Judge: Lee S. Arian, Case: 22STCV23184, Date: 2024-01-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV23184 Hearing Date: January 11, 2024 Dept: 27
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL
DISTRICT
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Plaintiff, vs. MARCELO
OSVALDO SPINELLI MORENO, et al., Defendants. |
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[TENTATIVE]
ORDER RE: MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENSE EXPERT DR. KYLE BOONE AND FOR ISSUE AND
EVIDENCE SANCTIONS Dept.
27 1:30
p.m. January
11, 2024 |
MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Sandra Garcia (“Plaintiff”)
RESPONDING PARTY: Defendants Marcelo Osvaldo Spinelli Moreno
and Temperature Equipment Corporation (“Defendants”)
I.
INTRODUCTION
This
action arises from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on September 27,
2021. On July 18, 2022, Plaintiff Sandra Garcia (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint
against Defendants Marcelo Osvaldo Spinelli Moreno, Temperature Equipment
Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”), and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of
action for: (1) Negligence/Negligence Per Se, (2) Negligent Entrustment,
and (3) Negligent Hiring.
On
September 20, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint.
On
December 1, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to strike Defendants’
retained neuropsychological expert, Dr. Kyle Boone (the “Motion”). Pursuant to
the Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court impose issue and evidentiary
sanctions against Defendants. The Motion is made on the grounds that Defendants
fraudulently misrepresented the nature and type of examination conducted in
order to obtain a mental examination which requires a court order.
On December
19, 2023, Defendants filed and served an opposition to the Motion. No reply
brief was filed. Any reply brief was required to have been filed and served at
least five court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd.
(b).)
On January 3,
2024, the parties submitted to the tentative ruling of the Court, and Court
granted Plaintiff’s motion for an order compelling production of Dr. Boone’s
neuropsychological raw data.
It is
undisputed that a neuropsychological examination of Plaintiff has occurred without
leave of this Court. Thus, the sole issues to be addressed in this ruling are:
(1) whether Dr. Boone should be stricken as an expert; and (2) whether issue
and evidence sanctions should be imposed against Defendants.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant
who seeks to conduct a mental examination of plaintiff must file a motion and
“obtain leave of court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2032.310, subd. (a).) The court
may grant such a motion “only for good cause shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2032.320, subd. (b).) A showing of good cause generally requires that “the
party produce specific facts justifying discovery and that the inquiry be
relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987)
43 Cal.3d 833, 840.) A mental examination is generally appropriate only when a
plaintiff alleges continuing emotional distress or mental injury and so places
his or her mental or emotional condition “in controversy” in the action. (Ibid.)
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
contends that Dr. Boone should be stricken as an expert because Defendants were
not entitled to a mental examination absent a stipulation or court order. Defendants
assert that an incorrect demand for examination was prepared and served on
Plaintiff due to the mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect of their counsel.
Declaration
of Plaintiff’s Counsel
In support of
the Motion, Plaintiff’s counsel, Arielle B. Farias, Esq. (“Farias”), declares
that prior to commencing the “fraudulently” obtained mental examination,
Defendants’ counsel, David Hillier, stated to her that he wished to conduct a
“neuro” examination of Plaintiff following her deposition. (Farias Decl., ¶ 3.)
Counsel thought that Defendants wished to conduct a neurological examination. (Id.)
On October 5, 2023, Defendants served a Demand for Physical Examination, and no
neuropsychological testing was stated therein. (Id., ¶ 4; Exhibit A.) After
Plaintiff served an objection and response, and Defendants served a reply which
mentioned a physical examination, Defendants’ counsel confirmed in an e-mail
that the examination to be conducted was a neurological examination. (Id.,
¶¶ 5-7; Exhibits C and D.)
Declaration
of Defendants’ Counsel
In opposition
to the Motion, David M. Hillier, Esq. (“Hillier”) states that
the parties agreed that Defendants
would not need to file a motion with the court regarding Plaintiff’s
neuropsychological issues. (Hillier Decl., ¶ 9.) Counsel indicates that, due to
his mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, an incorrect form was used to
prepare a Demand for Examination by Kyle Boone, Ph.D., and it listed Dr.
Boone’s specialty as neurology rather than neuropsychology but indicated that
Plaintiff would be cognitively evaluated. (Id., ¶ 10; Exhibit E.) Dr.
Boone prepared a report of the examination which was provided to Plaintiff as
an attachment to Defendants’ 2034 Response. (Id., ¶ 11; Exhibit F.) Counsel
attests that Defendants will be irreparably harmed and suffer a great injustice
if they are barred from presenting their expert witness, Dr. Boone, and her
work product due to the mistake and inadvertence of counsel. (Id., ¶
12.)
The Demand
The Court has reviewed the Demand for
Physical Examination at issue, which is attached as Exhibit A to the
declaration of Farias in support of the Motion. Such demand does not state that
the examination is a neuropsychological examination, and at multiple points
therein indicates that such examination is a physical examination. (Farias
Decl.; Exhibit A.) While there exists a conflict as to what respective counsel
thought was the scope and purpose of the examination, it is undisputed that
Defendants obtained a neuropsychological examination without obtaining leave of
court.
Based on a
review of the purported Demand for Physical Examination, it appears that
Defendants were only seeking a neurological examination of Plaintiff and not
the neuropsychological examination that ultimately occurred. The demand does
mention that such examination would include an evaluation of Plaintiff’s
cognitive health; however, it did not indicate that the examination would be a
neuropsychological examination. Thus, Defendants obtained a neuropsychological
examination without: (1) allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to challenge such
the scope and nature of such examination; and (2) obtaining leave of this
Court.
Remedies
The Court generally
agrees that there must be some consequence to the clear violation of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has
requested that Dr. Boone be stricken as an expert, which the Court deems to be
a form of an evidence sanction. Plaintiff
also seeks additional evidence sanctions, as well as issue sanctions.
Issue and
Evidence Sanctions
Plaintiff
contends that issue and evidentiary sanctions are warranted against Defendants.
Plaintiff seeks an issue sanction with a finding that she sustained a brain
injury as a result of the underlying incident that gives rise to this lawsuit.
As to evidence sanctions, Plaintiff seeks an evidence sanction precluding
Defendants from presenting any evidence contradicting Plaintiff’s brain injury
resulting from the underlying incident that gives rise to this lawsuit, as well
as, as noted above, the evidence sanction of precluding Dr. Boone from
testifying.
“Discovery
sanctions should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that
which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied
discovery.” (Ibid.) A trial court has
broad discretion to impose discovery sanctions, but two facts are generally a
prerequisite to the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.)
To impose issue
or evidence sanctions, there must be a failure to comply with a court order and
the failure must be willful. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp., supra,
124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) “Even where nonmonetary sanctions are called for,
they should be appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which
is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied
discovery.” (Ibid.) “The sanctions the court may impose are such that
are suitable and necessary to enable the party seeking discovery to obtain the
objects of the discovery he seeks, but the court may not impose sanctions which
are designed not to accomplish the objects of discovery but to impose
punishment.” (Ibid.)
The
Court is inclined to impose evidence sanctions by excluding Dr. Boone as an
expert. Before doing so, however, the
Court would like to hear further argument regarding whether the conduct was willful,
as well as hear about potential alternate sanctions. The Court finds that the other sanctions
requested are excessive and declines to impose those sanctions.
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Hon.
Lee S. Arian Judge of the Superior Court |