Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 21STCV38404, Date: 2024-11-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV38404 Hearing Date: November 20, 2024 Dept: 27
Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hearing Date: 11/20/24
CASE NO./NAME: 21STCV38404 BRENDA LEE vs
ACCESS SERVICES, et al.
Moving Party: Defendants MV Transportation and
Access Services
Responding Party: Plaintiff
Notice: Sufficient
Ruling: GRANTED
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hearing Date: 11/20/24
CASE NO./NAME: 21STCV38404 BRENDA LEE vs
ACCESS SERVICES, et al.
Moving Party: Defendant County of Los Angeles
Responding Party: Unopposed
Notice: Sufficient
Ruling: Off-Calendar
COUNTY
OF LA’S MSJ
Defendant County of Los
Angeles’s motion for summary judgment is taken off calendar because, on August
26, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed all causes of action against Defendant County of
Los Angeles.
DEFENDANTS
MV TRANSPORTATION AND ACCESS’ MSJ
Background
This lawsuit concerns
an incident that occurred on March 8, 2021, when Plaintiff was being picked up
for transport. While boarding the van operated by Defendant MV Transportation
and owned by Defendant Access Services, she hit her head on the top of the door
frame. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against various defendants,
including Access Services and MV Transportation, asserting a single cause of
action for general negligence. Defendants Access Services and MV Transportation
(collectively “Defendants”) now move the Court for summary judgment, arguing
that the dimensions of the van, including the door frame and the ramp, comply
with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) guidelines for transportation
vehicles for the disabled.
Legal Standard
In
reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a
three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2)
determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3)
determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable,
material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v.
Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)
“[T]he
initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that
there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf
v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A
defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or
her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If
the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion
must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even
if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still
defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)
To
meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a
defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed
evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed
evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for
the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero
v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The
defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably
obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The
supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice
may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 855.)
“Once
the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to
show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause
of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The
plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to
show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set
forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists
as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If
the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi
v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463,
467.)
The
court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of
that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz
v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra,
25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must
therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder
could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While
viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its
primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only
when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a
matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict,
the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further,
“the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to
determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor
may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of
credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex
rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts
deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the
evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing
party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)
Initial Burden
Defendants have provided evidence to establish the
following:
·
The Access van Plaintiff hit her head
when boarding is known as “MV-1”. (Correia Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6)
·
The MV-1 is the only purpose-built van
for paratransit use and meets or exceeds all applicable ADA standards. (Correia
Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6; Ex. “B”, ¶ 3; Ex. “C”.)
·
The door of the Access van where the
ramp attaches is 38 ½ inches wide, meeting the ADA standard (Correia Decl., ¶¶
5, 6; Ex. “B”, ¶ 4; Ex. “C”.)
·
The door of the Access van where the
ramp attaches is 56 ¼ inches high, meeting the ADA standard (Correia Decl., ¶¶
5, 6; Ex. “B”, ¶ 4; Ex. “C”.)
·
36 CFR Chapter XI Part 1192, entitled
“Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for
Transportation Vehicles,” governs the dimensions of equipment used to transport
the disabled. (Correia Decl., ¶ 5; Ex. “B”, ¶ 5.)
·
36 CFR Chapter XI Part 1192 Section
1192.25(c) requires doors on vans shorter than 22 feet to be at least 56 inches
high. (Correia Decl., ¶ 5; Ex. “B”, ¶ 5.)
·
The Access van is shorter than 22 feet.
(Correia Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6; Ex. “B”, ¶ 5; Ex. “C”.)
·
36 CFR Chapter XI Part 1192 Section
1192.30(f) requires vans like the Access van to have a minimum interior height
of 56 inches. (Correia Decl., ¶ 5; Ex. “B”, ¶ 5.)
·
The interior height of the Access van is
between 58.3 inches and 59.5 inches. (Correia Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6; Ex. “B”, ¶ 5; Ex.
“C”.)
·
Defendant’s expert declares that the
subject vehicle complied with the ADA guidelines regards door width and height
and the width and slope of the ramp when Ms. Lee claims she was injured on
March 8, 2021.
Defendants
thus demonstrated that the subject vehicle, including the door and the ramp,
met ADA guidelines. Therefore, Defendants have met their initial burden of
showing that no dangerous condition existed and that they did not breach any
applicable standard of care.
Plaintiff concedes
that the dimensions of the vehicle, including the door and the ramp, comply
with ADA guidelines but argues that compliance with ADA standards is not a
complete defense to liability. Plaintiff contends that even if the van complies
with ADA standards on paper, particular circumstances may render it
noncompliant in practice.
Plaintiff proposes
several theories on how the vehicle, despite its ADA compliance, could still be
dangerous:
1. If the ramp was not on level ground, the slope could exceed ADA limits, creating a tripping hazard.
2.
Accumulated dirt or debris in the door
frame could reduce the clearance height, posing a foreseeable risk of head
injury.
3.
The specific configuration may have
posed unique risks to mobility-impaired passengers, such as Plaintiff, who was
forced to manage boarding while observing COVID protocols.
4.
Plaintiff, using a cane, hit her head
while boarding.
5.
COVID protocols limited her ability to
seek assistance from the driver.
6.
Defendants failed to provide adequate
warnings or assistance, despite the obvious risks.
To raise a triable
issue of fact, Plaintiff must set forth specific facts. (Code Civ. Proc., §
437c, subd. (p)(2).) If Plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be
granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) Evidence that gives rise to mere speculation is
insufficient to establish a triable issue of fact. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Additionally, the opposing party cannot create a
triable issue by merely attacking the credibility of the moving party’s
evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)
Plaintiff has failed to present any affirmative evidence to
support her various theories regarding how the ramp and the door of the vehicle
could be dangerous. Plaintiff’s assertion that accumulated dirt or debris could
reduce the clearance height is entirely speculative, as no evidence has been
provided to show that such debris ever existed on the subject vehicle.
Similarly, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to demonstrate what specific
configuration of the van allegedly posed unique risks to passengers like
herself, nor has she identified what those unique risks are. Moreover,
Plaintiff has failed to present evidence showing that Defendants’ COVID
protocols or the alleged lack of assistance from the driver contributed to the
incident. Plaintiff does not provide details on how these protocols were
implemented, how they deviated from reasonable standards, or how they directly
caused or contributed to her injuries. Without any factual support, Plaintiff’s
theories are speculative and insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The
Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden under Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c, and Defendants’ MSJ is granted.
Continuance
Plaintiff requests a
continuance based on Defendants’ responses to Plaintiff’s RFP No. 16, served on
January 6, 2023, and September 24, 2024, regarding Plaintiff’s request for
documents of prior incidents. Defendants objected to the request and limited their
response to the subject incident. Plaintiff argues that she has been deprived
of critical information/documents to establish whether Defendants had notice of
prior incidents involving the vehicle.
“The nonmoving party
seeking a continuance must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to
opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and
(3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.]”
(Wachs v. Curry (1993)13 Cal.App.4th 616, 623.)
Plaintiff has failed to
make the requisite showing to justify a continuance. First, Plaintiff’s
declaration does not provide a valid reason to believe that the requested facts
exist. Second, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the proposed discovery would
lead to facts essential to justify opposition. (Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp. (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 307, 325-326.)
Plaintiff argues that
the information sought is directly relevant to establishing whether Defendants
had notice of the hazardous condition of the van’s door frame and failed to
take reasonable measures to mitigate the risk. However, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
how notice is “essential” to opposing the motion. Even if discovery revealed
prior incidents, Plaintiff has presented no evidence showing that the vehicle
constitutes a dangerous condition. Without such evidence, the existence of
prior incidents amounts to mere speculation that the vehicle might be
dangerous, which is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Court further finds
that Plaintiff did not file a sufficient declaration justifying a continuance.
The RFP was served on October 1, 2022, and Defendants served its response on
January 6, 2023. However, Plaintiff did not file a motion to compel further
responses even now despite taking issue with Defendant’s objections. “[C]ourts
have held that lack of diligence may be a ground for denying a request for a
continuance.” (Rodriguez v. Oto (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1038.) The
discovery response has been outstanding since January 2023, and Plaintiff has
not pursued further action for nearly two years. The Court finds that Plaintiff
has not acted diligently and has failed to demonstrate the requisite showing to
justify a continuance. Accordingly, the request for a continuance is denied.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
If a party intends to submit on
this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT”
followed by the case number.¿The body of the email must include the hearing date and
time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.
Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this
tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or
in person for oral argument.¿You should assume that others may appear at the hearing
to argue.
If the parties neither submit nor
appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the
tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a
tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.