate of Gonzalez and Best Buy Defendants to the action, and (2) limiting Plaintiffs’ recoverable damages to the insurance policy of the Estate of Gonzalez. (Decl. of Nevell, ¶¶ 6-7.) However, the declaration fails to describe how the amendment is necessary and proper in order to fully prove the applicable causes of action. The declaration also fails to address when facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered and/or reasons why the request was not made earlier. However, in light of Plaintiffs’ proposed addition of the Best Buy Defendants, the Estate of Gonzalez, and limiting damages to Gonzalez’s insurance policy, without substantially altering underlying facts alleged, the Court, in its discretion, finds the declaration’s lack of this information is not a basis for denying the motion. Further, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend was not made with undue delay, as it was filed shortly after the November 14, 2024, OSC hearing. (Decl. of Nevell, ¶ 5.) Given that trial is set for May 12, 2025, Defendants have sufficient time to attack the amended pleading.

Defendant presents arguments relating to the merits of the proposed SAC including: (1) Plaintiffs’ Request(s) for Entry of Default against Gonzalez, (2) Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred per the statute of limitations against the Estate of Gonzalez, and (3) Plaintiffs’ request to limit damage to Gonzalez’s insurance is duplicative and not relevant. (Opposition, pp. 3-6.)

Plaintiffs contend that at the time of his death, Gonzalez was in default of the instant action. Plaintiffs filed for Request for Entry of Default against Gonzalez on November 14, 2024. (see 11/14/24 Minute Order.) On April 3, 2023, counsel for Defendant delivered the death certificate of Humberto Gonzalez, dated November 27, 2022, to counsel for Plaintiff. (Opposition, p. 2; Declaration of Lauren E. Becker (“Decl. of Becker”), ¶ 2, Exh. A.) Counsel for Defendant, Mitchell L. Fenton (“Fenton”) declares that because he was unable to confirm whether Gonzalez was served with a copy of the summons and complaint due to several prison transfers, no answer could be filed to Plaintiffs’ complaint or FAC. (Decl. of Fenton, ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs contend that the need to file the SAC was prompted after counsel for Defendant submitted a declaration including Gonzalez’s death certificate following the OSC hearing. (Motion, p. 4; Decl. of Nevell, ¶ 5.)

The Court notes that a request for entry of default can be entered on a defendant who was served while in prison, as long as the following conditions are met. First, the defendant must have been served with the summons and complaint in a manner that permits entry of default. (CRC 3.110.) Second, the time allowed by law for responding to the complaint must have expired. If the defendant has not filed a pleading, motion, or otherwise appeared in the action, then the plaintiff may apply for entry of default. Finally, the plaintiff must apply to the court clerk to have the default entered.

Upon review of the proof of service of Gonzalez, the Court finds that Gonzalez was personally served with the complaint and summons. (see 12/6/24 Proof of Service.) As stated above, counsel for Defendant concedes that no answer was filed to the complaint, and following the November 14, 2024 OSC hearing, Plaintiffs petitioned the Court to enter default against Gonzalez. (Decl. of Fenton, ¶ 2; Motion, p. 4, Decl. of Nevell, ¶ 5.) The Court rejected the Request for Entry of Default on procedural grounds, but nonetheless finds that Plaintiffs have complied with the conditions prescribed in CRC 3.110.

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs failed to timely continue this action against the Estate of Gonzalez by failing to name the Estate of Gonzalez and serve his insurer within one year of Gonzalez’s death, or three years from the date of the accident. (Civ. Code § 377.41; Probate Code § 9370; Opposition, pp. 4-5.) Pursuant to Probate Code § 550, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs are allowed to continue this action to establish Gonzalez’s liability, as protected by insurance, without joining Gonzalez’s estate, personal representative, or successor in interest as a party. (Motion, p. 7; Reply, p. 3.) Statutes of limitations govern when claims can be commenced against a party, whereas Plaintiffs simply propose adding the Estate of Gonzalez to continue the causes of action asserted against Gonzalez. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is not substantially prejudiced by the proposed amendment.

Counsel for Defendant also declares that Plaintiffs’ attempt to recover from Gonzalez’s insurance policy is not relevant because Gonzalez had the same insurance policy and limits as an employee of SAAV, noting no available increases in coverage. (Decl. of Fenton, ¶ 3.) In reply, Plaintiff contends that the proposal to limit Plaintiff’s recovery of damages against the Estate of Gonzalez does not create a risk of prejudice to Defendant. (Reply, p. 4.) The Court notes that Defendant’s argument as to the relevance of the insurance policy in light of the SAAV policy is more appropriately raised on demurrer or motion to strike the proposed SAC.

Therefore, the Court finds Defendant will not be substantially prejudiced by the amendment and Plaintiffs are entitled to an order granting leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a SAC is granted.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court