There is no precise yardstick for measuring the “good faith” of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors, but it must harmonize the public policy favoring settlements with the competing public policy favoring equitable sharing of costs among tortfeasors. (See Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) 

“A more appropriate definition of ‘good faith,’ in keeping with the policies of American Motorcycle and the statute, would enable the trial court to inquire, among other things, whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries. This is not to say that bad faith is ‘established by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share.’ [Citation.] Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements. ‘For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote. And even where the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citation.] Moreover, such a rule would tend to convert the pretrial settlement approval procedure into a full scale mini trial [citation]. 

“But these considerations do not lead to the conclusion that the amount of the settlement is irrelevant in determining good faith. Rather, the intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.]  

Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. ‘[A] defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be.’ [Citation.] The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§877.6(d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6. (Tech-Bilt, Inc., 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.) 

Analysis 

The parties agree on these facts: (1) the settlement between Defendant Zhou and Plaintiff is for $5,000, (2) Zhou's policy limit is $100,000, and (3) Plaintiff is seeking approximately $300,000 in general damages and $55,327 in special damages. Baldwin Park does not allege any type of collusion between Plaintiff and Zhou. The central disagreement between the parties concerns Defendant Zhou's estimated liability in this matter. 

For Zhou’s estimated liability, an analysis under the “Sidewalk Accident Decisions” doctrine, which governs property adjacent to a sidewalk, is required. The doctrine is based on case law explaining that sidewalks are public and thus no duty is owed to users of the sidewalk unless the abutting property owner created the hazardous condition. Streets and Highways Code §5610 provides that owners of lots fronting on a public street shall maintain any sidewalk in a condition that will not endanger persons and not interfere with the public convenience in the use of those works.¿ Pursuant to Jones v. Deeter (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 798, 803, the duty imposed by this ordinance is owed to the city and not to persons using the sidewalk. “Under section 5610 the abutting owner bears the duty to repair defects in the sidewalk, regardless of whether he has created these defects. It was felt, however, that it would be unfair for such an owner to be held liable to travelers injured as a result of sidewalk defects which were not of the owner’s making. Thus, the ‘Sidewalk Accident Decisions’ doctrine arose; this doctrine holds that the abutting property owner is not liable in tort to travelers injured on the sidewalk unless the owner somehow creates the injurious sidewalk condition.” (Deeter, 152 Cal.App.3d at 803.)¿¿¿ 

¿ 

While generally a landowner is not liable for harm resulting from conditions or activities outside his property, on adjoining land or on the highway, street, or sidewalk, the landowner may be liable if the landowner created the defect or exercised dominion or control over the adjoining land (Jordan v. City of Sacramento (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1490-1491; Corcoran v. San Mateo (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 355, 359; Schaefer v. Lenahan (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 324, 326.)¿In settings where the abutting owners exercised control over the property such as by planting trees or habitually trimming or caring for them, these abutting owners have the duty to maintain the trees in a safe condition to make sure the roots do not cause a tripping hazard. (Alcaraz v. Vece, 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1162.) 

The Court is not persuaded by Defendant City of Baldwin Park’s argument for Zhou’s significant liability. In cases where non-government entities were found to be liable, it was due to their control over a portion of government property by maintaining it, fencing it in, or where roots of an adjacent tree encroached and created a tripping hazard. (See Jordan v. City of Sacramento (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1490-1491; Corcoran v. San Mateo (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 355, 359; Schaefer v. Lenahan (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 324, 326; Alcaraz v. Vece, 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1162.) The image provided by Baldwin Park shows that this is not the case here. (Exhibit 1.) Zhou’s property is completely fenced in and separated from the sidewalk, with no evidence that he is maintaining the sidewalk or exercising control over it. (Id.) Quite to the contrary, the fence provides a complete demarcation between the area of Zhou's control and the area outside of Zhou's control. (Id.)