Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV20118, Date: 2025-01-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV20118    Hearing Date: January 9, 2025    Dept: 27

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

Background

On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present action, alleging that he slipped and fell on ice in front of a concession stand at SoFi Stadium while attending a Los Angeles Rams football game. Based on this incident, Plaintiff asserts claims for negligence and premises liability against Defendant. Plaintiff further alleges: “The defendants who were the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the agency were StadCo LA, LLC; StadCo LA Manager, LLC; Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC; Hollywood Park Management Company II, LLC; ABM Industries" (collectively, “Stadium Defendants”). Stadium Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff signed a waiver releasing them from liability for negligence in connection with the incident. Plaintiff filed an opposition. Trial is currently set for February 24, 2025.

Legal Standard 

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.”¿(Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facia showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”¿(Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)¿A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)¿If the moving party fails to carry its burden, the inquiry is over, and the motion must be denied. (See Id.; see also Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)¿Even if the moving party does carry its burden, the non-moving party will still defeat the motion by presenting evidence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849-50.)

To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)¿It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.¿(Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)¿The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”¿(Ibid.)¿The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.¿(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”¿(Ibid.)¿“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.”¿(Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

The court must “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party,” including “all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”¿(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 844-45.) “On a summary judgment motion, the court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a factfinder could reasonably draw from the evidence.¿While viewing the evidence in this manner, the court must bear in mind that its primary function is to identify issues rather than to determine issues.¿[Citation.]¿Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court decide the issues as a matter of law.¿ If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.”¿(Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.)¿Further, “the trial court may not weigh the evidence in the manner of a factfinder to determine whose version is more likely true.¿[Citation.]¿Nor may the trial court grant summary judgment based on the court’s evaluation of credibility. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 840; see also Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864 [“Courts deciding motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party”].)

Release

On or about October 1, 2018, Plaintiff signed a Los Angeles Rams Fanfaire Membership Agreement (“Agreement). (Declaration of Mike Forrester, ¶¶ 4-7; Agreement, Ex. C; DocuSign certificate, Ex. D.) The agreement releases the stadium operators and affiliated parties from liability for personal injuries or property damage suffered by Licensee or Licensee’s guests.  (Exhibit C to the Agreement, page 12, section 9, Ex. C)

Specifically, Section 9 of the Agreement provides:

9) ASSUMPTION OF RISK; INDEMNIFICATION. a) Neither the Stadium Parties nor their respective officers, owners, directors, employees, and agents (collectively, the “Indemnitees”) will be liable to Licensee or responsible for, and Licensee, for itself and each of Licensee’s Guests, hereby assumes, all risk for any loss, damage, or injury to any person or to any property of Licensee or Licensee’s Guests in or around the Stadium (including the parking lots) arising out of, during, or related to their attendance at any Event/Game at the Stadium resulting from any cause whatsoever, including, but not limited to, theft and vandalism, incidents involving other patrons, the consumption of alcoholic beverages or other substances by other patrons, injury from thrown or dropped objects, and spills of food or beverages, regardless of whether the personal injury or property damage was caused by or results from, in whole or in part, the negligence or other fault of any Indemnitee, whether sole, joint, active or passive, excepting only those damages, costs or expenses attributable (and only to the extent attributable) to the gross negligence or willful misconduct of an Indemnitee, and then only such Indemnitee shall be liable with respect to such conduct. Licensee hereby agrees to assume all responsibility and liability for the consumption of alcoholic beverages or other substances by Licensee and Licensee’s Guests at the Stadium, and for the conduct and behavior of Licensee and Licensee’s Guests.

 B) LICENSEE HEREBY RELEASES AND AGREES TO DEFEND, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS THE INDEMNITEES FROM AND AGAINST ANY LIABILITY, LOSSES, CLAIMS, DEMANDS, COSTS, AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND LITIGATION OR ARBITRATION EXPENSES, ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO (I) ANY VIOLATION OF THIS LICENSE AGREEMENT OR OF ANY APPLICABLE RULES BY LICENSEE OR ANY OF LICENSEE’S GUESTS, (II) THE USE OF ALCOHOL OR OTHER SUBSTANCES IN OR AROUND THE STADIUM (INCLUDING THE PARKING LOTS) BY LICENSEE OR ANY OF LICENSEE’S GUESTS, (III) THE CONDUCT OR BEHAVIOR OF LICENSEE AND LICENSEE’S GUESTS, AND/OR THE USE OF THE SEATS OR THE STADIUM (INCLUDING THE PARKING LOTS) BY LICENSEE OR LICENSEE’S GUESTS, AND (IV) ANY PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE OCCURRING IN OR AROUND THE STADIUM (INCLUDING THE PARKING LOTS) IN CONNECTION WITH LICENSEE’S OR LICENSEE’S GUESTS’ USE OF THE STADIUM (INCLUDING THE PARKING LOTS) OR OCCUPANCY OF THE SEAT(S), INCLUDING AS A RESULT OF NEGLIGENT, RECKLESS, WILLFUL, OR WANTON ACTIONS OF THIRDPARTIES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY OR RESULTS FROM, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, THE NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER FAULT OF ANY INDEMNITEE, WHETHER SOLE, JOINT, ACTIVE, OR PASSIVE, EXCEPTING FROM THIS INDEMNITY ONLY THOSE DAMAGES, COSTS, OR EXPENSES ATTRIBUTABLE (AND ONLY TO THE EXTENT ATTRIBUTABLE) TO THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL MISCONDUCT OF AN INDEMNITEE, AND THEN ONLY SUCH INDEMNITEE SHALL BE LIABLE WITH RESPECT TO SUCH CONDUCT.

c) Licensee acknowledges that, although none of the Indemnitees (other than Fanfaire, the Stadium Company and the Team Party) is a party to this License Agreement, each such Indemnitee is an express third-party beneficiary of this Section 9 of Exhibit C of this License Agreement and will directly or indirectly receive the benefit of, and may enforce as if a party to this License Agreement, the provisions of this Section 9 of Exhibit C.

The “Stadium Parties” who shall be held harmless according to the waiver are defined under the Agreement as “the Stadium Company, the Team Party, Fanfaire, Event Organizers and their respective representatives, agents, tenants, subtenants, employees, corporate affiliates and contractors.”

The Agreement identifies the “Stadium Company” as Stadco LA, LLC. Defendants provided evidence showing that the rest of the Stadium Defendants are corporate affiliate or agents of the Stadium Company.

·        Defendant Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC is the asset manager of SoFi Stadium, which is owned by Stadco LA, LLC, and is a corporate affiliate of Stadco LA, LLC because it has certain common ownership interests and common control with Stadco LA, LLC. (Declaration of Marlene Nations, ¶ 3.)

·        Defendant Hollywood Park Management Company II, LLC is an inactive limited liability company and a wholly owned subsidiary of Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC. It is a corporate affiliate of Stadco LA, LLC because it has certain common ownership interests and common control with Stadco LA, LLC. (Declaration of Marlene Nations, ¶ 4.)

·        Defendant Stadco LA Manager, LLC is the manager of Stadco LA, LLC and a corporate affiliate of Stadco LA, LLC due to common ownership interests and control. (Declaration of Marlene Nations, ¶ 5.)

·        Defendant Hollywood Park Management Company, LLC engaged ABM Industry Groups, LLC to provide services at the Stadium for the benefit of Stadco LA, LLC. (Declaration of Marlene Nations, ¶ 6.)

The court finds that Defendants have provided evidence of a valid release agreement and evidence demonstrating that the release agreement applies to all of the Stadium Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants have met their initial burden.

        Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to meet its initial burden because Defendant did not present a complete defense to Plaintiff’s cause of action. Plaintiff has expressly alleged that Defendants’ liability arises from violations of law. (See infra Part I.A, citing Complaint at Cause of Action No. 2, ¶ 4.) In light of Plaintiff’s anticipation of Defendants’ reliance on the Release, Defendants were required to demonstrate that their conduct did not constitute violations of law in order to rely on the Release as a “complete defense” in their Motion. (Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1739–1740.)

In Westlye, the court held that when a defendant seeks summary adjudication based on an affirmative defense, such as a release, it must address any exceptions or counter-theories that the plaintiff has raised which would undermine the defense. Specifically, had Plaintiff here explicitly alleged facts indicating that Defendant’s conduct violated safety regulations or laws designed to prevent harm of the type suffered, Defendant would have been required to refute the existence of any such violations to prevail on its Motion.

The principle is further supported by Conn v. National Can Corp. (1981) 124 Cal. App. 3d 630, where the employees anticipated the employer’s defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies. The employees alleged both facts and a legal theory—that the union had breached its duty of fair representation—thereby excusing compliance with the grievance process. The court in Conn held “If ... the plaintiff pleads several theories or anticipates affirmative defenses by a showing of excusing events or conditions, the challenge to the opponent is made by the complaint, requiring the moving defendant to affirmatively react to each theory and excusing or justifying event, or condition which supports a theory, if the motion is to be successful.” (Id. at p. 639, original italics.)

Here, however, Plaintiff has not pleaded specific facts to support a theory that Defendant violated CBC § 1003.4 or any other specific regulation. Plaintiff’s complaint merely alleges that, on January 30, 2022, Plaintiff was lawfully on Defendants’ premises located at 1001 South Stadium Drive, Inglewood, CA, when he slipped on a wet substance in the concourse area of the stadium. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached their duty by failing to address, alleviate, or remedy a dangerous condition and by failing to warn business invitees of the hazard.

Unlike in Conn, where the employees provided detailed factual allegations supporting their theory of unfair representation, Plaintiff’s allegations here are broad and lack the requisite specificity regarding any alleged violation of safety regulations. Notably, while Plaintiff’s opposition references CBC § 1003.4, which pertains to slip-resistant surfaces, the complaint does not allege that Defendant’s surfaces were not slip-resistant or that a lack of slip resistance caused Plaintiff’s fall. Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint is premised on a general negligence theory, asserting that Defendant failed to remedy a wet surface. Absent specific allegations that Defendant’s surfaces violated CBC § 1003.4 or another identifiable regulatory standard, Defendants were not on notice of any specific regulatory violations they needed to negate in their motion.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s vague references to "violations of ADA, California Health and Safety Codes, building codes, and/or ordinances" fail to provide Defendant with adequate notice of the specific violations that Defendant must address in its MSJ. These broad references encompass numerous potential regulations without identifying any particular provision or factual basis for the alleged violations. This contrasts sharply with Conn, where plaintiffs specifically identified, in their complaint, that the defendant breached the duty of fair representation and provided a clear basis for the alleged misconduct.  (Further, California requires specific material facts to be pled.  It is not a notice pleading state. (See, e.g., Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 109 (detailing difference in California and federal pleading standards).)

Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to persuade the court and Defendant has met its initial burden.

Triable Issue of Fact

Plaintiff’s opposition does not dispute the applicability or validity of the waiver. Defendant’s separate statement regarding the waiver and its applicability to the various defendants remains undisputed. Additionally, Plaintiff does not contend that Defendant acted with gross negligence.

Plaintiff’s sole argument against the enforceability of the release rests on Civil Code section 1668, which renders unenforceable “contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated California Building Code (CBC) section 1003.4 and ASTM F1637-19, thereby invoking the “violation of law” exception under Civil Code section 1668.

ASTM F1637-19

American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) F1637-19, titled “Standard Practice for Safe Walking Surfaces,” is not a statute, law, or local ordinance. Plaintiff has not provided any authority or evidence to demonstrate that ASTM F1637-19 constitutes a legal mandate under California law. Consequently, the “violation of law” exception under Civil Code section 1668 does not apply to ASTM F1637-19.

CBC Section 1003.4

CBC section 1003.4 states: “Circulation paths of the means of egress shall have a slip-resistant surface and be securely attached.” Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the location of the incident constitutes a “Circulation path” or “means of egress” as defined by the CBC. The subject incident occurred in front of a concession stand where there was ice on the floor. (Plaintiff’s Deposition 49:1:9.) Plaintiff has not provided evidence that the area in front of the concession qualifies as part of a “Circulation path” or “means of egress.”

Section 202 of the CBC defines a “Circulation path” as “an exterior or interior way of passage from one place to another for pedestrians,” and a “means of egress” as “a continuous and unobstructed path of vertical and horizontal egress travel from any occupied portion of a building or structure to a public way.” A means of egress consists of three components: exit access, the exit, and the exit discharge. Plaintiff has not established how the area in front of the concession stand falls within these definitions. In fact, the concession stand area is not part of a designated “exit access” or “exit discharge” but rather a common area intended for patron use.

Furthermore CBC 1003.4 governs the design and construction of means of egress, not ongoing maintenance issues.  CBC section 1001.1 states that “Buildings or portions thereof shall be provided with a means of egress system as required by this chapter. The provisions of this chapter shall control the design, construction, and arrangement of means of egress components required to provide an approved means of egress from structures and portions thereof.”  CBC section 1003.4, pursuant to CBC section 1001.1, therefore governs the design and construction of means of egress, not ongoing maintenance issues. Plaintiff has failed to show that CBC section 1003.4 imposes a duty on Defendant to maintain the area in a specific condition beyond its initial construction requirements.

Since Plaintiff’s argument and expert declaration focus solely on the lack of slip resistance on the surface due to water, a slippery substance, and specifically ice in front of the concession stand, it does not establish a violation of CBC section 1003.4, which pertains to the construction or design of the means of egress. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the “violation of law” exception under Civil Code section 1668 applies in this case.

Accordingly, Defendants’ MSJ is GRANTED

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SSCDEPT27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court’s website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar. 

__________________________ 

Hon. Lee S. Arian  

Judge of the Superior Court