Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV08316, Date: 2024-05-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV08316, Date: 2024-05-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV08316 Hearing Date: May 30, 2024 Dept: 27

Hon. Lee S. Arian, Dept 27

MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT

Hearing Date: 5/29/24

CASE NO./NAME: 22STCV08316 HEDIYEH FETANAT vs KAREN CHRISTENBERRY STIMMING, et al.

Moving Party: Defendants Karen Stimming and William Stimming

Responding Party: Defendant Wendy West

Notice: Sufficient

Ruling: MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT IS GRANTED.

Legal Standard

In an action involving two or more joint tortfeasors or co-obligors, when one tortfeasor or obligor enters into a settlement with the plaintiff, the other tortfeasors or obligors are entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether the settlement was entered into in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6(a).) Where a plaintiff settles with one of several joint tortfeasors or co-obligors without releasing the others, a determination of “good faith” discharges the settling defendant from liability to the other defendants for equitable contribution or comparative indemnity. (CCP § 877(a)-(b).) The amount paid by the settling defendant reduces the claim against the others (CCP § 877(a)), but a risk of prejudice remains because an unreasonably low settlement (i.e., with the “most culpable” tortfeasor) exposes the remaining defendants to a judgment exceeding their fair share of the liability. (See Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 1012, 1019-1020.)

There is no precise yardstick for measuring the “good faith” of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors, but it must harmonize the public policy favoring settlements with the competing public policy favoring equitable sharing of costs among tortfeasors. (See Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)

“A more appropriate definition of ‘good faith,’ in keeping with the policies of American Motorcycle and the statute, would enable the trial court to inquire, among other things, whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries. This is not to say that bad faith is ‘established by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share.’ [Citation.] Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements. ‘For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote. And even where the claimant's damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citation.] Moreover, such a rule would tend to convert the pretrial settlement approval procedure into a full scale mini trial [citation].

But these considerations do not lead to the conclusion that the amount of the settlement is irrelevant in determining good faith. Rather, the intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.]

Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. ‘[A] defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be.’ [Citation.] The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§877.6(d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc., 38 Cal.3d at 499-500.)

Discussion

On March 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present motor accident case alleging that Defendants Karen Stimming and William Stimming rear-ended Co-Defendant Wendy West. As a result of this impact, Co-Defendant West was pushed into the rear of Plaintiff’s car. The Stimming Defendants entered into a settlement with Plaintiff for $24,999.99 and moved the Court for a determination of good faith settlement. Co-Defendant West filed an opposition stating that the Stimming Defendants are at least 80 percent liable for the accident, and that the settlement for $24,999.99 is grossly disproportionate.

The Stimming Defendants have addressed all the Tech-Bilt factors in their moving papers. The main contention between the Defendants is the estimated value of the case. Given that the Stimming Defendants caused the accident and initiated the series of rear-end collisions, Defendant West estimates the Stimming Defendants’ portion of liability to be at least 80%, which the court finds reasonable. West estimates the value of the case to be $149,331.54 based on Plaintiff’s Supplemental Discovery Responses from January 31, 2024, reflecting the amount of medical expenses incurred. (Opp. at p. 5.)

The Stimming Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s medical expenses are excessive and unnecessary. Specifically, Plaintiff had been under the care of Dr. Lawrence Miller for a six-month period following the accident. Dr. Miller testified recently at deposition that Plaintiff did not need any epidural injections and, since she was resolved from pain, he had released her from his care on January 19, 2022. A few months later, Plaintiff went to a different doctor who performed multiple injections, particularly to the low back, a body part about which she had never complained to Dr. Miller. Moreover, there is a question of whether the collision at less than 5 mph would cause Plaintiff to incur spinal disc injuries. Therefore, the Stimming Defendants value the case at $15,000 to $25,000. In her opposition, Defendant West provided no countervailing argument against the Stimming Defendants' claim that Plaintiff’s medical specials are excessive.

“The damages sought are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefore is often uncertain or remote. A settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if found liable at trial" (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499; Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 874 ["In order to encourage settlements, it is quite proper for a settling defendant to pay less than his proportional share."]). In Horton v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 727, the court stated: "In determining a settling defendant's equitable proportionate share of liability, the judge does not look to the plaintiff's claim for damages; rather the judge tries to determine a "rough approximation" of what the plaintiff would actually recover if the case should go to trial. This amount is then discounted for settlement purposes based on the savings in trial time, defense costs, attorneys' fees and the avoidance of the risk inherent in every trial of a verdict or judgment larger than expected.

Based on the arguments and evidence presented by both sides, the Court the case value here to be in a range of $25,000 to $100,000. This range must be discounted for settlement purposes, taking into account the savings in trial time, defense costs, attorneys' fees, and the avoidance of the risk inherent in every trial of a verdict or judgment larger than expected. Given these considerations, the settlement of $24,999.99 is within the ballpark and not grossly disproportionate.

Courts have found settlements to be in good faith with significantly lower settlement to value ratio than the present case. See, e.g., Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1028 (finding a $30,000 settlement reasonable in a litigation involving a claim for $1 million in damages); Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 969-970 ($25,000 settlement on a $40 million estimated value.); Horton v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 727 (value of case estimated at $320,000; judge determined the case was worth less than $150,000 and a $50,000 settlement was not "out of the ballpark).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Stimming Defendants’ settlement was made in good faith and grants the Motion.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:

If a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling,¿the party must send an email to the court at¿sscdept27@lacourt.org¿with the Subject line “SUBMIT” followed by the case number.¿ The body of the email must include the hearing date and time, counsel’s contact information, and the identity of the party submitting.

Unless¿all¿parties submit by email to this tentative ruling, the parties should arrange to appear remotely (encouraged) or in person for oral argument.¿ You should assume that others may appear at the hearing to argue.

If the parties neither submit nor appear at hearing, the Court may take the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court.¿ After the Court has issued a tentative ruling, the Court may prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion.