Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV02353, Date: 2024-05-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV02353, Date: 2024-05-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV02353 Hearing Date: May 30, 2024 Dept: 27

Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Hearing Date: 5/30/24¿

CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV02353 JANNETH OLIVERA vs AMANDA PORTOBANCO, et al.

Moving Party: Defendant Lyft

Responding Party: Plaintiff¿

Notice: Sufficient¿

Ruling: MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER IS DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Legal Standard

“In accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, California courts have been broad-minded in determining whether discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 172; Pettie v. Superior Court (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 680, 687.) As a practical matter, it is difficult to define at the discovery stage what evidence will be relevant at trial. Therefore, the party seeking discovery is entitled to substantial leeway. (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 172.) Furthermore, California’s liberal approach to permissible discovery generally has led the courts to resolve any doubt in favor of permitting discovery. (Id. at p. 173.) In doing so, the courts have taken the view if an error is made in ruling on a discovery motion, it is better that it be made in favor of granting discovery of the nondiscoverable rather than denying discovery of information vital to preparation or presentation of the party's case or to efficacious settlement of the dispute.” (Norton v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1761.)

Where good cause is shown, courts may enter protective orders limiting depositions. “The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420(b).) Courts have considerable discretion in granting and crafting protective orders. (Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.) A court may quash a subpoena entirely or partially, and issue an order to protect parties, witnesses or consumers from unreasonable or oppressive demands including violations of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., §1987.1; Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 8:598. See also generally Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Trials & Ev. (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶1:91.)

CCP section 2031.060 provides that a party can move for a protective order “[w]hen an inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of documents, tangible things, places, or electronically stored information has been demanded.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.060(a).) The court may make any order that justice requires to protect any party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense upon a showing of good cause. (Id., § 2031.060(b).)

A court may make any order that justice requires to protect a party from “unwanted annoyance, embarrassment or oppression or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (b).) The burden of proof is on the party seeking the protective order to show “good cause” for the order he or she seeks. (Fairmont Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) A motion for a protective order “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090.) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.)

Discussion

On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present motor accident action against Defendants, including Lyft. Lyft now moves the Court for a protective order in response to Plaintiff’s first set of form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for documents, and requests for admissions that allegedly seek confidential information. Lyft requests the Court issue a protective order attached to the present motion. Upon reviewing the exhibits, the Court notes that no proposed protective order was attached for its review.

Furthermore, a motion for protective orders requires the parties to adequately meet and confer. Defendant did not attach any email correspondence with the opposing party to the motion. Defendant's sole contention that "To date, counsel for Plaintiff has not agreed to sign any protective order of any nature" is insufficient and fails to demonstrate a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.

Lyft must meet and confer on how a specific discovery request will disclose trade secrets or why a protective order is necessary for the request sought. Protective orders need to be narrowly tailored to the specific discovery responses sought and should not merely require the opposing party to sign a blanket protective order.

The present motion is DENIED without prejudice for failing to comply with the meet and confer requirement.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:¿

If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number.¿ The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.

Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument.¿ You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.

If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.