Judge Lee S. Arian, Case Number: 22STCV15937, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling

This case arises from a fatal incident that occurred on May 22, 2020, in the parking lot of a Superior Market store. Plaintiff alleges that her father, decedent Jose Humberto De La Rosa Moreno, was struck and killed by Defendants’ vehicle while in the parking lot. Defendants Trukman Enterprises, Inc., Ultimate Express Moving, Jose Cabrera, and Joshua Quijano’s semi-truck was present in the parking lot around the time of the incident. However, Defendants deny any involvement and assert that their truck (the “Truck”) did not strike the decedent. Defendants now move for summary judgment.

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.) The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

· On May 22, 2020, a passersby noticed the decedent, Jose Moreno, lying outside of an alley of the parking lot of the “Superior Market” store, located at 9801 Laurel Canyon Blvd., Pacoima, California (the “Parking Lot”). The passersby called 911. The first responders pronounced Jose Moreno deceased at the scene.

· Between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m. on May 22, 2020, Defendant Cabrera arrived in the Truck at the Parking Lot, with the intention of parking the Truck there overnight.

· Defendant Cabrera decided to leave the Parking Lot and park the Truck elsewhere because of noises he heard outside.

· Before moving the Truck, Cabrera exited the Truck and went around it to inspect it and make sure no one was near the Truck. He did not see anything unusual or anyone near the Truck. After the inspection, he left the Parking Lot in the Truck to find another parking space.

(Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Separate Statement Nos. 1, 7-9)
Evidentiary Rulings

· Defendant’s objections to the deposition testimony of Officer Smith are overruled.

· Defendant’s objections to the deposition testimony of Detective Sadeh are overruled.

· The Court overrules the wholesale objection to consideration of the Traffic Collision Report.

Defendants meet their initial burden of establishing that the Truck did not hit decedent, and thus they cannot be held liable for negligence related to Decedent’s death through Cabrera’s declaration. In that declaration, Cabrera states that although he was present at the Parking Lot during or near the relevant time period, he did not collide with Decedent. Specifically, Cabrera states that he arrived at the Parking Lot between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m. on May 22, 2020, intending to park his truck overnight. He observed people drinking in the lot, briefly left the Truck to buy coffee, and returned. After hearing the sound of breaking glass, he decided to leave for safety reasons. He walked around the Truck to inspect it, saw nothing unusual or anyone nearby, and exited the lot through an alley, making a left turn onto Osborne Street. Cabrera denies colliding with anyone, including Decedent. He states that he returned to the lot around midnight, after police had closed the alley due to an incident. An officer permitted him to park in another area of the lot, where the Truck remained until the morning of May 23. During a pre-trip inspection the next morning, he again saw no signs of a collision or any bodily fluids on the truck or its tires. He then drove the Truck out of the lot. (Cabrera Decl., ¶¶ 5–10.) Based on this evidence, Defendants have met their initial burden of showing that the Truck did not strike the decedent.[1]

Plaintiff introduced multiple forms of evidence to raise a triable issue of fact. First, physical evidence found at the scene included tire marks with a dual rear wheel imprint, consistent with the Truck and not your average sedan or pick-up truck. Officer Smith testified the drag marks are continuous from where we “believe the impact occurred to where the decedent came to rest” and that such marks could only have been made by a vehicle with dual rear tires, stating, “This one left a dual imprint. So we believe that it was a dually truck that did it because you can't get those tire marks without it being a dually truck- so two tires 3 side-by-side on both sides of the truck.” (Smith Depo. 23:21-24.)

The drag marks are continuous from where the impact is believed to have occurred to where the Decedent came to rest. (Smith Depo., 16:16–19.) The tire marks were consistent with the Decedent being dragged approximately 70 feet. (Sadeh Depo., 50:1–14.) From the physical evidence alone, Officer Sadeh was able to determine that the drag marks, including bodily fluids, aligned with the tire marks. (Sadeh Depo., 71:15–72:12.)

The tire pattern at the scene also indicate the vehicle with dual tires was making a left turn from the parking lot into eastbound Osborne Street, which is consistent with Cabrera’s own account of events relating to his driving of the Truck. (Detective Case Progress Log, pg. 2, Cabrera Decl. ¶ 7.)

By following the vehicle’s direction of travel, police were led to investigate video footage from a nearby ARCO gas station (Sadeh Depo 18:24-25.), which further corroborates the theory that it was Defendants’ vehicle that struck decedent. Detective Sadeh identified the truck in the video as belonging to Ultimate Express Moving based on a distinct blue logo on the side of the truck that matched a still photograph. This identification was later confirmed by both the driver and the owner. (Sadeh Depo., pgs. 11–12.)

Detective Sadeh further testified “once the truck left, you can see the body — the decedent's body, you know, appearing on the street exactly where it was found. Before the truck left, there was nothing there. Right after that truck left and made that turn, then you see the body appear.” (Sadeh Depo., Page 24, lines 4–8.) “As soon as the truck left, that’s when you could, from a distance, see the decedent laying on the ground. So my belief is that was the only car that ran Mr. De La Rosa over.” (Sadeh Depo., Page 23, lines 14–21.) No other large vehicle was seen exiting the driveway during the relevant time period. (Sadeh Depo., 54:21–24.)

The combination of physical evidence, surveillance footage, and investigative testimony creates a triable issue of fact that the Truck was involved in the incident. The physical evidence includes dual rear tire impressions consistent with a dually truck making a left turn and dragging the body from the parking lot onto Osborne Street. Surveillance footage further supports this inference, showing that the only vehicle with such dual rear tires present during the relevant time period was the Truck.

In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot pinpoint whether the tire tracks were left on the date of the incident or at an earlier time, or whether they came from Defendants’ vehicle or another vehicle. Defendants similarly argue that Sadeh could not definitively confirm his observation from the video, specifically his statement, “Right after the truck left, that's when you could see from the video that appeared an individual near the driveway”. Sadeh explained that if you really zoom in, "you'll see something there after that truck leaves. But you have to—you have to really zoom in to be able to see it." Defendants point to the possibility that Sadeh may have been reviewing a police-enhanced version of the video that was not included in Plaintiff’s evidence. Regardless of this issue, the ARCO surveillance video shows no other dual-wheel trucks turning left onto Osborne Street during the relevant time period.

Plaintiffs are correct that these pieces of evidence do not conclusively establish that the Truck struck Decedent. But, they are sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact for a trier of fact to decide.

As to Defendant Quijano, Plaintiff alleges that Quijano, along with TRUKMAN and ULTIMATE, owned the tractor/trailer operated by Cabrera. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants, including DOES 1 through 100, negligently and carelessly entrusted, owned, managed, maintained, repaired, drove, insured, and/or operated the Freightliner in a manner that proximately caused the tractor/trailer to collide with Decedent Moreno. (Complaint at ¶ 17.) There is thus an allegation of negligent entrustment asserted against Quijano as an owner of the vehicle. Therefore, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s sole allegation against Quijano is that he instructed Cabrera to leave the parking lot on the day of the incident does not present the full scope of the alleged negligence. Defendant has not introduced any evidence, nor shown that Plaintiff’s discovery responses are factually devoid, as to the negligent entrustment. Defendant must show conclusively that all of the plaintiff’s causes of action or legal theories fail as a matter of law. (See Jimenez v. Protective Life Ins. Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 528, 534, Johnson v. Chui (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 775, 778 [“a defendant is entitled to summary judgment only when all theories of liability have been negated”]) Thus, Defendant Quijano failed to meet his initial burden to negate Plaintiff’s negligent entrustment theory against Defendant Quijano.

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Hon. Lee S. Arian

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] For reasons that are unclear to the Court, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment only in passing relies on Cabrera’s declaration to uphold their initial burden and instead appears to focus on purported devoid discovery responses as a basis for upholding its burden. However, the responses are not, as Defendants appear to contend, devoid simply because of the absence of third-party eyewitnesses. A factually devoid response is one where the responding party affirmatively admits to having no evidence —not merely a lack of direct observation. Here, Plaintiff identifies surveillance video and circumstantial evidence that implicate Defendants’ truck.