Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV12060, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Ingrid Licardie is a former tenant of Defendant 310 South Alvarado, LLC. Plaintiff resided at 310 South Alvarado from November 2014 through January 2022. Plaintiff alleges she sustained serious injuries on April 11, 2020, when a kitchen cabinet became dislodged and fell on her inside her apartment.

Defendant moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish Defendant had notice of the alleged defect.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Defendant’s objection to SS No. 7, regarding the improper installation of the cabinet, is sustained for the reasons set forth below. The Court overrules Defendant’s remaining objections.

· Plaintiff claims she sustained injuries as a result of a cabinet that fell on top of her head and body that occurred on April 11, 2020, at 310 South Alvarado.

· Plaintiff leased the apartment, unit 104, from 310 South Alvarado from November 2014 to January 2022.

· Plaintiff admitted that she never noticed any defect with the cabinets until the incident.

· Plaintiff resided at the subject property for nearly six years prior to the incident.

· The Los Angeles and Community Investment Department inspected Plaintiff’s premises on February 4, 2020.

A landlord is liable for a dangerous condition only if the landlord knew or should have known about the condition. (Harris v. Joffe (1946) 28 Cal.2d 418, 424; Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185, 1197.) "For landlords, reasonable care ordinarily involves making sure the property is safe at the beginning of the tenancy and repairing any hazards the landlord learns about later." (Stone v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608, 612.)

Defendant has met its initial burden of demonstrating that it had no actual or constructive notice of any defect in the kitchen cabinet prior to the incident.

First, when the property was leased to Plaintiff in 2014, Frank Acevedo, the property manager for the subject location, conducted an inspection of the apartment, including the kitchen cabinet, and found no identifiable defects during his visual inspection. (Acevedo Decl. ¶ 4.) Additionally, Acevedo performed annual inspections of Plaintiff’s apartment and observed no issues with the subject cabinet. (Acevedo Decl. ¶ 8).

Second, the Housing and Community Investment Department conducted thorough inspections of the property on October 17, 2019, and February 4, 2020, to identify conditions affecting the "health and safety" of the occupants. These inspections, which occurred just months before the incident in April 2020, did not reveal any defect with the kitchen cabinet.

Third, Plaintiff never reported any issues with the cabinet to Defendant prior to the incident, further supporting the absence of actual notice.

Taken together, this evidence establishes that Defendant had no reason to know of any dangerous condition involving the cabinet. Defendant has therefore satisfied its initial burden on summary judgment by demonstrating that it had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly relies on self-serving, conclusory, and uncorroborated declarations from Frank Acevedo, as well as the Housing and Community Investment Department’s allegedly irrelevant and unauthenticated reports. However, Acevedo’s declaration is admissible evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5, as it is a sworn statement based on personal knowledge detailing his inspections of the property. His declaration establishes that he conducted an initial inspection at the beginning of Plaintiff’s tenancy, performed annual inspections thereafter, and observed no defects with the subject cabinet. The Housing and Community Investment Department’s reports are also admissible as official records under Evidence Code section 1280, as they were prepared by a public agency in the course of its duties to identify safety hazards.

Plaintiff cites general principles of premises liability but fails to provide any legal authority demonstrating that the requirement of notice for landlord liability is inapplicable when the landlord has relinquished control of the property to a tenant. Plaintiff also relies on Mora v. Baker Commodities (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 775, 782, but Mora is distinguishable. In Mora, the landlord conducted no inspection of the property, and the court did not reverse summary judgment due to insufficient detail in the defendant’s affidavit regarding an inspection.

Moreover, Mora explicitly states that “the landlord's responsibility to inspect is limited. Like a residential landlord, the duty to inspect charges the lessor ‘only with those matters which would have been disclosed by a reasonable inspection.’ The landlord need not take extraordinary measures or make unreasonable expenditures of time and money in trying to discover hazards unless the circumstances so warrant.” (Id.) Here, Defendant has met its burden by introducing affirmative evidence, including Acevedo’s declaration, which details visual inspections of the apartment and confirms the absence of any defect, as well as official reports from the Housing and Community Investment Department that similarly revealed no hazards prior to the incident.

Plaintiff attempts to create a triable issue of fact by attacking the credibility of Defendant’s evidence rather than presenting contrary admissible evidence. However, to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiff must introduce affirmative evidence such as declarations, depositions, or discovery responses showing a factual dispute. Simply challenging the sufficiency of Defendant’s evidence is inadequate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant improperly installed the kitchen cabinets before Plaintiff’s move-in. However, this assertion is not supported by admissible evidence. Plaintiff relies on her own discovery responses, which are inadmissible hearsay against Defendant. Answers to interrogatories are only admissible against the party giving the answer. (CCP § 2030.410.) While they may be used as admissions against the responding party (Evid. Code, § 1220) or to impeach that party’s testimony at trial (Evid. Code, § 1235), they are inadmissible hearsay as to other parties.

Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact and summary judgment is thereby granted.

CCP section 437c(h) provides that “[i]f it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(h).)

Under CCP section 437c(h), the Court may continue or deny a motion for summary judgment when a party submits facts in a declaration to demonstrate that essential evidence may exist but cannot then be presented to oppose the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(h).) A summary judgment is a drastic measure which deprives the losing party of trial on the merits. (Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) To mitigate this harshness, the drafters of CCP section 437c included a provision making continuances virtually mandated. (Id.) Where the opposing party submits an adequate affidavit showing that essential facts may exist but cannot be presented in a timely manner, the Court must either deny summary judgment or grant a continuance. (Dee v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-35.)

Under CCP section 437c(h), the Court may continue or deny a motion for summary judgment if the opposing party submits a declaration demonstrating that essential evidence may exist but cannot yet be presented. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(h).) However, Plaintiff failed to submit such a declaration.

Furthermore, this case was filed on April 8, 2022, nearly three years ago. Plaintiff has had ample time to conduct discovery, and there is no justification for delaying the resolution of this motion. The Court sees no reason why Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable regarding inspections could not have been deposed earlier.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff were granted a continuance to obtain Defendant’s PMK, it would not change the undisputed fact that inspections were performed just two months before the incident, and no defects were identified. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a continuance is denied.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court