Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 21STCV42676, Date: 2023-11-17 Tentative Ruling

On November 18, 2021, Plaintiffs Olivia Solis Reyes (“Reyes”) and Juan Antonio Rodriguez Morales (“Plaintiff”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against Defendants Ricardo Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), Southern Glazer’s Wine & Spirits (“Southern Glazer”) (collectively “Defendants”), and Does 1-50, asserting causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) negligent entrustment; (3) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention. Plaintiffs allege that Rodriguez failed to yield the right of way to Plaintiff’s vehicle when entering Alameda Street and the collision caused Plaintiffs to suffer severe injuries. Plaintiffs also allege that Rodriguez was operating the vehicle while in the course and scope of his employment with Southern Glazer.

On August 4, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative, summary adjudication against Plaintiff. No opposition is filed.

On July 7, 2023, the Court granted Southern Glazer’s motion and deemed the Request for Admissions, Set One, against Plaintiff admitted. (07/07/23 Minute Order.)

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520. Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense.

To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Defendants move for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication on the basis that (1) Plaintiff’s first cause of action has no merit based on Plaintiff’s Court-deemed admissions, (2) the second cause of action has no merit based on Plaintiff’s Court-deemed admissions, and (3) the third cause of action has no merit based on Plaintiff’s Court-deemed admissions.

“The essential elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) the defendant's legal duty of care toward the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's breach of duty—the negligent act or omission; (3)¿injury to the plaintiff as a result of the breach—proximate or legal cause; and (4) damage to the plaintiff.” (Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103.) Owing a duty of care to the plaintiff is an indispensable prerequisite to the imposition of liability for negligence. (Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63.) A duty is an “obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.” (Hilyar v. Union Ice Co. (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 30, 36-37.) Generally, an omission to perform a contract obligation is not a tort, unless that omission is also an omission of a legal duty. (Jones v. Kelly (1929) 208 Cal. 251, 255.)

The elements of a cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are: (1) the employer’s hiring, retaining, or supervising an employee; (2) the employee was incompetent or unfit; (3) the employer had reason to believe undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment; and (4) harm occurs. (Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 836-837.)

“‘California is one of the several states [that] recognizes the liability of an automobile owner who has entrusted a car to an incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced driver’…through the tort of negligent entrustment.’ [Citation.]” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565-66.) “Negligent entrustment is a common law liability doctrine, which arises in numerous factual contexts. [Citation.] In cases involving negligent entrustment of a vehicle, liability ‘is imposed on [a] vehicle owner or permitter because of his own independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver.’ [Citations.]” (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559.) “’Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) The elements of negligent entrustment of a vehicle are as follows: (1) the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) the defendant owner owned the vehicle operated by the driver or had possession of that vehicle with the defendant owner’s permission; (3)¿the defendant owner knew, or should have known, the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; (4) defendant owner permitted the driver to operate the vehicle regardless; and (5) the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. (McKenna, 67 Cal.App.5th at 566.)

Defendants present evidence that on June 2, 2022, Southern Glazer propounded its Requests for Admissions to Morales, Set One, requesting Plaintiff to:

3) Admit DEFENDANT RICARDO RODRIQUEZ was not negligent in any way regarding the alleged INCIDENT.

4) Admit DEFENDANT RICARDO RODRIQUEZ did not violate California Vehicle Code section 22106 as alleged in Paragraphs 19 and 20 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

5) Admit DEFENDANT RICARDO RODRIQUEZ did not violate California Vehicle Code section 21804 (a) as alleged in Paragraphs 19 and 21 of YOUR COMPLAINT.

6) Admit DEFENDANT RICARDO RODRIQUEZ did not violate any California Vehicle Code causing the alleged INCIDENT.

7) Admit DEFENDANT SOUTHERN GLAZER'S WINE & SPIRITS, LLC was not negligent in any way regarding the alleged INCIDENT

8) Admit DEFENDANT SOUTHERN GLAZER’S WINE & SPIRITS, LLC is not vicariously liable to YOU as a result of the alleged INCIDENT.

9) Admit DEFENDANT SOUTHERN GLAZER’S WINE & SPIRITS, LLC did not violate any California Vehicle Code causing the alleged INCIDENT.

12) Admit YOU suffered no non-economic damages as a result of the alleged INCIDENT.

(Undisputed Material Facts “UMF” No. 8, Ex. C.) After receiving no response, Southern Glazer filed a motion to have Southern Glazer’s Requests for Admissions Deemed Admitted on January 30, 2023. (UMF No. 9, Ex. E.) On July 7, 2023, the Court granted Southern Glazer’s motion to have Southern Glazer’s requests for admissions deemed admitted. (UMF No. 10, Ex. D.) On July 10, 2023, Defendants served notice of the ruling on Morales. (UMF No. 11, Ex. F.)

Based on the Court’s July 7^th order, Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted: 1) he is entirely at fault for the alleged incident, 2) 100% responsible for damages he claims in this action, 3) Rodriguez was not negligent regarding the alleged incident, 4) Rodriguez did not violate any California Vehicle code causing the incident, 5) Southern Glazer was not negligent in any way regarding the incident, 6) Southern Glazer is not vicariously liable to Plaintiff as a result of the alleged incident, 7) Southern Glazer did not violate any California Vehicle Code causing the incident and 8) Plaintiff suffered no injuries as a result of the alleged incident. (UMF No. 8, Ex. C, E, D.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has met its initial burden as to the first, second, and third causes of action. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that a triable issue of material fact exists as to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has not opposed this motion. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of any triable issue of material fact. Thus, summary judgment of the first, second, and third cause of action is granted.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court